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Summary 
Political theorists agree that some form of unity is necessary for culturally diverse 
citizens to act collectively and take collectively binding decisions. But they seldom 
specify what they mean by such unity; agreement on political values, an emotional 
bond between citizens, shared fundamental ends? Moreover, these political theorists 
often aim to be of practical use and intend to shape the ideas and guide the actions of 
political elites. But they neglect to examine how these elites already conceive unity and 
it is not clear whether they can, as these are the ideas they seek to shape or alter. This 
thesis responds to these two gaps, making three contributions: it clarifies why studying 
existing ideas helps political theorists to be ‘practical’; it clarifies how unity is 
conceived by political theorists and by political elites; and it argues that one conception 
of unity is not only most defensible but also plausible within two contexts. I develop 
my argument as follows.  
In chapter 1 I show that political theorists remain unclear about what they mean by 
unity, while often aiming to be ‘practical’; and in chapter 2 I explain why such 
practicality entails studying the ideas of the elites theorists intend to influence and I 
outline how to study these. In chapter 3 I present and analyse four hitherto implicit 
conceptions of unity advanced by political theorists; and in chapters 4 and 5 I show 
how British and Dutch political elites, respectively, conceive unity in different ways. In 
chapter 6 I show the implications of how political elites think about unity for political 
theorists, so I can argue for one of their conceptions of unity in chapter 7. I thus show 
that paradoxically, in a time when multiculturalism is often considered divisive, a 
‘multicultural’ conception of unity proves both most defensible and plausible.  
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1 Introduction 
Scholars agree that unity among culturally diverse citizens is necessary (Habermas 
1995; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000b; Rawls 1993; Taylor 2007). But they do not specify 
exactly what unity is, often using metaphors such as ‘the ties that bind’ (Kymlicka 
1995, p. 187) to describe it instead. So it is not clear if they think we should understand 
unity as agreement on fundamental ends, or procedures; a common concern for each 
other; a sense of civic friendship; ties of culture and tradition; a commitment to a way 
of life, or something else still. And as these scholars are unclear about what unity is, 
they cannot say much about how we can know when it is sufficient, or if it is growing 
or eroding and how it may be fostered. If culturally diverse citizens must be united 
enough to make sacrifices for one another, like paying taxes to provide public services 
that they may never use, to trust one another not to be free-riders, to not feel 
threatened by their diversity (Parekh 2000b, pp. 196-238), and so on, then how can we 
know when they are if we do not know what unity is? Little wonder, therefore, that 
Kymlicka (2002, p. 257) claims that understanding what ‘is needed to sustain social 
unity’ is ‘one of the great unresolved questions of contemporary political philosophy’. 
This challenge is taken up in this thesis that looks at how unity is conceived both by 
political theorists and by political elites involved in shaping political responses to 
fostering it.   
Leading liberal political theorists such as Rawls (1993) and Habermas (1995) recognise 
the importance of unity for stability and legitimacy. Hence, Rawls (1993, p. 137) argues 
that the exercise of power is legitimate only if it is based on principles and ideals 
captured in a ‘political conception of justice that all citizens might be reasonably 
expected to endorse’, which suggests these citizens are united by shared political 
beliefs. But he (Rawls 1993, p. xlix) focuses his attention on explaining the appropriate 
basis for social unity rather than defining what the latter is and admits that ‘this 
concern is not pursued as far as it might be’. In other words, he does not specify exactly 
what he means by unity: what is the whole that is united; who belongs to that whole; 
and how do they belong to it? As this remains unclear, he also cannot clearly explain 
how such unity might be impeded and fostered.  
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Liberal nationalists such as Miller (1995) also affirm the importance of unity and 
associate it with the nation. He (Miller 1995, p. 30) notes how modern ideas of the 
nation comprise ‘the idea of a body of people capable of acting collectively and in 
particular of conferring authority on political institutions’ that is central to democratic 
legitimacy. National unity, then, enables citizens to participate on the basis of equality 
in collective political self-determination, deciding on how to govern the territory they 
inhabit together: it captures the democratic ideal of ‘government of the people, by the 
people, for the people’ (Lincoln 1863). It is also considered necessary for the pursuit of 
social justice: ‘If […] Leninist levels of coercion are ruled out and justice is to be 
achieved by relatively consensual means, social justice will be politically feasible only 
in a polity with a high degree of communal solidarity’ (Canovan 1996, p. 28). Citizens 
need to feel connected to each other enough to sacrifice resources for redistribution, 
and trust their state enough to handle such distribution. As Miller (1995, p. 93) puts it, 
welfare states need to be ‘rooted in communities whose members recognise such 
obligations of justice to one another’. But while he dedicates much attention to 
specifying what nations and national identities are, he does not clearly state what unity 
is and how it relates to them.  
Leading multiculturalist political theorists such as Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2000b) and 
Modood (2007) also recognise the importance of unity and accept that it is necessary to 
avoid fragmentation and to enable peaceful political cooperation, especially in societies 
where diversity might at times give rise to disagreement as well as misunderstanding, 
fear, prejudice and hostility between groups. Such societies, therefore, need some form 
of unity to assuage negative responses to diversity and manage potential 
disagreements. Thus, Parekh (2000b, p. 196) notes how paradoxically, ‘the greater and 
deeper the diversity in a society, the greater the unity and cohesion it requires to hold 
itself together and nurture its diversity’, and this is important because without ‘a 
strong sense of unity and common belonging among its citizens, […] it cannot act as a 
united community able to take and enforce collectively binding decisions and regulate 
and resolve conflicts’. Nonetheless, he does not explain what such unity consists in so 
it remains unclear how we can know when it is sufficient and how it may be fostered.  
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Political theorists hence agree that unity may be important for different reasons. But 
they neglect to clearly explain what it is. This thesis aims to do precisely that: it 
outlines the properties conceptions of unity have in order to then recognise and 
reconstruct how political theorists and political elites conceive unity in multicultural 
societies in different ways. In so doing, it also addresses a second gap. For while 
political theorists often think that their work is of practical use and may offer insights 
to those involved in shaping political action (e.g. Miller 2008, p. 44; Parekh 2008, p. 7), 
they have largely neglected to look at the ideas these actors already have. Yet it is not 
clear that they can, as their practical aims imply that these are the ideas they intend to 
shape. This thesis explicates this implication and studies parliamentary debates from 
the UK and the Netherlands so as to see how unity is conceived by political elites 
involved in shaping political responses to it. It will conclude by arguing that one 
conception of unity presents the most defensible approach and is also plausible within 
these two contexts.1  
The choice for these case studies is not accidental: debates about unity are particularly 
salient here because these are the two countries most strongly associated with what 
scholars have called a ‘crisis’ of (Phillips and Saharso 2008, p. 291), a ‘retreat from’ 
(Joppke 2004, p. 238) or a ‘backlash against’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010a, p. 7) 
multiculturalism in Europe that has been discerned since about 2001 – even though the 
reality and meaning of this alleged crisis remain contested (Duyvendak and Scholten 
2011; Koopmans 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Uberoi and Modood 2013b; Vertovec 
and Wessendorf 2010a). Part of this contestation probably stems from the fact that it is 
not always clear what is meant by multiculturalism and some of this confusion will be 
cleared up below, but for now note that both these countries were initially upheld as 
champions of multiculturalism but are now seen to have instigated a ‘retreat from 
official multiculturalism policies’ (Joppke 2004, p. 238; Vertovec and Wessendorf 
2010b) that publicly recognise diversity.  
                                                     
1 This is the multicultural conception of unity that will be presented in chapter 3; because this 
conception is not yet clearly specified, I do not elaborate here as that would unnecessarily 
confuse the discussion.  
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During this perceived crisis, critics of multiculturalism suggested that it inhibits unity: 
multiculturalism is said to breed division and segregation, particularly where it 
concerns Muslims (see: Joppke 2009; Kalra and Kapoor 2008; Kundnani 2007; Modood 
et al 2006; Worley 2005). Recognising cultural diversity allegedly exacerbates its 
divisive potential, so it is no wonder that these debates have focused on immigrants 
(and their children) rather than national minorities (such as the Scottish in the UK) that 
tend to be less culturally different from the majority. Multiculturalism is also said to 
erode national identity, cohesion and solidarity between citizens – all associated with 
unity (Barry 2001, pp. 12, 325; Putnam 2007; but see: Hooghe et al 2009; Kymlicka and 
Banting 2006; Letki 2008; Phillips 2006). According to Joppke (2007, p. 244), this retreat 
from multiculturalism coincides with a convergence on a set of civic integration 
policies in different countries in Europe. These policies emphasise national unity: they 
highlight the features (such as language and values) that all groups in society must 
share and subject immigrants to obligatory integration courses and tests in order to 
ensure this (see: Carrera 2006; Goodman 2010; Joppke 2004, 2007; Triadafilopoulos 
2011). Issues relating to unity and diversity thus play an important role in this alleged 
crisis and they have received sustained public attention in these two countries.  
This apparent tension between unity and diversity can be understood once we 
consider that traditionally, unity has been explained most convincingly as a corollary 
of nationhood (Canovan 1996, pp. 1-50). It is famously difficult to define what a nation 
is, and chapters 3 to 5 will show how it is conceived in different ways by political 
theorists and political elites, but for now a working understanding comes from one of 
nationalism’s leading scholars, Smith (2001, p. 13): a nation is ‘a named human 
community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a 
common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all 
members’. Meanwhile, a national identity reflects these features and characterises the 
nation and enables individual members to identify with it and each other (Parekh 2008, 
pp. 56-65).  
But representations of national identity in most European states tend to be rather 
homogeneous following the nation-building strategies of the 19th century (cf. Leerssen 
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1999) and that means they may become destabilised by new levels of diversity in 
society. Thus, Goodman (2010, p. 769) suggests ‘diversity in liberal nation-states and 
the content of national identity, despite modernising forces like globalisation and 
transnationalism, are not as complementary as we assumed, or as compatible as we 
had hoped’. Although there is no way of knowing it is multiculturalism that 
destabilises national identity and not other factors (Uberoi 2008, p. 404), it is true that 
cultural diversity has changed character in the second half of the 20th century. 
Immigration increased and technological developments meant that ties to countries of 
origins became much easier to sustain (Parekh 2008, p. 82). Diversity is now a fact 
because it is safeguarded as an expression of individual freedom in liberal democracies 
(Rawls 1989, pp. 234-235): it ‘can neither be wished out of existence nor suppressed 
without an unacceptable degree of coercion and often not even then’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 
196). Moreover, earlier ideas about assimilation were replaced by new ideas about 
human equality that inspired challenges to ‘the legacies of earlier racial and ethnic 
hierarchies’ (Kymlicka 2010, p. 100).  
The concept of multiculturalism is often associated with such changes, and it is 
commonly used to refer both to the fact of cultural diversity in society and to a political 
response to this fact that comprises a particular set of policies (e.g. Barry 2001, p. 22; 
Joppke 2004, p. 239; Parekh 2000b, pp. 2-6) that aim ‘to reduce fear of cultural 
difference, as well as the inequality, exclusion and disadvantage that are often 
experienced by cultural minorities in subtle yet significant ways’ (Uberoi and Modood 
2013a, p. 130). Uberoi and Modood (2013a, p. 130) include a third understanding of 
multiculturalism, as such policies work towards a particular ‘vision for the nation’ that 
is open to diversity. Such a vision includes a particular understanding of unity: 
multiculturalists (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b; Uberoi 2008; Uberoi and Modood 
2013a) think that by accommodating diversity, a state can make its policies and 
institutions more inclusive of minorities which enables the latter to identify with it and 
feel valued. These policies also encourage wider society to recognise that the nation is 
multicultural and cherishes that fact. Hence, contrary to what appears to be the 
accepted popular opinion during the perceived crisis of multiculturalism, 
multiculturalists do not aim to abolish unity altogether but pursue a specific form of it 
  
 
6 
 
(even if they fail to clearly delineate that form), and this understanding of unity forms 
part of their broader multicultural theories and orientations.  
The remainder of this introduction will begin to outline the different parts of this 
thesis. The next section will show how political theorists disagree about how unity 
should be conceived when they talk about related matters such as multiculturalism 
and national identity. These theorists often aim to be of practical use and section 1.2 
explains what such practical political theory entails: it clarifies potential tensions 
between unity and diversity and explains why certain responses are more defensible 
than others, and in so doing suggest what political actions would be appropriate in 
actual (rather than ideal) societies (Miller 2013, p. 34; Parekh 2008, p. 7). This thesis 
focuses on two actual societies and these case studies, the UK and the Netherlands, are 
introduced in section 1.3. Finally, section 1.4 will present the structure of the thesis and 
the argument it makes.  
1.1 Unity and diversity in multicultural societies 
While political theorists contributing to the contemporary debate about unity in 
multicultural societies often remain unclear about exactly what they mean by unity, 
they do gesture at why there might be a tension between unity and diversity: members 
of a polity with diverse beliefs need to achieve a sufficient degree of unity to cooperate 
and coexist peacefully. In so doing, they offer rather different perspectives and this 
section concisely introduces this disagreement to clarify why unity might pose a 
problem in multicultural societies.  
As suggested above, states have in the past used their machinery to promote national 
identities that aimed to unite citizens by making them the same in terms of features 
such as language, culture and values (Leerssen 1999). Such identities do not leave 
much space for minorities or indeed cultural or moral diversity because they suppose 
that unity requires cultural and moral sameness. This idea seems present in the 
communitarian conception of the nation defended by MacIntyre (2003, pp. 291-299), 
who sees it as a community characterised by emotional attachment, loyalty and 
identity that is based around a common morality. It can likewise be recognised in 
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Scruton’s (2003, pp. 278-284) defence of a conservative conception of the nation as a 
pre-political source of social unity based in piety, tradition and common descent. 
National identity is characterised by sameness, captured in a shared language, culture 
and history, sustained by historical continuity and intergenerational ties of obligation.  
A consequence of such understandings of national identity is that immigrants or new 
minorities who do not share these ties and the cultural values and sensibilities of the 
majority have no choice but to adapt if they want to become fully part of the nation 
(which may actually be impossible because they can never share its common descent 
[cf. Scruton 2003, p. 274]), and such assimilation is often painful and difficult (Parekh 
2000b, p. 198). The nation, as constitutive of its members, then takes precedence over 
individual desires and concerns (Beiner 1995, p. 18). Such demands for assimilation, 
however, have become somewhat discredited in the post-1945 era of human rights that 
saw increasing support for the rights of minorities, as equal citizens, to cultivate their 
own identities (Kymlicka 2010, pp. 97-103).   
This leads some political theorists to abandon the concept of national identity in favour 
of notions that apparently require a lower or easier to attain degree of sameness – like 
shared political values – that lack the connotations of commitments to ethical 
principles, emotive attachment and exclusionary community loyalties. Rawls (1987) 
thus argues that political communities, made up of different groups with their own 
identities, should not be based around shared conceptions of morality or the good life 
but rather on a shared commitment to the rights and liberties that constitute 
democratic citizenship, expressed in a political conception of justice. He believes that 
citizens of multicultural societies can agree on certain basic political values despite, 
and without jeopardising, their differences in terms of values and identities, by 
appealing to and affirming ideas that are present ‘in the public political culture of a 
democratic society’ (Rawls 1987, p. 6). 
Habermas (1995, p. 264) similarly argues for locating unity in rational agreement on 
political principles that transcend ethical-cultural differences and are laid down in the 
constitution: ‘the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a 
constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the 
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multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural 
society’. Diversity in society here is considered an expression of individual freedom 
that the state should not impinge on by imposing a national identity or morality.  
Such political conceptions of unity seem to pay more respect to diversity as they only 
require allegiance to a limited set of values that all could share across their cultural 
differences. They recall a civic nationalism that is defined as ‘liberal, voluntarist, 
universalist, and inclusive’, in contradistinction to its ethnic variety that is ‘illiberal, 
ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive’ (Brubaker 1999, p. 56). Markell (2000, p. 39) 
considers somewhat sceptically such a ‘strategy of redirection’ that 
‘claims to render affect safe for liberal democracies by redirecting our attachment 
and sentiment from one subset of objects (the ‘ethnic’) to another subset of objects 
(the ‘civic’). Since the ethnic conveniently turns out to be the source of all of 
affect’s pathologies, the civic can offer all the benefits of affect while ‘eschewing 
exclusion’ at the same time’. 
There are two problems with this strategy. First, these values supposedly unite citizens 
by being so abstract that they do not reflect the cultural predispositions of any of them. 
Such abstraction makes them void of any links to concrete situations, which means 
they are minimal statements of what is important that do not apply to particular cases 
in a straightforward way. Yet in this strategy, they need to inspire a sense of duty and 
motivate citizens to make necessary sacrifices, such as paying their taxes for 
redistributive programmes, and it is not clear how they can if they are this neutral and 
abstract. For values to thus motivate and unite citizens, they need to be grounded in a 
community with its particular understandings in order to be intelligibly applicable and 
gain motivational force (Calhoun 2002, pp. 151-158; Laborde 2002, pp. 591-597; Markell 
2000, pp. 41-53).  
At this point it becomes unclear whether what is doing the work is a rational 
commitment to these values or an emotional tie to the (usually national) community 
that harbours them, or alternatively, as Mason (2010, pp. 868-873) suggests, a shared 
allegiance or loyalty to the institutions that embody these values. Actually, Rawls’ 
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appeal to the public political culture is compatible with this need for particularity and 
can be read as expressive of a pre-existing shared political (O'Neill 1997, pp. 419-420) 
or national (Miller 1995, p. 93) identity. And Müller (2008, pp. 72-87) admits that 
constitutional patriotism requires grounding in a specific community: the point is not 
that the values that unite citizens are universal, as they are embodied in a particular 
constitution, but that they can be shared across differences and are held critically rather 
than unquestioningly.  
But if unity requires agreement on universal values as they appear grounded in particular 
communities, this strategy runs into a second problem. For that means these values can 
no longer be seen as separate from concrete democratic traditions and institutions, and 
hence that they may be no less historical and plural than wider cultures (and nor are 
they completely a-cultural). The civic, then, is not devoid of exclusionary potential, as 
in modern multicultural societies these values may not automatically meet full consent 
or endorsement from all groups in society (Brubaker 1999, pp. 61-63; Canovan 2000, 
pp. 420-421; Markell 2000, pp. 51-53; Uberoi 2007, p. 148). Perhaps political values 
cannot be seen as separate from the culture that produced them; and therefore do not 
offer the neutral source of allegiance they pretend to.  
Whether for intrinsic reasons of identity and community or for more instrumental 
reasons of stability, social justice and democracy, then, some theorists therefore argue 
that a shared identity has a role to play in generating unity in modern multicultural 
societies. The above suggests that such an identity needs to be ‘thick’ enough to inspire 
attachment and motivation, while avoiding the imposition of particular characteristics 
on diverse groups in society. Political theorists that seek to meet these aims argue that 
unity does not require uniformity: they propose thick versions of a shared identity that 
appeal to a shared culture, but are nonetheless hospitable to diversity and take care to 
avoid the exclusion of minorities. Perhaps they can offer a solution to the apparent 
conundrum that ‘nationalism and multiculturalism are doomed to remain strange 
bedfellows’ (Laborde 2002, p. 591).  
One of the most famous advocates of national identity, Miller (1995), defends it as a 
source of unity. Such a national identity reflects a mythical shared past as well as a 
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‘common public culture’ (Miller 1995, p. 25) best characterised as ‘a set of overlapping 
cultural characteristics – beliefs, practices, sensibilities – which different members 
exhibit in different combinations and to different degrees’ (Miller 1995, p. 85). 
Although its properties can be hard to pin down, this common culture is what makes 
the nation distinctive and sustains shared loyalties. According to Miller (1995, pp. 92, 
121-154), if national identity is to function as a source of unity, it is crucial that it is 
inclusive. In multicultural societies, that means it needs to reflect not only majorities 
but also minorities, and include them on equal terms. National identity is understood 
as the result of an on-going conversation in which all groups must participate equally 
to debate what kind of society we are, what kind of things we value, etc. Although 
national identity is based in history, its specific content can therefore change over time 
(Miller 1995, pp. 40, 127).  
And where national identity continues to reflect the ethnic identity of the historical 
majority, it needs to be adapted to make it more hospitable to minorities, to meet their 
need for belonging; ‘existing national identities must be stripped of elements that are 
repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more component groups’ (Miller 1995, p. 
142). It is through the re-imagination of national identities that minorities should be 
included, rather than through the recognition of their cultural or ethnic identities: these 
are no more authentic than national identities and should be private, like other sources 
of identity, as their recognition would risk fragmentation (Miller 1995, pp. 121-154). 
The state, in other words, is not neutral with respect to identities but only recognises 
the national one – suitably adapted to reflect minority identities. On this view then, 
unity reflects diversity.  
Multiculturalist responses to the relationship between unity and diversity have 
emphasised that minority cultural and national identities can both be public without 
conflicting. Leading multicultural theorist Parekh (2000b, p. 196) acknowledges the 
importance of national unity for democratic legitimacy and peace and harmony in 
society. Such unity flows from the experience of living together within shared 
parameters such as political institutions and a national identity, and the interaction and 
dialogue between different groups in society on an equal footing which will result in a 
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‘multiculturally constituted common culture’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 221) that is a mix of 
elements from all cultures. Diversity does not have to be transcended but rather 
engaged in a collective dialogue (Parekh 2000b, p. 341).  
National identity, for Parekh (2000b, pp. 231-237), is based in political institutions but 
also reflects this common culture and it needs to make sure to include all citizens as 
legitimate members of the nation and value minorities equal to the majority. In reality, 
however, institutions tend to be historically skewed towards the majority and to 
overcome this bias, minorities should receive appropriate accommodations so that they 
may feel at home, accepted and valued members of society; only through such public 
recognition will they share in the sense of belonging that national identity is meant to 
foster. Multicultural policies here are a precondition for the integrative function of 
national identity in diverse societies where mainstream institutions would otherwise 
reflect the majority only.  
Political theorists, then, clearly think unity is important and clarify why it might stand 
in tension with diversity and be problematic in multicultural societies. But even as they 
offer different responses to such issues, it often remains somewhat unclear what 
exactly they think unity is and that makes it difficult to know when enough of it exists 
and how to pursue more appropriate forms of it. Achieving a clearer view of unity, as 
this thesis facilitates, helps to respond to these questions that also have obvious 
political and practical significance, and the next section will explain that political 
theory often aims to be of practical use.   
1.2 Normative political theory as practical guidance 
Political action is conditioned upon a number of factors including power, interests, and 
limited resources. But it equally invites normative reflection: what actions are 
legitimate; what goals should they aim to realise; which political values should take 
priority (Swift and White 2008, p. 50)? Normative political theorists may aim to aid 
political elites involved in shaping responses to unity in multicultural society in such 
reflection by offering clarifications and suggesting why certain courses of action are 
more defensible than others (Parekh 2008, p. 7; Miller 2013, p. 34). For as Parekh (2011, 
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p. 40) explains, political theory ‘shapes people’s ways of thinking about themselves 
and their world, and through that, their choices and actions’. Such a practical approach 
to political theory thus entails an interest in the ways these people already think: if 
theorists hope to shape the ideas and decisions of political elites, it helps if they know 
the beliefs these elites already have because it is through understanding these that it 
becomes clear where they may need to be developed or challenged and how. This 
commitment implicit in a practical approach to political theory is made explicit and 
clarified in this thesis and this section begins by outlining what practical political 
theory is and distinguishing it from other methodological paradigms.2 
Parekh (2011, p. 39)3 describes political theory as three-dimensional: it analyses 
political concepts; critiques conventional political practice; and constructs an 
imaginative ‘vision of human life’ that is meant to inspire people. All three dimensions 
clearly bear on political life and it therefore seems plausible and legitimate when 
political theorists aim to offer practical guidance (although they do not need to), 
understood here not as concrete directions but rather as clarifications that offer insights 
that are useful for making decisions about courses of action. Such a practical 
understanding of political theory, in fact, is not uncommon (Farrelly 2007, p. 845; Lane 
2011, p. 135; Martineau and Squires 2012, p. 523; Miller 2008, p. 44; Modood 2007, p. vii; 
Parekh 2000b, p. 15, 2008, p. 7, 2011, pp. 38-45; Swift and White 2008, p. 51). Thus, the 
prominent political theorist Sandel (2005, p. 5) in a recent book for instance attempts to 
‘bring moral and political philosophy to bear on contemporary public discourse’.   
Political theorists concerned with unity in multicultural societies also often aim to be of 
practical use. Thus, Miller (1995, pp. 178-182) illustrates his theoretical position with 
practical suggestions for nation-building in Britain. Kymlicka (1995, p. 1) presents his 
work as a response to issues related to diversity that have arisen in democracies across 
the globe, which suggests he intends it to offer helpful insights to those political actors 
                                                     
2 By paradigm I simply refer to a typical pattern: methodological paradigms present different 
accepted views of how research should be undertaken.  
3 Parekh talks here about political philosophy. The terms political theory and political 
philosophy are often used interchangeably, and Parekh (2000d, pp. 242-259) does so elsewhere. 
However, I prefer to use the term political theory as my own work is more concerned with 
applied rather than philosophical problems.  
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dealing with these issues. Parekh (2000b, p. 15) explicitly addresses his work to both 
political theorists and ‘ordinary citizens and political activists and leaders’. Modood 
(2013, pp. 5-9) presents multiculturalism as a political idea embedded in actual liberal 
democratic practices and focuses specifically on Britain, which suggests his work might 
hold useful insights particularly for those engaged in British politics. Even the rather 
more abstract ideal theory proposed by Rawls (1971, p. 9) is intended to serve a 
practical ultimate purpose: ideal theory, he argues, provides ‘the only basis for the 
systematic grasp of these more pressing problems’ we face in day to day politics.   
But practical use may vary in form and what is intended here goes beyond the indirect 
guidance offered by ideal theory. Such theory tends to be concerned with the great 
problems of politics that are encountered across time and place and presents a long-
term goal to aim for that reflects the best possible outcome given the limits of the 
human condition and physical laws. It proceeds by reasoning, abstracting away from 
contextual contingencies to offer clarifications of principles to strive for that claim 
universal validity (Simmons 2010, pp. 7-12; Stears 2005, pp. 333-337). Such abstraction 
often means that it cannot offer more specific guidance to political elites grappling with 
particular issues within a political context – in Carens’ (1996, p. 168) words, ideal 
theory ‘may be irrelevant to the moral issues we face’ and to which we may need to 
devise political responses. Practical political theory aims to be of practical use in a more 
applied sense: it is concerned not with the specification of ideal principles but offers 
insights that might illuminate political debates about unity in multicultural society and 
guide the actions of political elites. 
That means, effectively, that practical political theory begins by asking the question: 
‘What course of action should we pursue in this particular context?’ (Carens 1996, p. 
160). Hence, it does not begin with a fully pre-specified system of universal principles, 
which sets it apart from nonideal theory (Rawls 1999, p. 216) that takes the principles 
designed in the ideal theory stage and then applies them to the messy real world, 
determining what can be achieved and what compromises need to be made (Stears 
2005, pp. 330-336). Nonideal theory tends to focus on the practical failures of actual 
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institutions to live up to the ideal and suggests how they may be improved to progress 
towards an integrated vision of the wholly just society (Simmons 2010, pp. 12-24). 
But there are good reasons to question the guidance offered by such nonideal theory: 
the principles of the ideal theory stage are designed under assumptions of what an 
ideal society would look like under the most favourable conditions we can imagine. 
Real societies are much more complex so that these principles cannot simply be 
assumed to be equally appropriate here (Farrelly 2007, p. 848).4 Existing societies may 
give different weight and meaning to such principles than the political theorist does 
(Parekh 2011, p. 44). And institutions designed for ideal societies probably would not 
yield the same results in real societies (Farrelly 2007, p. 856; Sabl 2011, pp. 171-173): by 
design, they ‘cannot achieve their own ends’ (Shklar 1989, p. 1139). Hence, the 
application of ideal principles to real societies may end up generating or reinforcing 
injustice (Swift and White 2008, pp. 59-60).  
Instead, the approach furthered here is more closely associated with a variety of 
approaches that have been classified as ‘realistic’ (Carens 1996, p. 156), ‘contextual’ 
(Carens 2004, p. 117; Miller 2013, p. 43) and ‘inductive’ (Triandafyllidou et al 2006, p. 
6).5 Such approaches do not have to suffer from lacking fully pre-specified goals to aim 
for: Sen (2006, pp. 221-235) argues that even with an incomplete understanding of 
perfect justice, we can make judgments about injustice; and even if we cannot agree on 
the ideal, we could agree on actions that advance justice in the here and now.6 These 
approaches develop a deep awareness of the context at which they are aimed in order 
to provide practical guidance to political elites. In fact, a lot of multicultural theory 
attains such contextual grounding (most importantly: Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000b).  
                                                     
4 To provide a simple illustration to this point: racism probably does not exist in an ideal society 
so institutions would not be equipped to challenge it.  
5 There are differences between these forms of theory but their detailed clarification is beside the 
point: the approach described here draws insights from all these approaches that, in contrast to 
ideal theory, are grounded in real political dilemmas and contexts.  
6 Of course, some conception of what justice means needs to guide such judgments. Whether 
that needs to be a fully developed principle, as Miller (2013, p. 235, note 14) argues against Sen, 
however, is unclear.  
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Such approaches start within context, acknowledging the institutions that already exist 
and aiming to improve them (Honig and Stears 2011; Sabl 2011, p. 165). Paying 
attention to institutions and political context is considered useful as they may contain 
wisdom about justice and political order that has not been captured in political theories 
(Carens 2004, p. 122; Favell and Modood 2003, p. 490)7, so that theory and context can 
be engaged in mutually challenging dialectic interaction, where theory can be used to 
criticise contextual realities, but also vice versa (Carens 2004, pp. 123-132).8  
Practical political theory attends to the complexities of the issue at hand: there will 
always be competing interpretations, and it will have a history in which it is likely that 
some have experienced injustices at the hands of others. Practical suggestions and 
clarifications are sensitive to these circumstances, especially as the latter will impact on 
the outcomes of any political action (Favell and Modood 2003, pp. 491-493). Policy 
typically is not made on a blank slate. Therefore, such practical political theory draws 
on social science evidence to be aware of the likely outcomes its suggestions will result 
in (Miller 2008, p. 47); not only in terms of effectiveness, but also with regards to 
symbolic and political effects, altering the relative position of groups in society (Favell 
and Modood 2003, pp. 492-493). It pursues justice and other principles not in the 
abstract but in real societies and uses contextual awareness to avoid, as best as 
possible, counterproductive outcomes. Hence, it attempts to address complexity rather 
than abstract it away (cf. Modood 2007, p. 103).  
But while such practical political theory avoids being irrelevant to particular decision-
making contexts, it is not without dangers of its own. Carens (1996, p. 164-166) points 
out how an unreflective use of a realistic approach to political theory would too readily 
take for granted the conditions that happen to exist. By emphasising the ‘need to avoid 
too large a gap’ (Carens 1996, p. 164) between how things are and how they should be, 
it could fail to go beyond what existing actors think (Miller 2013, p. 5) and challenge 
                                                     
7 Recall that multicultural policies were being developed in Canada well before the first 
theoretical statements of multiculturalism.  
8 This is reminiscent of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium, where moral judgments are reached by 
going back and forth between facts, intuitions and principles. Given the complexity of this 
concept it is not further developed here, because the discussion does not depend on it.  
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current circumstances where that would be morally required, such as for instance in 
the case for the abolition of slavery (Carens 1996, pp. 164-166; Stears 2005, pp. 340-
341).9 It is important to recall that people’s beliefs may be wrong so we cannot simply 
know or derive how things should be understood and approached by studying how 
they are now.10 The contingencies of context are the starting point of reflection, not its 
end point. 
Practical political theorists hope precisely to challenge and reshape these beliefs where 
they are unclear, morally dubious, incoherent and so on (cf. Parekh 2011, pp. 39-40): 
this is implied in their commitment to guiding political action, because the 
clarifications they offer and courses of action they suggest do not merely attempt to be 
compatible with these ideas regardless of what they are, but to bring issues, 
relationships and values into clearer view. A political theorist may understand herself 
as a partner in conversation (Parekh 2000d, p. 250) and that implies there are other 
partners, and for the practical political theorist, these are not only academics but also 
politicians and citizens – and most significantly, those elites involved in shaping 
political action. A good conversationalist is aware not only of her own position but also 
of those of others. So it is interesting to note that none of the political theorists 
concerned with unity and aiming to be of practical use cited above have systematically 
taken notice of how these partners in conversation actually conceive unity. After all, 
reshaping beliefs presupposes knowing them. This thesis therefore analyses how unity 
is conceived by parliamentarians because these political elites are both important 
figures in wider political debates and involved in shaping political courses of action.  
By analysing and responding to these ideas, this thesis not only claims to contribute to 
political conversations but demonstrates how it does so by showing where it builds on 
or rejects them. A practical political theorist who asserts to know the positions 
                                                     
9 Miller (2013, p. 44) distinguishes between conventionalism or relativism, and contextual 
theory: the latter can make objective claims with a universal character (i.e. that hold if particular 
conditions hold) and that are distinct from people’s beliefs, which may be false.  
10 That does not necessarily mean that the two are entirely unrelated, or that how things should 
be can only be understood from a perspective external to the moral understandings current in 
real contexts. Walzer (1985, p. 25) points out that most cases of moral progress are 
reinterpretations of existing principles: in the case of slavery, the existing moral principle of 
equal dignity was extended to include a new group of previously excluded people as equals.   
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advanced in political debate but neglects to show that she does and to specify how she 
knows them (as she would for academic partners in conversation) leaves herself open 
to the objections that she simply asserts to know them; that she may be wrong about 
the internal logic of these positions; that she cannot therefore show that her 
clarifications indeed pertain to the issues that concern political elites and offer useful 
insights; or worse, that she may have intentionally distorted them to more forcefully 
present her own position. If political theorists aim to contribute practical guidance, a 
more systematic examination of the debates they contribute to helps them to avoid 
such charges.  
This thesis, therefore, analyses how political elites conceive of unity before responding 
to these ideas. This locates it within an emerging methodological paradigm that 
combines normative reasoning with empirical analysis (Favell 1998; Klosko 2005; 
Laborde 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Modood et al 2006; Uberoi and Modood 2010, 
2013b; Uberoi 2008). Three prominent examples that illustrate this paradigm have 
particularly inspired the approach. These can be understood as studies that ‘bridge 
questions of political reality and questions of what political agents should do’ (Sabl 
2011, p. 155). These examples all focus their empirical analysis on political debates. 
They study the normative dimension of the ideas present in these debates and analyse 
how the questions they are interested in are answered here: they explicate the 
normative commitments already inherent in the positions put forward.  
First of all, Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero (2006) present an edited 
volume that brings together chapters on several European countries. The book aims to 
build ‘multicultural theory from the ground upwards rather than deontologically or 
from first principles, and approaches the normative from substantial case studies 
within a comparative European framework’ (Triandafyllidou et al 2006, p. 7). These 
case studies take the form of an analysis of public debates on multicultural 
controversies that also considers ‘how the national and local debates relate to wider 
normative principles and ideas of equality, liberalism and citizenship’ (Triandafyllidou 
et al 2006, p. 14). Like this book, this thesis approaches the normative question of 
pursuing unity in multicultural societies by reference to European case studies that 
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focus on how this question is approached in actual political debates. The thesis spends 
somewhat more time than this book on drawing out the link between the empirical and 
the normative analysis that underpins this type of research and that is often left 
implicit in research undertaken within this paradigm. This leaves the latter open to 
methodological objections that might undercut its normative arguments, and the thesis 
(particularly the next chapter) hopes to add some clarity to this complex link.  
Secondly, Laborde (2008) analyses French debates on the Hijab controversy to clarify 
what Republicanism looks like in this context and how French Republicanism can 
contribute to ‘the normative republican response to multicultural conflict’ (Laborde 
2008, p. 3). Her critical republicanism incorporates ‘critical social theory into republican 
normative philosophy’ (Laborde 2008, p. 8): it takes seriously the normative 
significance of sociological facts but also the implicit assumptions that colour the 
context in which rational justification takes place. The approach taken here equally 
uses empirical analysis to inform a normative response – or a ‘principled strategy for 
reform’ (Laborde 2008, p. 13) – sensitive to the status quo. In contrast to the approach 
taken by Laborde, however, this response is not based in an ideal theory, for the 
reasons outlined above.  
Finally, Favell (1998) examines the political practices that constitute the response to 
multiculturalism in Britain and France. He focuses on the ideas and justifications 
present in political argument and translates these into comparable normative theories – 
in each country, he identifies a ‘public philosophy’ (Favell 1998, p. 2) comprising a set 
of consensual interpretations of core political concepts that directs policy development. 
This interdisciplinary study of ‘political theory’ as it is practised or embodied in 
politics uses empirical methods and normative analysis to clarify the normative 
commitments of these political consensuses and explains how they came about and are 
sustained. This concern for the normative content of political ideas is taken up here, 
but used for a slightly different purpose: whereas Favell focuses on a longer period of 
time to explain policy developments, here, political ideas defended in political debates 
are studied to show how a conception of unity can respond to them plausibly.  
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The next chapter will explain how practical political theory, aimed at shaping the ideas 
of political elites involved in devising responses to unity, can study their ideas to 
enhance its practical use. Such theory, it will be argued there, can be conceptualised as 
a contribution to democratic debate that needs to avoid the pitfalls of both abstract 
ideal theory and overly realistic theory: proposals should be both morally defensible, 
that is, not unreflective reformulations of ideas current in society that may be unjust; 
and politically plausible, or responsive to the complexities of context.  
1.3 Case studies: the UK and the Netherlands 
The thesis analyses the ideas about unity that political elites in the UK and the 
Netherlands express in political debate, in order to subsequently respond to them 
effectively. Such debate is set within a particular context: it responds to local events as 
they arise and is structured by historical developments and traditions. This section will 
introduce the British and Dutch contexts in which the debates analysed are held, or the 
institutional and ideational settings that form the background to the analyses in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
The notion that European countries have developed immigration and integration 
policies in line with national traditions and self-conceptions, or national models, has 
been an influential one in the comparative social science literature (e.g. Brubaker 1990; 
Joppke 2007; Koopmans and Statham 1999). Regardless of whether these models are 
decreasing in relevance (Joppke 2007, pp. 243-244), and of whether they form an 
appropriate analytical framework or misrepresent the coherence of national policy 
developments (Bertossi 2011, p. 1562), such accounts do have some descriptive value as 
they point to cross-national differences in the way minorities are dealt with. Koopmans 
(2008), for example, identifies a number of specific policies according to which he 
classifies countries as more or less multicultural. From such a comparative perspective, 
both the UK and the Netherlands are classified as multicultural (Bertossi 2011, p. 1561; 
Joppke 2004, p. 239, 2007, p. 244; Koopmans 2008, p. 2): they display a number of 
policies and attitudes that are relatively open to the recognition and accommodation of 
cultural difference, in contrast to the ‘French’ assimilation and the ‘German’ separation 
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approaches.11 This section will introduce the development of such policies, or the 
‘trajectories of multiculturalism’ (Winter 2010) in the UK and the Netherlands.  
The literature discussing the development of multiculturalism in the UK (Bleich 2011; 
Cheong et al 2007; Favell 1998; Grillo 2007, 2010; Modood 2006, 2007; McGhee 2003; 
Parekh 2000b; Pilkington 2008) reveals a more complicated picture than the 
‘multicultural model’ analysis would suggest. Multiculturalism here developed in a 
piecemeal manner, with policy development pragmatically responding to local issues 
(Favell 1998, pp. 98-134). Consequently, the UK never fully developed a coherent, 
comprehensive strategy or model at the national level (Bertossi 2011, p. 1569). A broad 
consensus existed nonetheless on the need to keep race issues off the political agenda 
and prevent racial tensions from becoming public order issues. This was reinforced by 
Conservative Shadow Defence Secretary (1965-1968) Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ 
speech in 1968 that opposed Labour’s introduction of race relations legislation and 
presented immigration as divisive and dangerous, and threatened to rally white 
Britons around an anti-immigrant platform.12 Political elites quickly defused this threat 
by settling on the policies and institutions of British multiculturalism that Favell (1998, 
p. 123) hence characterises as ‘a calculated, paternalistic attempt to engineer a kind of 
social harmony and multicultural equilibrium well in advance of the preferences of the 
general public’.  
Integration in the UK was indeed conceived in a way that might be termed 
multicultural: Roy Jenkins, Labour Home Secretary from 1965-1967 and 1974-1976, 
defined it ‘not as a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with 
equality of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (quoted in Favell 1998, 
                                                     
11 Note that this classification is based on a number of empirical characteristics and in 
comparison to other countries (i.e. in terms of social science evidence) and not in terms of how 
they measure against multicultural ideals and principles as specified in normative political 
theory.  
12 Powell’s (1968) speech suggested that high levels of immigration would irreversibly change 
the country; he suggests that immigrants crowd out native Britons in housing and public 
services and that they are unwilling to integrate because they want to dominate society. The 
speech receives its name from Powell’s quote from the Aeneïd: ‘As I look ahead, I am filled with 
foreboding; like the Roman, I see “the River Tiber foaming with much blood”.’ Powell was fired 
from the Shadow Cabinet the day after the speech and never held a prominent political position 
again.  
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p. 104). Integration was not seen to be antithetical to minority cultural identities, and 
was about equality rather than uniformity or even commonality. Multiculturalism here 
was characterised by progressive race relations legislation, non-discrimination, and 
local accommodation. Following the example of the US (Bleich 2011, p. 61), issues of 
race became the pivotal questions, with progressive interpretation in case law 
extending the reach of the legislation to other characteristics of minority groups (Favell 
1998, pp. 107, 120).  
Bleich (2011, p. 65) notes a shift in the 1970s from colour-blind non-discrimination 
policy to more pronounced and pro-active race-consciousness. Another shift took place 
in the categories that policies target: following race, ethnicity became important in the 
1990s (Grillo 2010, p. 58), allowing for further differentiation among minorities, thus 
enabling South Asians to mobilise on the basis of their shared ethnicity (Favell 1998, 
pp. 214-218; Modood 2007, pp. 40-42). More recently, the focus has shifted to faith 
(Grillo 2010, pp. 58-60), illustrated by the appeal for the recognition of ‘religious 
identity and communal rights in the practice of the law’ made on behalf of Muslims 
and others by such a leading figure as Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury 
(Williams 2008, p. 267). 
Overall, it is said that Britain has provided exemptions and accommodations of 
cultural difference to a degree rarely found elsewhere in Europe (Joppke 2009, p. 455), 
even if their justification was mostly consequentialist and aimed at preventing disorder 
(Favell 1998, pp. 116-117). It may have seemed like British multiculturalism was firmly 
established when the Macpherson (1999)13 and Parekh (2000)14 reports expressing its 
spirit were published (Pilkington 2008).  
                                                     
13 This report (the outcome of a public inquiry carried out by Macpherson) presents the 
investigation of the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence and finds that the police is 
‘institutionally racist’, meaning it fails to deliver its services appropriately to ethnic minorities 
because of the persistence of structural and often unconscious prejudice. It spurred a renewed 
concern for racial equality.  
14 This report (produced by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain set up by the 
think tank Runnymede Trust and chaired by Parekh) favourably and coherently articulates the 
ideas at the basis of British multiculturalism and provides a list of recommendations to take it 
further. Among those is the idea that traditional notions of British national identity need to be 
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Grillo (2007, p. 987), however, warns against understanding this multicultural 
consensus as too strong: British multicultural integration was a political project to deal 
with diversity but stopped short of institutionalising recognition of minority identities 
in the public sphere and special representation measures. In addition, it was never 
uncontested. Perhaps the most significant challenge to British multiculturalism was the 
Rushdie affair in 1989. Muslims in Britain, as globally, felt offended by the publication 
of Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. Following domestic unease the affair came to a head 
with the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini that called for Rushdie’s death. Because 
of the limited focus on race in British multiculturalism, the grievances of Muslims as a 
religious (rather than racial) group could not be addressed under the existing 
legislation. Debate quickly focused on the limits of toleration and the importance of 
free speech rather than their concerns, and questioned the appropriateness of 
multiculturalism as a strategy for integration (Favell 1998, pp. 219-225; Parekh 1990, 
2000b, pp. 295-306). The aforementioned Parekh report also met with severe opposition 
in the press and subsequently by political actors, because its argument for a more 
inclusive national identity reflecting diversity in society was taken to discredit British 
identity (Pilkington 2008).  
The British ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ that has allegedly erupted since the riots of 2001 
in Oldham, Burnley, Leeds and Bradford15 hence was not completely without 
precedent.16 The investigations and numerous reports that followed these riots 
expressed a concern that communities – particularly Muslims – in these cities were 
living ‘parallel lives’, with segregation occurring simultaneously in several dimensions, 
including education, housing, and work (Grillo 2007, p. 988; Kalra and Kapoor 2008, p. 
6). It was widely argued in the media and by political actors that multiculturalism had 
allowed this separation to occur by institutionalising difference, and thereby 
facilitating isolation, but also radicalisation. Diversity itself came to be seen as 
                                                                                                                                                           
reconceived to reflect British minorities as well as the majority and discard older racist 
connotations.  
15 These riots were sparked by racial tensions but fuelled by a number of complex 
interdependent factors.  
16 After all, there had been ‘race riots’ in Britain before (in 1958, 1981, 1995, and, arguably, again 
in 2011). The ‘crisis’ starting in 2001 was also, of course, inevitably influenced by the 9/11 
attacks in New York (2001) and the 7/7 London bombings in 2005.  
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problematic from the perspective of solidarity (Goodhart 2004, p. 30; see also: Putnam 
2007). Policy therefore was re-orientated towards the promotion of citizenship, shared 
values, and a national sense of belonging (Cheong et al 2007, p. 28).  
The new ‘community cohesion’ strategy shifted its focus to interaction as a means to 
overcome the fear and prejudice that both flow from and sustain segregation. It aimed 
to build relationships between different cultural groups, thereby overcoming the 
divisions that were exposed by the riots. Cultural groups needed to overcome their 
differences (while retaining their identities) and converge around common values in an 
open and inclusive civic realm, reflective of a newly invigorated sense of citizenship 
that invites sustained and equal dialogue (Cheong et al 2007, pp. 28-29; Grillo 2007, pp. 
988-993; McGhee 2003, pp. 381-391). The simultaneous focus on national identity, or 
Britishness, as a means for providing unity and cohesion was furthered especially by a 
series of speeches by Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer (1997-2007) and later Prime 
Minister (2007-2010) Gordon Brown (see: Lee 2006).17 Cheong et al (2007, p. 32) point 
out how strong community ties that were once seen as contributing to integration were 
now cast as threatening solidarity and unity. The focus on shared values, cohesion and 
national identity points to the idea that a reinvigorated sense of unity is needed in the 
face of the fragmentation that multiculturalism had allegedly allowed diversity to give 
rise to.  
Critics argue that community cohesion neglects material inequality and racism 
(McGhee 2003, pp. 392-393; Pilkington 2008); and demarcates Muslims as 
fundamentally different (Kalra and Kapoor 2008, p. 2; Worley 2005, p. 491), thereby 
normalising a new type of anti-Muslim racism targeting values rather than skin colour 
(Kundnani 2007, p. 24). It is sometimes understood as a move away from 
multiculturalism to assimilation (Grillo 2007, p. 980; Kalra and Kapoor 2008, p. 11). 
Others, however, question such a move: they point to the fact that the UK still has its 
                                                     
17 The popular argument that Brown’s engagement with Britishness can be explained by 
reference to his Scottishness is considered irrelevant here. That is not to deny that these 
speeches also addressed the issue of devolution: the conception of Britishness was precisely 
supposed to tie together members of different cultural, ethnic, religious, and so on, as well as 
national communities.   
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multicultural policies (cf. Koopmans 2008, p. 7), and has seen increased political 
support for the multiculturalist idea of an inclusive national identity (Uberoi and 
Modood 2013b, pp. 23-26), so that the emphasis on citizenship might be better 
interpreted as a ‘civic re-balancing’ of multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2009, p. 
473). 
The literature on Dutch integration policy (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007; Duyvendak 
and Scholten 2009, 2011, 2012; Entzinger 2006; Penninx et al 2005; Prins and Saharso 
2010; Scholten 2011; Timmermans and Scholten 2006; Vasta 2007) also presents a more 
nuanced picture than the ‘multicultural model’ notion would imply. Here, a more or 
less coherent paradigm did develop, but was subsequently replaced: policy has 
developed as a sequence of relatively stable periods ruptured by substantial paradigm 
shifts. Three paradigms that roughly coincide with the 1980s; the 1990s; and the 2000s 
are commonly discerned in policy and discourse, each with its own understanding of 
integration, policy goals, and policy instruments.18 Only the first of these paradigms 
could be straightforwardly classified as multicultural. 
The ‘multicultural’ paradigm is associated with the 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy 
(EMP)  that developed as an acknowledgement of the permanence of immigrants in the 
Netherlands. This policy was characterised by widespread consensus and de-
politicisation. It aimed to prevent the permanent marginalisation and isolation of 
particular groups in society that were specified by both cultural/ethnic and socio-
economic criteria (Guiraudon et al 2005, pp. 76-77). 19  EMP could be considered 
multicultural because it aimed to promote equality through the recognition of cultural 
identity (as well as in other ways) and to pursue a culturally and religiously diverse 
society. Ethnic minorities were encouraged to emancipate, or cultivate and strengthen 
                                                     
18 Sometimes a fourth one is added: before the 1980s no official, coherent policy was put in place 
to deal with immigrants. There was a general assumption that they would either assimilate 
automatically or go back home.  
19 ‘Guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and 
woonwagenbewoners [caravan dwellers]’, (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, p. 15). These were groups 
that occupied a poor socio-economic position and that the government felt responsible for, 
because of colonial history or active labour recruitment policies. Hence, relatively rich 
minorities such as the Chinese were never targets of this policy.  
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their cultural identity. This was believed to help them integrate into society – both as 
groups and as individuals (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, pp. 12-17). 
This approach to cultural identity and integration is commonly linked to pillarisation, a 
Dutch tradition for dealing with diversity that saw society divided into several ‘pillars’ 
representing different worldviews: Catholics; Protestants; Socialists; and Liberals.20 
These pillars had their own institutions that straddled most of society and included 
political parties; broadcast channels; schools; sports clubs; and hospitals. Communities 
lived largely separate lives in their pillars, but their elites were brought together in 
government, which formed an overarching structure. This institutionalised pluralism 
was then extended to immigrant groups that were encouraged and subsidised to 
develop their own representative organisations and institutions as well as elites to be 
consulted in policymaking (Entzinger 2006, pp. 123-126).  
To what extent this paradigm was actually multiculturalist is disputed: society by then 
had started to become ‘depillarised’ and an Islamic pillar never developed because 
minorities lacked the necessary resources (Vink 2007, pp. 342-348). EMP, moreover, 
developed out of earlier efforts to provide immigrants with services that would allow 
them to retain their cultural identities but did so with the aim of their repatriation 
(Kymlicka 2008, pp. 804-807). Lenard (2012, pp. 188-189) hence argues that its intent 
was actually exclusion rather than inclusion: developing separate institutions for 
minorities allowed the pre-existing ones to avoid change.  
A paradigm shift took place at the beginning of the 1990s. It was felt EMP had not lived 
up to its promise as minorities were still mired in economic inequality, and that too 
much attention had been paid to the cultural element of integration policy, to the 
detriment of individual participation. Socio-economic concerns took centre-stage in the 
new Integration Policy (IP), framed in terms of citizenship, that shifted the emphasis 
from the group to the individual. It emphasised rights and duties, and encouraged self-
sufficiency and responsibility. Integration became the priority: immigrants needed to 
be familiar with Dutch language and society in order to participate, through education 
                                                     
20 This latter pillar was not as comprehensive as the others and could alternatively be described 
as the ‘general’ pillar.  
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and labour, in the institutions of Dutch society and achieve equality with native Dutch 
citizens. Culture became a private matter (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, pp. 16-20). 
Policy no longer targeted ethnic minorities, groups that were defined in the old policy 
by criteria of birth place as well as socioeconomic conditions, but allochtonen, 
individuals defined only by their foreign origin (and contrasted to autochtonen, or 
citizens of native origin) (Guiraudon et al 2005, pp. 77-78; see also: Yanow and Van der 
Haar 2010).  
Although the socio-economic position of immigrants and their children improved 
gradually, the persistence of inequalities in combination with international and internal 
experiences with Islamic fundamentalism21 fuelled a narrative of policy failure and 
failed integration (Entzinger 2006, pp. 134-137; Timmermans and Scholten 2006, p. 113), 
hinged on the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, p. 19). 
The Integration Policy became increasingly unpopular. Where integration issues in the 
past had been kept off the political agenda, they now moved right to its top. This is the 
Dutch ‘crisis of multiculturalism’, announced evocatively in an influential op-ed piece 
by Left-wing intellectual Scheffer (2000) entitled ‘The Multicultural Tragedy’, which 
blamed the multicultural policies of the past for the enduring marginalisation of 
minorities.  
The Integration Policy New Style (IPNS) of the early 2000s, in response, was designed 
as a definitive break with the past. It retained the emphasis on citizenship and 
individual rights and responsibilities but focused on cultural rather than socio-
economic aspects of integration: it moved from ‘active’ to ‘common’ citizenship 
(Scholten 2011, p. 81). Where culture was seen as a means to emancipation in EMP, it 
was now considered an obstacle to integration; especially for Muslims, who were 
portrayed as adhering to values that clash with supposedly Western values such as 
                                                     
21 A number of events raised tensions around multiculturalism, including: the terrorist attacks 
in the US of 9/11; the sudden rise in Dutch politics of Pim Fortuyn on an anti-immigrant 
platform in 2002; his murder by a left-wing fanatic briefly before the 2002 elections; the murder 
in 2004 of famous film-maker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh, who had just released a 
provocative film displaying texts from the Koran on naked female bodies, by a Dutch-
Moroccan; the controversy around Ayaan Hirsi-Ali, an MP of Somali origin and stridently 
critical of Islam, who participated in the aforementioned film and received dead threats, and 
was also found to have lied to obtain asylum in the Netherlands.  
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freedom of speech, gender equality, and democracy (Entzinger 2006, p. 128; Winter 
2010, p. 174). Perceived integration failure was explained as a lack of effort by 
immigrants (Entzinger 2006, pp. 130-131). Policy therefore became more demanding 
and centred on instilling a sense of shared (‘Dutch’) norms and values.  
This has led some (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, p. 3; Vasta 2007, p. 714) to proclaim 
that the Netherlands has moved from multiculturalism to assimilation. Others 
(Koopmans 2008, p. 7; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010a, pp. 17-18), however, emphasise 
how more multicultural policy legacies remain influential and changes have taken 
place in rhetoric more than in policy. The Dutch engagement with multiculturalism 
thus reads as a mixed picture. What is clear, however, is that similar to what we saw in 
the UK, INPS suggests the idea that a greater degree of unity, based in shared values 
and commonalities, is needed in the face of cultural diversity.  
Although the policy traditions of both these countries may be multicultural in 
comparison to other European countries, this legacy plays out in different ways. 
Multiculturalism as a political idea in both cases rests upon an understanding of 
integration as hospitable to diversity (which has now become contested) and policies to 
accommodate minorities and enhance their position in society. Yet in the UK, it centred 
on race relations and accommodation, and moved to community cohesion, while in the 
Netherlands, it was based around pillarisation and ethnic minorities, and shifted to the 
integration of allochtonen. The specific policies deployed hence may differ, but they are 
similar enough in nature and intention to still be characterised as multicultural (at least 
in the first phases) (cf. Uberoi 2008, p. 405). Policy traditions can have enduring effects 
on how issues are perceived so that they may structure the debate on unity in each case 
study (e.g. Favell 1998; Schmidt 2008). The trajectories of multiculturalism described 
above, therefore, form the context and background in which the debates that will be 
analysed in chapters 4 and 5 are set.  
1.4 The structure and argument of this thesis 
This final section will sketch the argument this thesis presents by briefly discussing its 
chapters. Recall how this chapter noted that political theorists have neglected to clearly 
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specify what they mean by unity, even as they agree on its importance and suggest 
alternative routes to fostering it. Moreover, when they offer clarifications of issues 
relating to unity and diversity and suggest why certain courses of action are more 
defensible than others, they often hope to be of practical use. That implies shaping the 
ideas and guiding the actions of political elites involved in shaping political responses 
to unity, but they have largely neglected to look at the ideas these elites already have 
(which are the ideas they intend to influence). Responding to these gaps, this thesis 
makes three contributions.  
First, in the next chapter it clarifies how political theorists can be of practical use and 
shows that this aim entails a commitment to shaping the ideas of the political elites 
involved in shaping political action. Shaping these ideas presupposes knowing them, 
and studying them helps political theorists to demonstrate the practical use of their 
insights as it allows them to clarify how their proposals are not only morally defensible 
but also politically plausible. 
Second, the thesis clarifies what unity is by specifying the different properties a 
conception of unity needs to have: it specifies what the whole that is united is; who 
belongs to this united whole; how they belong to it; and how such unity may be 
impeded and fostered. Chapter 3 shows that different political theorists give different 
meanings to these properties so that they advance different conceptions of unity. 
Chapters 4 and 5 then show that British and Dutch political elites, respectively, also 
conceive unity in different ways.  
Third, the thesis argues that what can roughly be designated here as a multicultural 
conception of unity is both most defensible and politically plausible in the UK and the 
Netherlands.22 Chapter 6 explains the implications of the case studies for political 
theorists: it distils the existing patterns of thought about unity that they need to pay 
attention to when proposing a politically plausible conception of unity, and highlights 
the significance of pluralism. Chapter 7 then shows that a multicultural conception of 
unity is not only most defensible, as it is better able to withstand theoretical objections 
                                                     
22 This conception is based in the multiculturalist ideas introduced in this chapter and will be 
further developed in chapter 3.  
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than its rivals; but is also politically plausible in these two countries where 
multiculturalism nonetheless, paradoxically, has been portrayed as a failure (Cameron 
2011) or a tragedy (Scheffer 2000) by leading figures in public debates.  
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2 Practical political theory 
The previous chapter showed that political theorists agree that unity is important but 
rarely clearly specify what it is, and that they often aim to be of practical use. This 
chapter clarifies how they may achieve the latter by explicating the contribution 
practical political theory makes: it offers clarifications and suggests why certain 
courses of action are more defensible than others (Miller 2013, p. 34; Parekh 2008, p. 7) 
and in doing so aims to be not only morally defensible but also politically plausible. 
Such insights illuminate political debates in order to shape the ideas of political elites 
and guide their actions. That implies engaging with the ideas these elites already have. 
This commitment implicit in practical political theory has largely gone unnoticed and 
this chapter draws out its implications by explaining why and how practical political 
theorists might engage with these ideas. The remainder of the thesis then shows how 
unity is conceived not only by political theorists (chapter 3) but also by political elites 
(chapters 4 and 5; and discussed in chapter 6) in order to show that a multicultural 
conception of unity is most defensible and also politically plausible in the UK and the 
Netherlands (chapter 7).   
Practical political theory is considered ‘a branch of practical reason – it is thought 
whose final aim is to guide action’ (Miller 2013, p. 34), in contradistinction to 
approaches that restrict political theory to more philosophical goals and argue that it 
should ask ‘not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we 
should think makes no practical difference’ (Cohen 2003, p. 243). There are, of course, 
many ways of doing political theory, as reflected in debates about its method, scope 
and nature (Cohen 2003; Farrelly 2007; Floyd and Stears 2011; Leopold and Stears 2008; 
Stears 2005; Swift and White 2008). This chapter does not pretend that the approach 
furthered here is the best methodology for political theory, but it does clarify its 
distinctive quality. Section 2.1 explains that the insights practical political theorists 
offer can be conceptualised as interventions in political debate. These interventions 
attempt to shape the ideas of political elites involved in devising political action, in 
order to guide their actions. This suggests a concern for the ideas these elites already 
have and section 2.2 explains why these ideas matter by outlining what political ideas 
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are. Although knowing these ideas is important, however, they do not condition the 
content of practical political theory: section 2.3 explains that as a contribution to 
political debate, it benefits from meeting two criteria, moral defensibility and political 
plausibility. Section 2.4 then outlines a method to study political ideas, and section 2.5 
discusses the research design of the empirical component of the thesis.   
2.1 Practical political theory as a contribution to political debate 
Practical political theory ‘whose final aim is to guide action’ (Miller 2013, p. 34) can be 
conceptualised as a contribution to political debate (Swift and White 2008, pp. 54-55), 
understood simply as debates held in a variety of formal as well as informal settings 
pertaining to political topics, however broadly construed. This section will build on the 
work of leading political theorists to develop this idea so as to explain how political 
theory may achieve practical use and guide action. 
When political theorists clarify our ideas about political problems and specify how we 
should approach them and why certain responses are more defensible than others, 
they probably hope their arguments will lead to change and improvement in the 
situation they perceive as unjust or problematic (Parekh 1995, p. 172). But such impact 
is indirect: the theorist needs to enter into political debate in order to convince 
politicians and citizens to view the issue as they do, and in particular, to shape the 
ideas of those involved in devising political action. Such an intervention in political 
debate is possible because while it may be less reflective than theoretical debate 
(Freeden 1996, pp. 41-42; Parekh 2000b, pp. 304-313), it nonetheless draws on a shared 
vocabulary to express responses to political problems (Miller 2013, p. 42; Parekh 2000c, 
p. x). Moreover, as Freeden (1996, pp. 13-14, 40-45) argues, the nature of debate in these 
two realms is similar: both revolve around the construction of arguments that define 
and combine political concepts in particular ways in order to prescribe action and 
shape the social world. Supposedly, then, the arguments political theorists make 
should be intelligible also in political debates and may offer insights that political elites 
may draw on to devise and justify political action.  
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This presupposes the existence of open, democratic political debate, which reflects the 
‘middle-range’ aims (Haddock 2011, p. 70; Levy 2007, pp. 187-190; see also for a related 
discussion: Carens 2013, pp. 300-311) of the thesis: it brackets the most abstract, eternal 
questions in order to focus on a particular type of multicultural controversy as it occurs 
within vested liberal democracies. As section 1.2 already explained, this type of 
practical political theory starts from within context and takes for granted certain 
political institutions and values, such as democratic debate and equal citizenship, that 
are deemed fundamental and widely supported and embodied in institutions and 
practices (if only in the form of a vague conception) in such contexts (Modood 2007, 
pp. 6-8).23 Such a middle-range perspective should not be mistaken for conservatism or 
conventionalism (cf. Miller 2013, p. 49): after all, accepting the status quo as a starting 
position does not preclude challenging or transforming it.  
When contributing to political debate, the theorist is not a philosopher-king that can 
dictate political action, but a ‘professional thinker’ (Freeden 1996, p. 30) trained in and 
dedicated to contemplation and reflection, which makes her particularly well-placed to 
contribute valuable arguments and illuminate the normative dimensions of political 
problems (Swift and White 2008, pp. 54-55); she acts as a ‘social critic’ who critically 
interprets the status quo in order to improve it (Walzer 1985, p. 30), or a ‘public 
intellectual’ (Habermas 2003, pp. 289-290) who contributes to political debates about 
the self-understanding of modern societies. In so doing, she must offer an ‘account of 
civil life [that] illuminates the latter in such a way as to guide our choices’ (Parekh 
1995, p. 169). Crucially, such activity is not about simply repackaging existing 
traditions in more appealing terms, but about challenging, improving, and where 
necessary transcending or subverting them (Modood 2007, pp. 122-123; Walzer 1985, 
pp. 27-28, 43-53); and the result may be new positions. Where the other parties engaged 
in political debate do not already agree with the theorist, that means political theory 
‘should be in the business of changing political attitudes’ (Miller 2013, p. 37). And of 
                                                     
23 This is not to deny that these values may require further justification and are far from 
universally upheld, and that their precise meaning is contested within political theory as well as 
within political contexts. 
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course, such impact remains hypothetical, as its arguments might go unnoticed (Stears 
2005, p. 343). 
Political theory, then, can be seen as an intervention in political debate. Indeed, section 
1.2 noted how some political theorists (Parekh 2000b, p. 15; Sandel 2005, p. 5) explicitly 
characterise their work in this way. This extends the conception of such debate: it is 
understood as an interactive process (Stears 2005, p. 347) that is characterised by 
argument and embraces both theory and practice. That is not to deny that politics is 
much more (or, perhaps, less) than rational argument, nor to deny the crucial 
importance of power. But political theorists are not politicians and can avoid such 
considerations in order to focus on clarifying what is at stake, proposing particular 
courses of action and explaining why these are most defensible.24 
As a contribution to political debate, practical political theory does not simply aim to 
change political beliefs, but does so with the goal of inspiring political action. After all, 
in most cases it is not enough for people to change their mind about an issue: to 
improve a situation often requires political action in the form of policy or legislation. 
This link between political theory and practical guidance relating to institutional 
design and policy is not always clear but it has been acknowledged over a long period 
of time by such leading scholars as Miller and Siedentop (1983), Parekh (2001) and 
Waldron (2013).  
Thus, Miller and Siedentop (1983, p. 2), ruminating on the active nature of political 
theory, note how political theory is about connecting and applying concepts to social 
conditions so that ‘shaping social and political concepts is also, in the longer run, 
shaping social and political institutions’. Language is not neutral (as the next section 
will clarify further), so that theorising about institutions inevitably involves evaluation 
and prescription; engaging in political theory is a form of political action. More 
recently, Miller (2013, p. 43) supposes that the activity of doing political theory 
                                                     
24 In contrast, some might argue that concrete proposals may violate moral principles if they 
help to bring about justice in the long run (cf. Stears 2005, pp. 345-346). Liberal institutions often 
came about through illiberal means. This, however, blurs the distinction between the politician 
and the theorist: whereas the former may rely on such expedient reasons, it is up to the latter to 
offer better – more just – alternatives.  
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involves that ‘we have to assess the justice of a decision, or an institution, or a policy’25 
and clearly, such assessments of existing political structures are meant to inspire 
political action. Parekh (2001, p. 696) explains that the Parekh report26 was a direct 
attempt at using political theory to influence policy makers: it sketches a political 
theory and uses it to explore social issues such as ‘education, criminal justice […] and 
political representation’ and to underpin ‘appropriate recommendations concerning 
how best to eliminate the discrimination and disadvantage suffered by ethnic 
minorities’. And Waldron (2013, pp. 8-9, emphasis in the original) recently made an 
appeal to political theorists to loosen their exclusive focus on justice to include a 
concern for politics and institutions:  
‘Even if our main preoccupation remains with justice, liberty, and equality, we 
still need to complement and inform that work with an understanding of the 
mechanisms through which these ideals—these ends of life—will be pursued. 
This is what I mean by political political theory—theory addressing itself to 
politics and to the way our political institutions house and frame our 
disagreements about social ideals and orchestrate what is done about whatever 
aims we can settle on’. 
Practical (or political, in Waldron’s words) political theory, then, addresses itself to 
politics in an effort to shape political structures and courses of action in order for these 
to more effectively pursue and realise justice and other political values. This suggests 
that while the clarifications such practical political theory offers to political debate may 
help a variety of actors, including politicians and citizens, to understand issues of unity 
and diversity more clearly, political theorists who aim to be of practical use contribute 
                                                     
25 Miller here discusses the difference between universalist and contextual approaches to 
political theory and notes how the former assumes that the same principles can be appealed to 
in all such judgments, thus presupposing that these judgments are what political theory is 
about.  
26 This report about multiculturalism in Britain was introduced in the previous chapter.  
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to political debates with a particular interest in shaping the ideas of those political 
elites involved in shaping political courses of action.27   
2.2 Political ideas 
Recall that section 1.2 noted how political theory ‘shapes people’s ways of thinking 
about themselves and their world, and through that, their choices and actions’ (Parekh 
2011, p. 40). In other words, choices and actions normally make sense because they 
reflect ideas so that it is through shaping the ideas of the political elites involved in 
devising political action that political theorists who aim to be of practical use may 
guide political action. But these actors are not blank slates: they come with a set of 
ideas. Shaping these is probably a lot easier once we know what they are to begin with 
and where they may need to be reformed, and chapters 4 and 5, therefore, present how 
British and Dutch political elites, respectively, conceive of unity. To understand why 
studying these ideas might be interesting for political theorists, and particularly to 
those working on unity, we need to first know what political ideas are. 
Political ideas, or concepts, can be conceived as ‘the constituents of thoughts’ (Margolis 
and Laurence 2011); they make up the structures and patterns of human thinking and 
exist as mental impressions in the human mind. As such, they order experiences and 
make sense of reality: they are a medium for understanding. In Skinner’s (2002, p. 176) 
words, ‘our concepts form part of what we bring to the world in our efforts to make 
sense of it’. Freeden (1996, p. 52) defines political concepts as ‘complex ideas that inject 
order and meaning into observed or anticipated sets of political phenomena and hold 
together an assortment of related notions’. Ideas enable meaning and understanding 
because they classify situations and experiences: they comprise a number of criteria in 
light of which particular instances are categorised as this rather than that type of 
phenomenon. Moreover, such classification often involves evaluation, certainly for the 
                                                     
27 Note also that practical political theorists who are dedicated to more direct forms of 
democracy might target citizens and action groups rather than political elites; but most liberal 
democracies currently are representative democracies which means that change (including 
reforms towards more direct democracy) still needs to run through political elites so that 
paying attention to their ideas seems at least a plausible element of a practical orientation.   
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class of ideas this thesis is concerned with: concepts not only describe something but 
also praise or condemn it (Freeden 1996, pp. 57-59; Skinner 2002, pp. 160-162).  
But ideas are not only categories for ordering experience: they also have an active 
dimension. Interpretation and action are enmeshed: the way an issue is interpreted and 
represented as a policy problem tends to imply the response it requires, or what 
political action is considered appropriate and effective (Freeden 2008, p. 198; Stone 
2002). In other words, ideas play a role in policy development. Of course ideas are only 
one among other factors (such as power and interests) to explain policy developments, 
but they may have an influence nonetheless (Béland 2005; Campbell 2002; Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993; John 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). They can do so by 
functioning as roadmaps, providing guidance on which actions to take to obtain 
specified goals; or as focal points, standing at the basis of cooperation and coordination 
to overcome collective action problems by reducing uncertainty; or by exercising 
influence through their institutionalisation, with ideas becoming entrenched in norms 
and habits and routinely reinforced (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, pp. 11-24). Ideas 
may also function as paradigms that structure and filter information, modifying it to fit 
into the existing ideational framework (Hall 1993, pp. 279-281). When political theorists 
clarify issues and concepts, they hence may shape how these are perceived and 
subsequently responded to. That implies that they alter or refine existing political ideas 
so studying the latter helps to know where and how they may want to do so.  
So far, this discussion has been rather general, suggesting that studying ideas helps 
political theorists to make a more effective practical contribution to political debate. 
However, this thesis is concerned with the issue of unity in multicultural societies and 
the nature of this issue presents an additional reason for studying existing ideas. This is 
because what unity is depends on how it is conceived. Phenomena like unity and 
national identity do not simply ‘exist in the world independently of the beliefs people 
have about them, in the way that, say, volcanoes and elephants do’ (Miller 1995, p. 17). 
What these concepts mean exactly depends on how they are defined and evaluated, or 
constructed, in debate and argument (although, clearly, that construction is limited by 
conventional empirical reference points) (cf. Blyth 2003; Campbell 2002; Finnemore and 
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Sikkink 2001; Freeden 1996; Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Skinner 2002). Thus, Bauböck 
(2008, p. 8) considers that the change in political discourse about multiculturalism 
following its alleged crisis is important as it ‘affects how the political community is 
imagined by the wider citizenry’. This means that unity cannot straightforwardly be 
studied through empirical tests or quantitative measurements but is more readily 
captured by an approach focusing on ideas.  
Hence, political ideas help to make sense of political reality and structure responses to 
it: they influence decisions on political action and political theorists may attempt to 
shape them to that effect. Moreover, they capture something of the nature of the issue 
of unity, so that knowing them helps to gain a firmer grasp of what unity is within a 
particular context. Studying ideas thus facilitates a greater awareness of the 
phenomenon that most political theorists discussed in the next chapter address.  
2.3 Two criteria for practical political theory  
As a contribution to political debate, then, practical political theory not only clarifies 
issues and concepts but does so in an attempt to shape the ideas of political elites and 
that involves responding to the ideas these elites already have. But while engaging in 
debate certainly implies knowing and addressing the other positions that are being 
defended, practical political theory is not entirely conditioned by or contingent upon 
these positions: it needs to meet certain standards, which can be derived from the 
discussion of different methodological paradigms in the introduction and are outlined 
in this section.  
It was suggested in section 1.2 that practical political theory would benefit from 
avoiding the dangers of both unreflective realistic theory (which risks unquestioningly 
affirming the attitudes, institutions and social relationships that exist within the context 
it targets) and overly idealistic theory (which might be irrelevant to political dilemmas 
in current societies). On top of the considerations that guide any form of political 
theory, such as a concern for clarity, consistency and coherence, practical political 
theory therefore pays particular attention to two criteria: it is both morally defensible 
and politically plausible. These criteria are not meant as formal conditions that can be 
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applied as a checklist, but simply aim to guide judgment. Clearly, this involves 
interpretation and sensitivity, and the criteria help by pointing to relevant 
considerations. 
Moral defensibility is one element of wider defensibility: practical political theory 
needs to be able to withstand logical criticism, offer credible depictions and 
evaluations, and so on. Meanwhile, it is somewhat obvious that an argument put 
forward in normative political theory aims to be morally defensible. For while it may 
aim for impact, such theory is primarily normative in nature, even when its scope is 
not universal but restricted to a particular context. Hence, moral defensibility is prior 
to the political plausibility criterion discussed below. Indeed, the question of moral 
defensibility, or the specific content of ‘what we owe to each other’ (Scanlon 1999), has 
been the topic of much intelligent reflection in political theory over the centuries. Such 
reflection has not resulted in unanimous agreement, however, and the criterion 
outlined here does not seek to defend a fully determined theory of morality, justice or 
obligation, but rather point to different types of considerations that might be relevant 
when devising responses to particular cases: it sketches the outlines of a conception of 
what moral defensibility requires for practical political theory that aims to contribute 
insights to political elites in real contexts.  
Moral defensibility can be approached as a product of taking up what has been called 
‘the moral point of view’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1990, p. 71), which holds that a 
position should not favour the interests of a particular person or group; it should be 
impartial or fair and apply to all equally and identically. Such reciprocity expresses a 
commitment to the status of persons as free and equal as it does not discriminate 
between persons on the basis of any particularities they may have. But it may not be 
enough to determine the moral defensibility of a practical political theory that is not 
universal but forms a contribution to political debate within a particular context 
(although the moral defensibility criterion developed here is meant as a heuristic 
device to guide judgment in particular situations: it does not depend on a position 
concerning the metaphysical status of principles). As section 1.2 explained, the 
practical form of political theory subscribed to here has affinities with contextual 
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approaches to political theory. In the words of Miller (2013, p. 48), a prominent 
advocate of such approaches, determining moral defensibility demands that ‘we 
interpret the context of decision in a certain way, and this tells us which principle to 
use’. That means such practical political theory is aware of its practical implications: it 
is sensitive to its likely consequences, and takes into account the importance of special 
relationships that create moral obligations (Bellamy 1999, pp. 6-7; Miller 2013, pp. 33-
38, 46-48; cf. Parekh 2000b, pp. 127-128).  
Reciprocity or impartiality as a consideration of moral defensibility corresponds to the 
‘Golden Rule’ that has animated ethics since Antiquity: treat others as you would like 
to be treated. Rawls’ (1971, pp. 17-22) Original Position28 is one of the most famous 
thought experiments to bring out the importance of this principle. It depicts the 
conditions under which parties would agree to the principles ordering the basic 
structure of society: a fair agreement requires that all differences between the parties 
are abstracted away, so they are forced to take the perspectives of the others and will 
only agree to principles that do not privilege particular beliefs, positions or talents. 
Principles thus agreed would be in the interest of the many, not the few, and avoid the 
domination of particular groups or doctrines. For constructivists (e.g. Roberts 2007), 
the reciprocity principle should inspire practical reasoning to progressively detract all 
subjective beliefs and preferences so as to achieve moral objectivity. A legal analogy to 
the reciprocity principle is the non-discrimination article found in most constitutions: 
individuals and groups should be treated equally, regardless of their different 
backgrounds. Rules should be neutral and applied without reference to characteristics 
such as ethnicity, gender or religion.  
In practice, however, reciprocity may not lead to desirable outcomes. Political theory 
that is practical in a more applied sense than Rawls’ ideal theory acknowledges that the 
context it addresses will have a history of shifting power relations between different 
groups in society and a present in which actors are not located equally in terms of 
                                                     
28 See the next chapter for a more detailed discussion of this concept. 
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symbolic and material resources.29 These contextual factors are likely to impact on the 
consequences, both real and perceived, of the proposed action (Favell and Modood 
2003, pp. 491-493). A seemingly neutral and strictly reciprocal position might end up 
disadvantaging some unfairly, or perpetuate existing injustices. It will simply not do to 
point to impartiality, if impartiality leads to unfair outcomes and fails to challenge 
covert domination (cf. Bellamy 1999, pp. 62, 120-121; Levy 2007, pp. 187-195; cf. Miller 
2008, pp. 46-48).30 To extend the legal analogy offered above, this consideration can be 
likened to the indirect discrimination legislation that is often adopted to complement 
the non-discrimination clause, to protect minorities from seemingly neutral rules that 
bear on them more heavily than on others.  
Finally, practical political theory cannot ignore the special relationships we stand in to 
significant others and practices. Such relationships carry moral obligations: what we 
owe to our children, friends, religion or art is of a different urgency and nature to what 
we owe to a stranger (Bellamy 1999, p. 7; Miller 2013, p. 48). Some (e.g. MacIntyre 2003; 
Miller 1995) argue that nationality constitutes such a special relationship: nations are 
communities of ethical significance. Whether that is rationally justifiable remains 
contested (e.g. Carens 1987; Habermas 1995). Likewise, cultural membership can be 
seen as a special relationship (e.g. Parekh 2000b); although others understand it as a 
choice (e.g. Barry 2001). Which relationships should count as special clearly is difficult 
to determine, but is hard to deny that for most of us, the moral duties arising from 
special relationships often take precedence over more abstract moral obligations. If a 
man sees both his beloved wife and a stranger drowning in a pond and he can save 
only one, the question of who he should save is not really a question (Frankfurt 2004, 
pp. 35-37). Therefore, practical political theory does not ignore these demands.  
                                                     
29 The importance of context also limits reciprocity in another way: strict reciprocity would 
require proposals to be acceptable to all people, i.e. universally (cf. O’Neill 1997). That restricts 
the detail or thickness of any proposal and it is unnecessary for the type of practical political 
theory discussed here. Rather, proposals need to be reciprocal between the people political 
action directly pertains to, i.e. citizens.  
30 Of course, actions and particularly political actions may have unintended consequences and 
we can never be fully aware of all the processes set in motion; but a sincere and thorough 
attempt at understanding the consequences of a proposal would improve its moral 
defensibility.  
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Moral defensibility, then, entails sensitively balancing considerations of reciprocity, 
consequences and special relationships. These considerations may at times point to 
different courses of action, and participants to the political debate that practical 
political theory responds to may appeal to them (as well as different values, interests, 
and so on) in different ways. As indicated above, the specificities of the situation that 
practical political theory addresses should help to determine the best response to such 
conflicts (Miller 2013, pp. 48, 61-63). Contextual awareness helps to understand ‘how 
these obligations interact with each other and what they demand, so that we can 
appreciate the distinctive force of the reasons involved in the dilemma’ (Bellamy 1999, 
p. 12), in order to come to a balanced solution.  
Thus conceived, the moral defensibility criterion likely avoids the risk of simply 
affirming existing beliefs, but also goes some way to avoiding the risk of irrelevance. 
However, to make a contribution that is of practical use, or to ‘cast some light on the 
murky business of actual political debate or public policy-making’ (Favell and Modood 
2003, p. 485), practical political theory goes further: it is also politically plausible. This 
goes beyond the logical plausibility any political theory exhibits but does not involve 
empirical plausibility in a strict sense because, as noted above, unity is difficult to 
quantify, model and predict. Rather, practical political theory is politically plausible: it 
forms a credible contribution to a debate that is not abstract and eternal but rather 
concrete and contextual.  
As noted above, this implies an engagement with existing positions defended in such 
debates. Such an engagement both presupposes and facilitates that practical political 
theory is relevant to the issues and the context it addresses: only when it speaks to the 
existing ideas of political elites will they recognise it as relevant and useful, and by 
taking care to explain how it speaks to these ideas, it demonstrates its practical use. 
This roughly translates into two considerations of political plausibility: first, practical 
political theory benefits from conceptual relevance, or a clear awareness of how the 
issue it addresses is understood so that it offers insights that are readily recognised as 
applicable; and secondly, engaging with existing ideas helps practical political theory to 
show that it could be acceptable in the context it addresses, or that it actually stands a 
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chance of being endorsed following democratic debate so that it may shape political 
action.  
Practical political theory is conceptually relevant to the context it is aimed at: the 
concepts it uses and the propositions it defends reflect the situation it addresses so that 
it is clearly applicable. This might seem obvious, but some political theory operates at a 
level of abstraction that can make its propositions seem distant and foreign (cf. Carens 
1996, pp. 167-169). In addition, political theory sometimes pretends or appears to have 
universal validity when it is really based in local experiences that structure its content 
more than it concedes. Some multicultural theory that is taken to apply to Europe in 
fact has a Canadian or North American bias; it was developed with indigenous 
peoples, national minorities and a particular type of religious communities such as the 
Amish in mind. The concepts that were developed to understand the appropriate 
relationships between minorities, majorities and the state in this context may not prove 
as useful when considering multiculturalism in other contexts (Favell and Modood 
2003, pp. 487-495; cf. Levy 2007; Triandafyllidou et al 2006). 
A more ‘inductive’ approach to political theory that starts from contextual knowledge 
likely enhances the use of appropriate concepts to respond to the issues raised by 
multiculturalism within the context of study (Triandafyllidou et al 2006, p. 6) and 
avoids excessive abstraction and false universality. For example, practical political 
theory about multiculturalism in Europe reflects the common understanding of this 
concept as referring to post-immigration cultural and religious diversity (cf. Modood 
2007, pp. 1-5; Triandafyllidou et al 2006). Practical political theorists hence ‘make use of 
the conceptual markers that are present in everyday judgment’ (Miller 2013, p. 42) so 
that it is clear what they are talking about and so that people will recognise that 
practical political theory has ‘practical force, in the sense that people will be motivated 
to act on its requirements’ (Miller 2013, p. 42). In other words, political theorists share a 
language or vocabulary with other participants to the political debate to which they 
contribute, and practical political theory operates within the bounds of this shared 
language rather than obfuscate it. In the words of the Parekh report (Parekh 2000c, p. 
x):  
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‘We are fully aware of these and other limitations of the dominant language of 
debate. Inventing a wholly new vocabulary does not make sense, for such a 
language would be too abstract, artificial and unrelated to the idioms of everyday 
life to be intelligible, let alone provide a vehicle for meaningful dialogue’.  
Studying how central concepts are understood in political debate helps political 
theorists to remain grounded in this shared language and offer clarifications and 
suggestions that are readily recognised by other participants to the debate as useful 
and applicable.  
Secondly, practical political theory is relevant to the context it targets and that means 
there is a real possibility that its suggestions are feasible – a concern that characterises 
realistic theory (Carens 1996, pp. 160-164). As Miller (2013, pp. 36-37) explains, such 
feasibility not only pertains to physical possibilities but also to political factors: 
practical political theory proposes courses of action that could actually be adopted 
following political deliberation. In other words, it is acceptable not only in a more 
abstract sense but also within a particular context: such practical political theory speaks 
to existing political ideas. However, contra Miller (2013, pp. 33-35), that does not mean 
that practical political theory takes as given the fundamental beliefs current in a given 
society. It is hard to distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental beliefs, especially 
as such beliefs may be prioritised differently by different people, and (as Miller [2013, 
p. 33] himself notes) even fundamental beliefs may change over time. And these 
fundamental ideas may actually be wrong.  
That means any existing consensus is contingent and a practical political theorist may, 
or indeed should, try to alter it if she believes it flawed (Baier 1989, pp. 782-785; Stears 
2005, p. 339-347; Swift and White 2008, p. 67). The moral defensibility criterion, 
therefore, is meant to stop the approach developed here from being ‘contextual all the 
way down’ (Levy 2007, p. 193), or ‘political in the wrong way’ (Rawls 1989, p. 250). 
That is, while practical political theory responds to existing ideas in order to be 
plausible, it needs to be defensible first. While the practical political theorist takes 
existing ideas seriously ‘as prima facie worthy of respect, as objects that are rightly 
accommodated or taken into account (perhaps because doing so is democratic, or 
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consensual) rather than merely denounced to the extent that they fail to track a given 
ideal’ (Sabl 2011, p. 170, note 34), she may aim to radically transform them. That means 
effectively that while practical political theory does not follow the positions that 
already exist in debate, it is aware of them in order to show how it engages with them 
and challenges them where necessary. The acceptability consideration, then, mainly 
functions as a signpost.31 Practical political theory already achieves a sufficient degree 
of acceptability by meeting the moral defensibility criterion and applicability 
consideration, but bears in mind and responds to existing ideas as the background at 
which it is targeted and the positions in debate it addresses in an attempt to win them 
over (cf. Parekh 2000b, p. 308).  
Yet as noted before, while political theorists such as Miller (2013, p. 38) may recognise 
the ‘need to explore the structure of those [pre-existing political] beliefs’, they have 
failed to do so systematically in the debate on unity in multicultural society (but see: 
Modood et al 2006; Uberoi and Modood 2010, 2013b). Of course, political theorists may 
claim to know these ideas because they are simply aware of them, embedded as they 
are in the same society, language and political debate as the political elites they attempt 
to influence. A more systematic study of these ideas then seems unnecessary for 
practical political theory. But as the introduction explained, this leaves political 
theorists open to the charge that they merely assert knowledge of these ideas without 
showing evidence for it (as they would do for scholarly expressions of ideas) so that 
they may be accused of misunderstanding or distorting them. 
Practical political theorists can use a more systematic study of the ideas they intend to 
shape to more credibly achieve their practical aims, as they can then lend empirical 
support to their claims that they know these ideas and therefore know that their 
suggestions are applicable and acceptable, and therefore politically plausible, within 
the context they address. Studying political ideas thus helps political theorists to 
advance positions that are not only morally defensible but also politically plausible; 
and to demonstrate rather than assert the latter.   
                                                     
31 Such that proposals only need to make it likely that they might be adopted following 
democratic debate.  
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2.4 Analysing political ideas 
The previous sections have explained that practical political theory can be conceived as 
a contribution to political debate and as such it responds to existing ideas, and such a 
response is facilitated by studying these ideas. Now that we know why the study of the 
existing ideas of political elites might be useful, this section will turn to how they can 
be studied. Applying this method will enable this thesis to make an innovative 
contribution to the debate on unity in multicultural societies in contemporary political 
theory that not only responds to theoretical disputes but can also demonstrate its 
practical use within the context of the UK and the Netherlands by responding to the 
ideas about unity that already exist here.  
The analysis of existing political ideas in chapters 4 and 5 will provide information 
about political realities, but it also aims to exemplify the political debate to which a 
practical political theory contributes. As suggested before, this requires the possibility 
of communication between positions defended in political theory and those defended 
in political debate, which implies a certain similarity in the structure of their 
arguments. Indeed, Freeden (1996, pp. 13-14) argues that political debate is not inferior 
to theoretical debate but rather a distinct genre of political thought. It may not follow 
the same standards of rationality and coherence, but ‘the differences between them […] 
are insufficient to warrant the analysis of their political thinking as belonging to 
entirely discrete categories’ (Freeden 1996, p. 44). That is, the political ideas expressed 
in parliamentary debates can be analysed as ‘amateur political theory’ (Favell 1998, p. 
15), or in ways similar to how historians of ideas analyse the ideas they find in 
historical texts (Laborde 2008, pp. 5-6).  
The analysis, hence, is interested primarily in the meaning of the positions defended in 
these debates: understanding their internal logic helps to know how to respond to 
them. That sets the method developed here apart from approaches in the social 
sciences that aim to establish the causal importance of ideas (and their supporters) in 
explaining political developments (e.g. Béland 2009; Campbell 2002; Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Hall 1993; Yee 1996): such approaches largely bracket the content or 
meaning of these ideas and instead focus on the explanation of their effects.  
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Understanding the meaning of ideas requires interpreting them. Interpretation, 
however, can be approached in different ways. Finlayson (2013, pp. 313-314) 
distinguishes between three ways of approaching language in political theory: first, the 
‘Kantian tradition’ is concerned with ‘setting limits to what will be considered 
reasonable language, and with policing the borders of linguistic legitimacy’ (Finlayson 
2013, p. 313) through designing principles for deliberation. Many political philosophers 
dedicate their efforts to determining the best possible definition of particular concepts 
such as justice (Freeden 2005, p. 121). Yet they continue to disagree, and such 
disagreement is mirrored in politics (Floyd 2011, p. 44), which leads Miller (2013, pp. 
41) to question: 
‘What […] is the point of theorizing about justice if the only result of our efforts is 
to produce yet one more theory to lay alongside the existing array, with no real 
prospect of converting anyone who already adheres to a rival theory?’  
A second, ‘Wittgensteinian tradition’ (Finlayson 2013, p. 313), therefore, ‘place[s] a 
question-mark against all those neo-Kantian projects of our time in which we 
encounter an aspiration to halt the flux of politics by trying definitively to fix the 
analysis of key moral terms’ (Skinner 2002, p. 177). Instead, it focuses on how concepts 
can be used to express different meanings. Of course, the fact that concepts are 
currently understood in a variety of ways itself does not mean that no best definition is 
possible. But it does suggest that to understand how political elites conceive of unity in 
multicultural society, a more interesting path is to look at how they define and relate 
central concepts in different ways. Interpretation thus shifts from a concern with truth 
or the establishment of a singular correct understanding of a concept (cf. Sartori 2009), 
to a concern with what agents believe to be true. As Skinner (2002, p. 47) puts it when 
discussing historical interpretation, this means trying ‘to think as our ancestors thought 
and to see things their way’.  
It is this conception of interpretation that the thesis follows, and it can be distinguished 
from a third tradition that is loosely based in Critical Theory and emphasises how 
ideas are vehicles for power and domination. Their interpretation consequently 
involves uncovering power dynamics that can then be challenged through their 
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reformulation (Finlayson 2013, pp. 313-314; cf. Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). It would 
be foolish to deny that power is central to politics, and it may operate through 
language and ideas (Agger 1991; Fischer 2003; Freeden 1996, p. 23; Hajer 1995; Lukes 
1974)32: as indicated above, ideas structure interpretation and action, and every ‘serious 
utterance will always be doing something as well as saying something, and doing it in 
virtue of what is said’ (Skinner 2002, p. 106). Politics may be understood as ‘a 
discursive struggle to create and control systems of shared social meanings’ (Fischer 
2003, p. 13): when a particular representation of the social world becomes dominant it 
will structure subsequent actions and policy decisions. However, the empirical analysis 
is interested in the different positions in debate, in order to subsequently engage with 
them, rather than in exposing power dynamics. It is primarily concerned with the 
structure of the ideas that are defended, rather than their relative importance or 
support or how they reflect power.  
The thesis, hence, will interpret the positions defended in debate as compositions of 
concepts in use. The approach to the study of these positions proposed here differs 
from that pioneered by Skinner (2002). While he equally directs attention to how 
concepts can carry a variety of meanings depending on their location in larger 
structures of argument, he suggests studying context in order to explain why agents 
hold the beliefs they do and to elucidate their intentions in expressing them, so as to 
fully grasp the meaning of a text. Such analysis is inappropriate here because in 
contrast to the canonical texts of political philosophy he studies, the parliamentary 
debates analysed here are contemporary; much more obviously already contextual (as 
they respond to political events); less rigorously reflective and complete in terms of 
argument (Freeden 1996, pp. 39-40); and more ‘political’: positions may be defended 
with more strategic liberty (Béland 2009; Campbell 1998; Swift and White 2008, p. 64), 
such that actors are seen to defend alternative perspectives at different times, in line 
with their political goals (Jacobs 1998, p. 358).  
                                                     
32 Lukes (1974) distinguishes between three forms of power that specify different ways in which 
governments can make people behave in certain ways: they may impose coercive rules; they 
may keep certain issues and interests off the political agenda; and they may use ideological 
power to shape the desires and needs of people, such that they will want what the government 
tells them to want.  
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A more appropriate basis for studying different conceptions of unity advanced in 
political debate is offered by Freeden’s (1996) influential approach to the analysis of 
ideologies (understood not as distorted views of reality but simply as political 
orientations or worldviews) that focuses on how concepts are defined and related in 
larger structures of argument. Such ideologies, Freeden (1996, pp. 22-23, 33-35; 2008) 
argues, are produced and consumed by groups rather than individuals: they are 
ubiquitous forms of political thinking and while individual actors may shape, alter or 
contribute to them, they exist independently of them and authorship is not easily 
attributed – such that their interpretation also requires reconstructing unintended or 
implicit meanings. Political actors behaving strategically, then, draw on such 
ideologies to delineate their position.    
The conceptions of unity analysed in chapters 4 and 5 in fact are only partial 
ideologies: they offer only a limited view of social and political reality and do not 
specify a definite orientation to most other political values. As such, they may be 
compatible with different political outlooks. But as partial ideologies, they are still 
clusters of concepts that are defined in particular ways. Such concepts, Freeden (1996, 
pp. 47-67) argues, are somewhat indeterminate because they are essentially contestable: 
their meaning is never ultimately fixed and depends both on traditional usage (which 
effectively renders it rather stable) and the position they take in connection to other 
concepts within a particular argument. Such arguments, then, form a temporary 
‘decontestation’ (Freeden 1996, p. 6) of these concepts that responds to both logical and 
cultural constraints: the forms, or meanings, concepts may take on are limited by 
logical concerns of intelligibility but also by what is perceived to be normal and 
legitimate within a particular cultural context (Freeden 1996, pp. 67-75). Freeden (1996, 
pp. 47-67) suggests a three-dimensional analysis of the form of political concepts that 
identifies and analyses the larger structure or arrangement in which concepts are 
embedded; the concepts at its core; and the attributes of these concepts.  
Freeden’s (1996) ultimate focus is on the concept because his aim is conceptual analysis 
and clarification of the different ways in which concepts are used. But the aim of this 
thesis is slightly different: it seeks to understand and then engage with the positions 
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found in debate. That is, whereas Freeden’s aims are strictly interpretative, here they 
are also normative. Freeden (1996, pp. 6-8; 2005, pp. 133-134; 2008, pp. 210-211) argues 
that the analysis of political ideologies needs to be a separate activity from a 
substantive engagement with the topics they address. It is about interpreting and 
decoding messages, not about judging them in terms of validity or appeal. However, 
while it is certainly important to retain a critical distance during the activity of 
interpretation so as to render different positions fairly33, it is unlikely that a political 
theorist can ever switch off her judgmental capacities completely. The study of 
competing normative positions, be they political theories or ideologies, will likely 
result in a considered judgment that favours some over others. The worry is perhaps 
that making that judgment explicit, or ‘taking sides’, might make the discussion of the 
different positions seem biased, but leaving it implicit does not take away that 
possibility, just like transparency does not necessarily increase it.  
Hence, this thesis switches between interpretative and normative logics: when it 
uncovers how unity is conceived by political theorists (chapter 3) and political elites 
(chapters 4 and 5) it seeks to understand what they think unity is and why they think it 
is important, and it interprets their arguments in order to present their positions as 
impartially as possible. But subsequently, it will argue that a multicultural conception 
of unity presents the most defensible approach to unity and is also politically plausible. 
Ultimately, therefore, the focus here is not on the concept but on the positions that 
arrange and delimit concepts, because these are the positions that are responded to in 
the second stage. The analysis of how concepts are used, then, is a means to 
understanding what is being argued for in a proposition (Swift and White 2008, p. 65).  
The suggested focus on larger structures of argument rather than concepts also brings 
into clearer view how ideologies are not only internally structured but also respond to 
external factors such as political or social events, and other ideologies in debate 
(Finlayson 2012, pp. 757-758). Thus, Finlayson (2012, p. 757) notes that more than 
simply an arrangement of concepts, ‘an ideology is a way of making political claims, 
                                                     
33 And the positions analysed in chapters 4 and 5, hence, do not reflect my opinion, although 
they follow from my interpretation and reconstruction of the arguments.  
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proving judgements and staging interventions in ways that might persuade others to 
assent to them’. Ideologies, effectively, seek to convince their audience that the 
propositions and the perspective on the social world they defend are valid and 
appropriate (Finlayson 2012; cf. Parekh 2000b, p. 308): they are moves in an argument 
(Skinner 2002, p. 115). That means that analysing and contrasting the different 
perspectives that are responding to each other may help to recognise their full shape: a 
plural perspective can ‘use each [position] to illuminate the insights and expose the 
limitations of others’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 339). This helps to identify conflicts and 
overlaps between them.  
The analysis of positions comprised of ideas found in political debate presented in 
chapters 4 and 5, then, interprets their meaning that is partly contextual, and proceeds 
to translate it ‘into general categories, give it a rational grounding and a formally 
logical structure’ (Laborde 2008, p. 5), with the aim of accounting ‘for their justificatory 
force by interpreting and reconstructing their logic as accurately as possible’ (Laborde 
2008, p. 6). Context shapes the way concepts are conceived and related within larger 
structures of argument – or, as Freeden (2005, p. 115) puts it, ‘access to our 
understanding of political thinking [is] always mediated through its spatially and 
temporally contextualized instances’ – and the introduction of political and social 
context in the previous chapter and the case study chapters is meant precisely to 
explain their shape. Nevertheless, the content and structure of these arguments can be 
appreciated in their own right. Interpretation brings out the reasons, rationale and 
commitments of the positions on unity in multicultural society that are defended by 
political elites in the UK and the Netherlands. These positions are thus interpreted and 
reconstructed into something like ‘political theories’ that can be compared across 
linguistic contexts (Favell 1998, p. 5). This process of reconstruction draws on the 
insights into the normative issues and potential justifications for different courses of 
action that the next chapter offers in order to draw out the implications of the 
sometimes incomplete arguments political elites make (cf. Swift and White 2008, pp. 
62-63).    
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To put to practice these somewhat abstract insights and analyse how concepts are 
defined and combined in different ways in different perspectives on unity articulated 
in parliamentary debates from the UK and the Netherlands, the approach developed 
here draws on frame analysis. This method developed in the social sciences and offers 
more practical suggestions for data analysis. It focuses on how social issues are 
interpreted and represented differently: any issue can be ‘framed’ in different ways, for 
actors can highlight different dimensions, provide alternative explanations, attribute 
blame and responsibility in different ways, and downplay or ignore different elements 
(see: Bacchi 2000; Béland 2009; Rein and Schön 1994; Stone 2002).  
Such ‘framing’ is a way of constructing social reality, providing a more or less coherent 
picture of what is at stake and what needs to happen (Benford and Snow 2000). This 
corresponds to what Freeden (2005, p. 115) refers to as ‘the construction of political 
visions’. Skinner (2002, p. 5) equally takes an interest in ‘the power of words to 
underpin or undermine the construction of our social world’. Just like political 
theorists construct visions of social reality to aim for, so do political actors – although 
they do so more strategically: they frame or package their ideas to appeal to a broad 
audience (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614). Typically, ideas are represented as being 
close to the central values of a society, displaying a good fit with national traditions 
and needs (Béland 2005, 2009), so that they may appear less abstract than in political 
theories.  
To identify frames competing within a broader debate, analysis starts from a clear 
understanding of what they look like (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007; 
Triandafyllidou 2006). Frames perform three core tasks: they provide a diagnosis, or 
problem definition; a prognosis, or a solution; and motivation for actors to support and 
act on their content (Benford and Snow 2000, pp. 614-618). In other words, they make 
sense of reality and present arguments about how to respond politically to social 
issues. This roughly corresponds to the three interlinked components of a political 
argument that Favell (1998, pp. 14-15) distinguishes: they contain epistemological 
claims about the reality of the situation; explanatory claims about the causality of 
political action; and normative claims about what ideals to aim for. These tasks feed 
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into a list of ‘sensitising questions’ (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007, pp. 315-316; 
Triandafyllidou 2006, p. 136) to aid the recognition of frames (Appendix 1). In the 
social sciences, studies often identify frames in order to then draw out causal 
influences on their content (e.g. Timmermans and Scholten 2006) or to establish their 
importance in terms of frequency (e.g. Koenig 2006; Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007), 
but as indicated, here they are considered in terms of their internal logic.  
The interpretative quality of this method (like most qualitative research) inevitably 
brings in an element of subjective judgment. To substantiate the interpretation with 
evidence and lend it credibility, the frames will be presented through the use of quotes 
from the debates. These are the quotes that most pertinently express ideas that are 
central to the frames. Some of the quotes selected might fit with more than one of the 
frames, and this indicates how the frames overlap; their position in one frame rather 
than the other depends on the place the quote takes in the argument the speaker 
makes. As noted above, furthermore, the same speaker may refer to different frames, 
but the focus of the analysis is on the frame and not the speaker, so that the articulation 
of the idea is more important than who articulates it. To reiterate, this is because this 
thesis approaches the frames as positions in debate that it aims to address in terms of 
their content, and this content – unlike political significance – can be assessed 
independently of who utters it. These frames represent ubiquitous patterns of political 
thought that in some sense exist independently of political actors (who may draw on 
them to position themselves and in so doing may nonetheless modify them) (cf. 
Freeden 1996, pp. 22-23, 33-35). Finally, as the frames are interpretations and 
reconstructions of the arguments found in the debates, intended to model and clarify 
what is at stake, the relationship between the quotes and the frames is not completely 
direct (as the frames are not purely descriptions). The quotes illustrate the discussion of 
the frames, which also draws on other parts of the debate that sometimes expresses 
ideas in a less ‘quotable’ way.  
This section has suggested a method for the analysis of political ideas that identifies 
different perspectives, or frames, within a wider debate and interprets these as 
instances of political thought, or in terms of how they specify and relate particular 
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ideas. This method will be applied to parliamentary debates from the UK and the 
Netherlands. The results this yields will provide political theorists with a view of the 
debate they address, so that they may engage with the positions that exist in this 
debate. Nevertheless, this analysis is also valuable in its own right as it tells us 
something about the world we live in by clarifying how questions about unity in 
multicultural society are understood in these two countries. In Freeden’s (1996, p. 39) 
words, it supplies ‘us with the abundant varieties of political thought from which to 
embark on a voyage of understanding of this facet of the human mind and its linkage 
with the worlds of government, power, and group-activity’.  
2.5 Research design 
This chapter has explained why practical political theory can benefit from studying 
political ideas (to be able to more effectively shape the ideas and guide the actions of 
political elites involved in shaping political action; and to be able to show its political 
plausibility); and how such ideas can be studied (by analysing frames comprised of 
ideas defended in debate as political thought). This section will now focus on what will 
be analysed: the sample of empirical data. The choice for this sample reflects the 
interdisciplinary quality of this thesis that combines interpretative and normative 
logics (cf. Laborde 2008, pp. 1-26): the analysis not only aims to interpret the ideas 
present in these debates but does so with the aim of subsequently responding to them.  
The problem this thesis is interested in concerns attitudes to unity and diversity. The 
UK and the Netherlands are two pertinent examples of countries where such attitudes 
have recently attracted popular as well as scholarly attention: these are the two 
countries most strongly associated with a recent perceived crisis of multiculturalism as 
they were both initially upheld as models of multiculturalism and now seen to have 
turned against the concept (e.g. Bertossi 2011; Joppke 2007; Koopmans 2008). 
Multiculturalism and national identity have received sustained public attention here 
during this crisis, so that debates from these countries should form an interesting data 
source. Hence, the empirical analysis may offer an empirical counterpart to political 
theories of liberalism and multiculturalism (cf. Favell 1998, p. 14; Modood 2007, pp. 6-
8). Comparing how unity is conceived in two different countries, moreover, helps to 
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highlight local idiosyncrasies (Laborde 2008, pp. 5-6), so that it may help to achieve ‘a 
certain distance’ (Sen 2006, p. 232) from the perspectives in each case that allows for the 
challenging of parochial prejudice (cf. Parekh 2000b, p. 339), and thus help to avoid the 
complacency that realistic theory might risk. 
It is clear that this comparison is not a goal in its own right but rather intends to further 
our understanding of each case study. Consequently, the research design is not strictly 
comparative in a social scientific sense: the cases were selected for their familiarity with 
multiculturalism as a political idea, not because their analysis would warrant 
generalisation. This is in contrast to much comparative work on multicultural policy 
that has instead focused on countries with more contrasting approaches to diversity, 
such as the UK and France, to bring out differences and similarities across these 
different approaches and illuminate more general problems (e.g. Brubaker 1990; Favell 
1998). This is because the ultimate aim of this thesis is normative rather than 
explanatory.  
The analysis focuses on parliamentary debates. This is an interesting data source, 
because as Freeden (2008, p. 206) notes, these debates ‘serve witness to the mores 
outlining the permissible and the knowable in a particular context’. After all, 
parliamentarians are involved in shaping legislation, which codifies and consolidates 
such mores. Therefore, ideas advanced in parliamentary debates help to understand 
how certain types of approaches might be considered more readily applicable and 
acceptable than others, not only by these parliamentarians but also by the wider 
population whose mores they supposedly represent. Parliamentary debates can be 
read as a subset of wider political debates because they are set within a context to 
which they are responsive, as parliamentarians want to appeal to their electorate, so 
that the ideas articulated here tend to reflect those in society. This is reinforced by the 
fact that Members of Parliament are important actors in the establishment of wider 
political frames (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008, p. 4): they attempt to shape how 
society views issues and are important actors in wider political debates. Parliamentary 
debates, then, form part of and reflect wider political debates that play out in civil 
society and the media.  
  
 
55 
 
This part of the wider debate is of particular interest because the political elites that 
participate in these debates are involved in shaping political action. As noted above, 
practical political theory normally contributes to political debate with the aim of 
guiding political action and such action runs through the ideas of political elites 
involved in shaping it. Parliamentarians shape legislation but also the wider context in 
which policy is made: they operate at the intersection of ideas and action. Their ideas 
about unity, multiculturalism and national identity are important because they 
influence political action, which in turn affects these phenomena. Parliamentary 
debates, thus, give an insight into how important political elites conceive of political 
dilemmas such as the problem of unity in diverse societies.  
Parliamentary debates, furthermore, are interesting given the methodological position 
outlined above: the contribution this thesis aims to make can be understood as a 
contribution to political debate. These debates exemplify the background of existing 
ideas that it responds to, and as an instance of sustained political deliberation, they 
may give insight into any political agreement that already exists (cf. Uberoi and 
Modood 2013b). They hence point to the pre-existing consensus that practical political 
theory addresses and help to determine the acceptability of a position (cf. Miller 2008, 
pp. 47-48). Thus, Favell (1998, pp. 9-10) finds that in France and the UK a wide 
consensus exists on the terms of the debate and overall policy rationale. Although 
political actors engage in contentious argument, they agree on the structure of the 
debate and the meaning of a number of key concepts. Parliamentary debates showcase 
different positions in the debate on unity in diverse societies in interaction, while also 
pointing to overlaps between them.  
Finally, parliamentary debates are well suited to the type of analysis outlined in the 
previous section. As a sample of institutionalised political deliberation, they are 
instances of political elites engaging in public reason-giving, elaborating their position 
and justifying their proposals, while trying to persuade their opponents. These actors 
do so through the reading of prepared speeches that is controlled by a chair who also 
manages interjections (Van Dijk 2000, p. 99). Van Dijk (2000, p. 100) describes how 
parliamentary debates follow a particular format: the speeches contain a problem 
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definition that is aligned with the ideology of the speaker; an account of the negative 
consequences that will occur if their proposed action is not taken; an evaluation of 
current policies and a critique of the proposals of opponents; and finally, a defence of 
proposals for improvement. This recalls the three functions of frames introduced 
above. Moreover, the topics parliamentarians address in these speeches and the way 
these are presented are strategic political choices (Van Dijk 2000, pp. 99-101); they are 
the result of conscious framing. The speeches that make up parliamentary debates set 
out positions that are indicative of frames and include the type of justificatory reasons 
that facilitate the interpretation of the argument as political thought.  
A sample of parliamentary debates was selected for analysis. First of all, the time 
period for the selection was set to 2001-2011, as during these years questions of 
national unity received sustained public attention as part of a perceived crisis of 
multiculturalism fuelled by a series of events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), 
as well as those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005); the riots in Northern English 
cities (2001); and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (2004). In this context, 
questions of unity are debated in the register of multiculturalism and national identity. 
Transcripts of the debates are available online and can be searched for keywords. Both 
cases have bicameral legislatures and both Chambers are included in the analysis.  
Selection occurs in two steps (cf. Huysmans and Buonfino 2008, p. 6). First, all debates 
that mention both multiculturalism and national identity (and the relevant substitute 
terms determined by a literature review for each case study: see Appendix 2) are 
collected. Second, a selection based on relevance is made following a first reading by 
assessing the topic the debates address; and the quality of the argument. That is, 
debates are selected if they address issues relevant to unity, multiculturalism and 
national identity – if they contain information about the normative questions that the 
thesis asks; and if they do so in a reflective manner, with participants giving reasons 
and justifications – if they provide the type of information that the thesis is interested 
in.  
Debates that mention multiculturalism or national identity in passing, for example in 
relation to the war in Afghanistan, are thus excluded; and the sample consists of 
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debates that are weighed towards mostly reflective speeches, rather than those that are 
heavy with party-political struggles. These criteria reflect the aims of the empirical 
chapters of the thesis: the sample is meant to provide the best possible information 
about the conceptions and justifications of unity, multiculturalism and national 
identity current among parliamentarians in each country. 
This selection strategy resulted in slightly different samples for both case studies 
(Appendix 3). In the British case, the most reflective debates on the most relevant 
topics were seven debates from the House of Lords. In the Dutch case, the overall 
relevance and reflectiveness was of slightly lesser quality than these debates, and the 
sample therefore is bigger: it consists of twelve debates, all from the ‘Second Chamber’ 
(which in the Netherlands is the directly elected chamber). This discrepancy between 
the samples stems from the selection criteria that are primarily concerned with the 
quality of information the debates contain. It is not an obstacle to the purpose of the 
empirical analysis, which is to understand how unity is conceived in these contexts; the 
research design is not strictly comparative, and although the selection may not 
represent exactly the same subset of political elites, it does represent the wider sample 
of debates on these issues, and indeed contains the most relevant and reflective ones.  
 
This chapter has explained that political theorists who aim to be of practical use 
contribute to political debate to shape the ideas and guide the actions of political elites 
involved in shaping political responses to unity. Knowing the ideas these elites already 
have helps them to enhance and demonstrate the practical use of the clarifications they 
offer about what unity is and how it might be fostered. The next chapters will now 
clarify how unity is understood by political theorists contributing to the debate on 
unity in multicultural societies (chapter 3) and by members of the political elites 
practical political theorists attempt to influence (chapters 4 and 5).  
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3 Conceiving unity 
The previous chapter explained that political theorists can be of practical use by 
offering clarifications and suggesting courses of action that are both morally defensible 
and politically plausible, and that they can study political ideas to demonstrably meet 
the latter criterion. But another important criterion for any political theory is clarity, 
and this has been lacking somewhat in the conceptions of unity offered by political 
theorists. That is, as chapter 1 noted, while they agree that unity is important, they 
have largely neglected to specify exactly what they mean by it. This chapter will first 
offer an outline of what any conception of unity entails and then use that to make 
explicit the hitherto implicit conceptions of unity advanced by different political 
theorists contributing to the debate on unity in multicultural societies in contemporary 
political theory. As the next two chapters will show, this perspective on unity also 
helps us to understand how British and Dutch political elites think about unity in 
different ways. After chapter 6 explains the implications of these existing political ideas 
for political theorists, chapter 7 will argue that the multicultural conception of unity, 
outlined in section 3.5 below, is most defensible and also politically plausible in the UK 
and the Netherlands.  
The debate on multiculturalism in contemporary political theory developed from the 
early 1990s onwards, after claims for minority rights had been around in politics for a 
while. It was sparked in particular by Kymlicka’s (1989, 1995) work. Much normative 
theory in this period was still heavily influenced by Rawls’ (1971) seminal A Theory of 
Justice, to which this debate also responds. Although previous chapters have noted that 
his ideal theory is not practical political theory in the sense intended here, his work is 
included in this chapter because of its notable influence.34 Multiculturalism developed 
as a broad range of thought that favours a political response to diversity based on the 
public recognition of minority cultural groups, in contrast to the liberal insistence on 
                                                     
34 In fact, this chapter discusses the most influential advocates of these different conceptions of 
unity within the debate on unity in multicultural societies in contemporary political theory 
regardless of their conception of the nature and purpose of political theory (Kukathas’ theory 
also has little direct practical guidance to offer).  
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individual rights in a neutral public sphere.35 Such ideas were not entirely 
unprecedented (Nimni 1999, p. 290) but received renewed attention and elaboration. 
As chapter 1 indicated, multiculturalism sits uneasily with conceptions of unity that 
require a high degree of cultural sameness. Yet some form of unity is necessary to 
explain why diverse citizens would cooperate to generate, and abide by, collective 
political structures and decisions and live together harmoniously with their 
differences. As seen, political theorists are unclear about what unity is, even as they 
disagree about how it may be fostered (and it is clearly difficult to foster something if 
we do not know what it is, and therefore how to recognise if it is sufficient or lacking, 
growing or eroding): while some, for example, argue for a political consensus (Rawls 
1993), others advocate using a national identity (Miller 1995).  
This chapter analyses the different conceptions of unity that are implied in such 
positions advanced by political theorists. Section 3.1 explains what conceptions of 
unity comprise and this perspective on unity is then used to make explicit how 
political theorists think about it. Four such conceptions of unity that underpin or form 
part of broader political theories can be distinguished. Section 3.2 presents and 
dismisses a negative conception of unity: certain political theorists reject unity as a 
potential source of oppression, but while their criticisms are important, their vision 
does not help us to think about unity in actual societies. The remainder of the chapter 
will present the other three conceptions of unity in their own terms, without judging 
between them: the purpose of this chapter is simply to clarify how unity is conceived 
in different ways and to uncover the internal logic of these different conceptions of 
unity. Once we have a clear view of these distinctive conceptions, chapter 7 will then 
evaluate them and argue for only one of them.  
The three conceptions of unity are presented as three broad and loosely coherent 
families of approaches which nonetheless overlap and intermingle and that can be 
characterised as political conceptions of unity (section 3.3); national conceptions of 
unity (section 3.4); and multicultural conceptions of unity (section 3.5). This distinction 
                                                     
35 But, as chapter 1 explained, it also refers to a sociological reality, a political response to that 
reality, and a vision for the nation.  
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is meant as a heuristic device rather than a strict typology, but it helps to illustrate the 
differences between conceptions of unity implicitly advanced by political theorists. 
Note that this presentation departs from a more conventional way of arranging this 
literature that identifies different ‘modes of integration’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 199; see also: 
Parekh 1999; Modood and Meer 2011; Modood 2012; cf. Walzer 1997), because these 
effectively focus on how states (should) respond to cultural diversity whereas here the 
focus is more directly on unity.   
3.1 A perspective on unity 
As noted before, political theorists often do not specify exactly what they mean by 
unity. In order to uncover and analyse their conceptions of unity, therefore, we need to 
first know what such conceptions consist in. Once we know the properties of 
conceptions of unity, we can begin to recognise and reconstruct them from the 
arguments political theorists make. This section therefore delineates what conceptions 
of unity comprise by offering a new perspective on unity.  
Unity pertains to the bonds that hold a political community together (Canovan 1996, p. 
30), or the attachments that most citizens need to feel for such a community to function 
(Uberoi 2007, pp. 142-143). As such, it is not simply an abstract value but a feature of 
social reality, in which something is united. It thus forms part of the view of social 
reality that a political theory expresses. Rawls (1989, p. 234) notes that any theoretical 
position ‘presupposes a view of the political and social world’. Miller (2013, p. 73) 
emphasises how such a ‘sociology’ needs to be ‘realistic’, or empirically plausible. But 
this view of social reality is not only descriptive (cf. Modood 2007, p. 122). Kymlicka 
(1989, p. 162, emphasis added), for example, discusses how the ‘moral ontology’ of 
liberalism only recognises individuals. These views of social reality, in other words, 
express beliefs not only about what society is, but also about what it ought to be. 
Indeed, recall that political theory constructs ‘a vision of human life’ (Parekh 2011, p. 
39) to aspire to, and here such visions pertain to the ideally united society. The 
previous chapter already indicated that such views matter for they are not without 
effects: the ‘linguistic turn’ (Freeden 2008, p. 199) in philosophy raised attention to how 
language is dynamic and structures experience and action, so that ‘to the extent that 
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our social world is constituted by our concepts, any successful alteration in the use of a 
concept will at the same time constitute a change in our social world’ (Skinner 2002, 
pp. 117-118).  
Political theories concerned with unity, then, can be read as expressive of a vision of 
the united society. So how do different theorists think the polity is, and should be, 
united? To answer this question, it helps to disaggregate such visions of social reality 
into the elements that are united and to examine the relationships between these 
elements. That is, unity is a cognate of unit and it implies that different elements are 
united into this unit, or whole. This logically implies the following questions: what is 
this whole that is united, how do we characterise it? Who belongs to this whole, or 
what are the elements that are united into it? How are these elements united into it, 
through what kind of relationships? And with that in mind, we can now see how such 
unity can be found lacking: how might it be impeded and how it can be fostered by 
uniting the different elements into the whole? Conceptions of unity provide answers to 
these four questions and as the next sections will show, they do so in rather different 
ways. 
First, we need to know the character of the whole that is united. In modern liberal 
democracies, this comes down to the question whether a polity is, in first instance, a 
nation or a state. As Miller (1995, pp. 18-19) notes, nation and state are commonly used 
interchangeably, but it is important to distinguish between these two concepts as some 
states may contain several nations, and some nations may be spread out over several 
states: nation refers to a specific type of ‘community of people’, and state denotes a ‘set 
of political institutions’. Indeed, Nimni (2009, p. 323) points out that most nations 
currently do not have their own state. This distinction also enables discerning a 
disagreement about what comes first: is, as nationalists assume, the nation a source of 
unity with a legitimate claim to political self-determination, preferably in the form of a 
state (Miller 1995, p. 81)? Or does national unity follow from state policies in the form 
of nation-building (Gellner 2010, pp. 77-78)? If this is the case, that means the state has 
some responsibility for the nation it builds and the national identity it constructs or 
reconstructs, as the products of its actions. Hence, there is a stronger claim that it 
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should be concerned with ensuring these are as just as possible – that equality between 
free fellow nationals is real. But, alternatively, maybe unity is not national but simply 
an effect of state sovereignty such that citizens are united through and under the law 
(cf. Miller 2013, p. 143).   
Second, we need to know who belongs to the polity: ‘who’ are the elements that are 
united into a whole? In what Parekh (2000b, pp. 179-185) terms the ‘dominant theory 
or model of the state’, individuals, as citizens, are understood to belong directly to the 
state: they are united ‘in terms of their subscription to a common system of authority’ 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 181). This is the implicit sociology of liberalism, but Miller (2013, p. 
73) argues that multiculturalism poses a problem for it, because in multicultural 
societies citizens may identify with communities other than the polity first. Schachar 
(1999, p. 89) therefore instead proposes a ‘trichotomy’ of the individual, identity 
groups and the state: she argues that multiculturalism attempts to redraft the 
relationship between the individual and the state, with citizenship no longer a direct 
link between them but sensitive to groups (see also: Canovan 1996, p. 37).  
Such groups can be defined in terms of their structural position in society (whether 
they are oppressed) or in terms of their cultural (or other) identity (Young 2007, pp. 60-
88) and they can be understood as associations entered into by choice (e.g. Kukathas 
2003) or as inherited communities that shape their members (e.g. Parekh 2000b). Given 
the distinction between nation and state outlined above, the aforementioned 
trichotomy here becomes a fourfold structure: individuals and groups may belong in 
first instance to the nation or the state. Depending on how these concepts are defined, 
then, a polity may comprise only individuals or individuals as well as groups. A vision 
of what a united society does and should look like then includes some or all of these 
four concepts.  
Third, now we have the elements that form the basic building blocks of conceptions of 
unity, we need to know how they are related. At this stage, these relationships remain 
somewhat opaque because they depend on how political theorists define individuals, 
groups, the nation and the state when they devise conceptions of unity that express a 
vision of a united society, and they do so in rather different ways (cf. Freeden 1996). To 
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give an indication, Uberoi (2007, pp. 142-143) suggests that unity requires three types 
of attachments: reciprocal attachments between citizens (as individuals and groups), 
and attachments that these citizens feel to a shared political life, as well as to the 
political process that makes it possible. Parekh and Canovan, on the other hand, 
suggest that citizens are not connected to each other directly but such attachments are 
mediated by the political community (Parekh 2000b, p. 341) or the nation (Canovan 
1996, pp. 68-72). But how, then, do individuals and/or groups belong to the polity? 
Effectively, united citizens share something– be it certain experiences, forms of 
interaction, emotional ties, beliefs, sensibilities, cultural or civic values, a language, and 
so on – and they may do so in different ways, but political theorists disagree about the 
degree and kind of characteristics that need to be shared. Based on section 1.1 (and this 
will be further elaborated in the sections below), we may infer a rough distinction 
between approaches that emphasise rational commitments to shared political values; 
approaches that emphasise a shared national identity; and approaches that emphasise 
how citizens are united through being members of groups that are different but equal.  
Fourth, now that we know how different elements are united into a particular type of 
whole, we can begin to discern different ideas about why unity might be lacking or 
impeded and, relatedly, how it can grow and be fostered. For example, if 
marginalisation and discrimination effectively exclude particular groups from full 
belonging to the nation, and therefore impede unity, then addressing these processes 
through multicultural policies is necessary to nurture the latter (Kymlicka 2007, p. 47). 
Or alternatively, if unity depends on shared political values, then it may be deficient if 
there are groups or individuals in society who do not adhere to these values and 
policies to rectify this might include civic education (cf. Canovan 2000, pp. 420-421). If 
the above questions aimed to draw an overall picture of unity, this question brings into 
perspective how it is not a static feature of social reality but dynamic. The previous 
chapter noted that ideas shape how issues are represented as requiring political 
intervention and such representations often imply certain responses. This dynamic 
dimension of unity implies how states should address it as it suggests a route towards 
more comprehensive, just or stable unity.  
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Taken together, responses to these four questions present a set of elements and 
relationships that may be defined in different ways and that combine into rather 
different conceptions of what unity is, and different visions of what a united society 
looks like. To provide a crude distinction that will become more precise in the 
following sections, such visions can be characterised as political (with citizens 
belonging to the state through rational beliefs); national (with individuals belonging to 
the nation through national identification); and multicultural (with individuals and 
groups belonging, the latter mediating the membership of the former, to both nation 
and state). As will become clear, these positions also offer slightly different reasons for 
why unity is important and desirable. First, however, the next section will consider 
why unity may not be desirable.  
3.2 Unity as oppression 
Chapter 1 already explained that for some, unity may have negative connotations 
given its traditional link to national identities that required a high degree of cultural 
sameness. Those with views and practices other than the majority would be 
marginalised or oppressed so that unity would require coercion. Hence, Young (1990) 
and Kukathas (2003) present (rather different) positions that share a suspicion of unity 
while giving space to diversity, the former of which Miller (1995, p. 131) therefore 
classifies as ‘radical multiculturalism’.  
Young (1990, p. 227) states that ‘the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in which all 
participants share a common experience and common values’. Unity, for her, imposes 
homogeneity and suppresses and marginalises difference. That means that what is 
united in Young’s (1990) view is clearly not a nation, as commonly understood. Indeed, 
the polity is better characterised as a state, which in her position is explicitly 
democratic. The state in Young’s view (1990, pp. 96-121) should not be impartial, 
because the ideal of impartiality is a liberal myth that denies difference. Not only 
would transcending particularity mean something important would be lost, as it 
contains a perspective on reality; but it is actually not possible. An impartial state thus 
ends up reflecting a set of norms presented as universal and neutral that are in fact 
those of the dominant majority, while those of the minority are expulsed from the 
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public realm and ‘constructed as deviance and inferiority’(Young 1990, p. 116). To 
challenge such hierarchies, these differences need to be brought into democratic 
deliberation so that the civic public is not homogeneous – made up of citizens who 
leave their differences behind in the private sphere – but heterogeneous.  
Kukathas (2003, p. 22) thinks the good society should be conceived not as a ‘social 
unity’ but as an archipelago: a collection of communities that operate together in a sea 
of mutual toleration. As such, what is united is a political community that is only one of 
several associations individuals belong to (Kukathas 2003, p. 171-172). It does not 
constitute their identity and does not subsume other communities, as that would create 
pressures for homogeneity, suppress cultural diversity and lead to oppression. 
Membership is conventional rather than the result of significant relationships: the 
polity is not a nation, an inherited community with shared practices and values, but an 
association whose authority and stability are grounded in acquiescence, or its 
continued acceptance (as evidenced in the absence of protest) by its members 
(Kukathas 2003, pp. 178-210). This authority is commonly expressed in the state 
(although it could take different forms) (Kukathas 2003, p. 173). Hence, the polity both 
follows from the state as its boundaries reflect historical circumstances; and underpins 
the state, because the latter’s authority is based in the continued acquiescence of the 
members of the polity.  
Who belongs to the polity is conceived in rather different ways by Young and 
Kukathas. For Young, difference typically attaches to social groups so that it is groups 
who belong to her heterogeneous public. Their identities need to be publicly 
recognised in order to pursue equality between them (Young 1990, p. 163). Group 
difference is the result of interaction and social processes: it is ascribed, relational and 
dynamic, and it cross-cuts groups. These groups shape individual identities as 
individuals always find themselves already having a group identity and then need to 
decide how to respond to that identity; whether to endorse it passively or actively, alter 
it, or reject it (Young 1990, pp. 45-48). They are free to leave groups and shape their 
own lives, but ‘group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of 
modern social processes’ (Young 1990, p. 47). Citizens are inevitably characterised by 
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the groups they belong to and are part of the polity as group members: they can never 
totally shed their group identity and perspective. This is particularly obvious in the 
example of race, but clearly also applies to other types of groups. As for how these 
groups belong, it is clear that they do so precisely through their participation in 
democratic institutions, expressing their difference in the pluralised democratic 
institutions of the state (cf. Young 1990, pp. 163-191). That means unity is enabled 
through the existence of the state that empowers groups to assert their identities.  
Kukathas (2003, pp. 41-72, 89-93), on the other hand, calibrates the relationship 
between groups and individuals in a different way. He (Kukathas 2003, p. 55) 
emphasises the importance of a shared human nature that gives rise to a fundamental 
shared interest in the absence of force to act or live against the claims of one’s 
conscience. This translates into the priority of the principle of individual liberty, which 
implies freedom of association in groups that in turn give rise to diversity. For him, 
acquiescence underpins all associations that are therefore ‘not fixed but highly mutable 
things which change with economic, legal, and political circumstances’ (Kukathas 2003, 
pp. 78) – and that holds even for ethnic groups (Kukathas 1992, pp. 110-111). That is, if 
(for whatever reasons, including in response to changing circumstances) group 
members no longer accept the terms of the association they will leave or change it so 
that the group changes its nature or dissolves.  
This also means that a free society upholds an exit option: people need to be free to 
leave their group without facing physical violence, and to join another association 
(Kukathas 2003, pp. 25-38). Meanwhile, toleration is central: the state should not 
intervene in internal group affairs, even where those affairs are illiberal (Kukathas 
2003, pp. 160-162), and groups have the freedom to treat and educate their children in 
line with their convictions (Kukathas 2003, pp. 134-137). Groups, then, may shape 
individuals (and their conscience) but the latter always remain separate (Kukathas 
2003, pp. 67-73) and ultimately prior, as the former rely on their consent. Hence, it is 
individuals who belong to the polity, which is one association among others, and it is 
clear that through their acquiescence is how they belong.  
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, both these conceptions of unity are rather thin and do not 
specify substantive shared experiences or features: Young’s account locates it in groups 
that express their difference and Kukathas’ grounds it in individual acquiescence. The 
answer to the fourth question posed above, how unity is impeded and, relatedly, can be 
fostered, takes a particular form here as both positions actually seem more concerned 
about how it can be avoided. Hence, Kukathas (2003, pp. 175-181) fears that the 
elevation of a political (or any other form of) community over other associations could 
lead to pressures for uniformity and the oppression of diversity – implying that unity 
can be fostered by emphasising shared features. Likewise, Young (1990, p. 179) rejects 
measures to promote unity such as for example the use of a public language in official 
institutions because it ‘requires that persons transform their sense of identity in order 
to assimilate. Self-annihilation is an unreasonable and unjust requirement of 
citizenship’. While it is unfair that some citizens will have to learn a second language 
for use in public circumstances where others do not, we can question whether it really 
equals self-annihilation; it might simply be a relatively minor transformation or even 
an addition. Meanwhile, we could think of appropriate forms of compensation instead, 
particularly as sharing an official language facilitates civic interaction between 
different groups in society, which might help them to see themselves as part of a 
larger, united whole. But that presupposes that unity is desirable, and relatedly, that 
there are risks associated with disregarding it.  
In fact, that claim seems reasonable once we consider that some conception of unity is 
necessary to explain and justify democratic political authority (Taylor 2007, pp. 138-
146). Such authority is understood to be not purely coercive but reflecting the input of 
the citizens it governs, thereby respecting how they are free and equal (Habermas 1998, 
p. 215). But that means these citizens need to be united enough to ‘take and enforce 
collectively-binding decisions’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 196): to interact together to come to 
courses of action that all can accept as legitimate, even where these may not reflect the 
desires and needs of all groups in society equally at all times.  
Unity is necessary to explain legitimate authority, and such authority is necessary to 
intervene in situations where groups mistreat their members. Kukathas (2003, p. 194) 
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would reject such centralised power, but does so at the risk of condoning the 
oppression of vulnerable group members such as women, children and dissenters at 
the hands of their own group for the dubious benefits of toleration, in an attempt to 
ensure that the state should never infringe individual freedom of conscience (see: 
Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005a, b; Shachar 1999). This is what Shachar (1999, p. 88) 
calls ‘the paradox of multicultural vulnerability’: while multicultural policies may 
protect minorities from assimilatory pressures arising from wider society, they may 
also leave vulnerable group members unprotected from internal pressures. Okin (1998, 
1999) famously brought home the point that multicultural policies that delegate 
authority to group leaders, who all too often tend to be patriarchal, traditional men, 
might make women worse off when they condone traditional practices aimed at 
controlling them.  
Yet simply leaving may not be an option for these mistreated people as personal and 
group identities are entangled (Weinstock 2005, p. 236), it would mean a painful breach 
with family and friends (Reitman 2005, pp. 193-196), and may not even be conceivable 
following lifelong socialisation (Reich 2005, p. 215). History of course shows that exit is 
in fact possible as individuals have left their groups (Spinner-Halev 2005, p. 164), but 
other liberals would still argue for a more sensitive interpretation of the exit option. 
Barry (2001, pp. 146-162), for example, argues that membership in groups should be 
voluntary not in the sense of an initial choice, but because adults should be able to 
freely decide to leave without facing prohibitive material and physical costs (see also: 
Spinner-Halev 2005).  
That leaves aside the question whether the exit option is fair or desirable, as it 
effectively presents persons that face harmful treatment by their group with the choice 
between their culture and their rights (Shachar 1999, p. 100), or simply leaves them in 
the rather bleak situation in which the costs of leaving are higher than those of staying 
(cf. Barry 2001, pp. 149-155). There is an argument for limiting the power of groups 
over their members, then, and that assumes political authority. Such authority was 
only considered legitimate, rather than coercive, if it reflects the equal input of 
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different but united citizens. It is clear that the positions discussed above do not offer a 
plausible account of such unity.  
Note, however, that Young’s position is not as radical as Kukathas’. For while she 
claims to reject unity, her position actually implies a conception of it that centres on 
constitutional democracy. Her heterogeneous public engages in principled deliberation 
(Young 1990, p. 190) which means it must conceive of itself as already united in some 
way and agrees to shared rules of dialogue (Miller 1995, pp. 96-98). Young (1990, p. 
190) even suggests they share principles of justice and these likely find consolidation in 
the constitutional foundation that she (1990, pp. 93-94) argues democracy requires; 
itself a type of (at least political) unity. Moreover, as Miller (1995, p. 149) notes, her 
account assumes the existence of a state that can perform the act of public recognition, 
and such recognition itself ultimately aims for inclusion, equality and participation, 
processes that both presuppose and work towards a more fair form of unity: a more 
just society. In other words, the state is actively involved in shaping unity through 
challenging prejudice and inequality. Hence, Young’s position implies a conception of 
unity that remains somewhat unclear but seems located in shared political sensibilities 
and may therefore bear some similarity to those to which we will now turn.  
3.3 Political conceptions of unity 
Advocates of a political conception of unity (Rawls 1971, 1993; Habermas 1995, 1998) 
accept the suspicion that unity based in cultural sameness could lead to the 
marginalisation and oppression of minorities, but reach a different conclusion. Rather 
than reject unity, they hold – contra Young, as seen above – that citizens can transcend 
their differences to agree on a set of political values that are acceptable to all because 
they do not favour any. Such unity is important for stability and legitimacy, which 
require generalised consent with politically coercive structures. What is united, then, is 
a polity that is characterised in decidedly political terms and associated with the state 
rather than interpreted as a nation.  
Rawls (1971, pp. 6, 137) thinks unity is necessary for stability and legitimacy: a polity 
needs to agree on principles of justice in order to be stable and confer legitimacy on 
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coercive political institutions. In Rawls’ (1993, p. 12) ideal theory, membership is not 
freely chosen but stable over the course of a lifetime: the polity’s ‘members only enter it 
by birth and leave it only by death’, so it is not simply an association, as in Kukathas’ 
view above. But Rawls (1993, pp. 40-43) emphasises that does not make it a 
community: it is not governed by a shared view of the good life. Rather, society can be 
characterised as a scheme of social cooperation that brings mutual advantage to all 
participants and in which individuals can freely cultivate their conceptions of the good 
(Rawls 1999, p. 4).  
The inherited nature of Rawls’ (1993, p. 12) ‘closed society’ means it somewhat 
resembles a nation (cf. Miller 1995, p. 93; O'Neill 1997, pp. 419-420) although, as will 
become clear below, the ties that define its unity are understood not as cultural or 
communal but as rational and reasonable. Habermas (1998) actually thinks that what is 
united is something that grows out of a nation. Although national unity, characterised 
by shared cultural values, practices and a sense of community, was necessary for the 
development of democratic states (to explain their boundaries and to sustain solidarity 
between citizens), we are now ‘on the precarious path towards postnational societies’ 
and are ‘on the point of superseding’ nation-states (Habermas 1998, p. 107).  
Allegedly, the existence of democratic states enabled a new form of social integration 
to arise that sheds the cultural connotations citizenship had in earlier phases (so that 
demos becomes uncoupled from ethnos [Habermas 1998, p. 132]): democratic procedures 
themselves can sustain unity through facilitating communication and interaction. 
Thereby, such procedures obtain legitimacy as they ensure that all citizens are both the 
‘addressees’ and the ‘authors’ (Habermas 1998, p. 215) of the law. The polity is 
‘primarily conceived as a legally constituted entity’ made up of citizens who may 
‘uphold their constitution as an achievement in the context of the history of their 
country’ but think of their nation primarily in universalistic and ‘cosmopolitan terms’ 
of international cooperation (Habermas 1998, p. 114). While unity used to flow from 
the nation, it now arises from the practice and values of democracy itself.  
Clearly, who is united in both these accounts are individual citizens that are free and 
autonomous. That is, they are not simply subjugated to a common system of authority 
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but actively involved in shaping it, for the latter is presented as legitimate precisely 
because it rests on their consent. For Rawls (1999, p. 17), these citizens rationally 
pursue and revise their life plans, suitably adapted to the society in which they live. 
These individuals, nonetheless, also belong to groups that affirm the value of their life 
choices and their self-worth – society is ‘a social union of social unions’ (Rawls 1999, p. 
462), an overarching framework embracing smaller social groups. But the diversity of 
beliefs these groups represent remains in the private sphere, as these individuals qua 
citizens transcend their particular group memberships to recognise how political 
values normally outweigh their other moral commitments where they may conflict 
(Rawls 1993, pp. 138-157). Reasonable citizens recognise that the political values of 
freedom and equality are fair because they would benefit members of all moral 
traditions equally.36 This is because they are motivated not only by a rational 
conception of their good but also by a sense of justice that makes them want to do what 
is right (Rawls 1999, p. 17), which means that society has a shared end in the form of 
just institutions (Rawls 1999, p. 462).  
Habermas gives somewhat more emphasis to the social nature of individuals. For him 
(1998, p. 145), citizens are shaped by the networks of communication in which they are 
embedded:  
‘a nation of citizens is composed of persons who, as a result of socialization 
processes, also embody the forms of life in which they formed their identities, 
even if as adults they renounce the traditions in which they were brought up’.  
But while he thinks groups are important, it is ultimately only individuals who belong 
to the polity. Groups matter because the freedom of individuals can be protected ‘only 
by simultaneously protecting the context in which their formation processes unfold’ 
(Habermas 1998, p. 139), so that the principle of individual rights itself (Habermas 
1998, p. 221) implies that in multicultural societies ‘all persons must also be recognised 
as members of ethical communities integrated around different conceptions of the 
                                                     
36 ‘People are reasonable when […] they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as 
justifiable to them’. (Rawls 1993, p. 49).  
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good’ (Habermas 1998, pp. 224-225). But it is not clear how such recognition can come 
about as Habermas 1998, p. 225) emphasises that it needs to be strictly ‘uncoupled from 
the abstract political integration that includes all citizens equally’ – i.e. as individuals – 
and which requires ‘the legal system’s neutrality vis-à-vis communities’.  
Effectively, that means the political culture needs to be separated from any cultural 
group, even though it tends to be suffused by the majority culture, so this may be a 
difficult process (Habermas 1998, p. 118). It is based around a constitution that 
embodies universal principles that are interpreted in light of national histories.37 
Constitutional patriotism, then, relies on democracy to unite citizens: ‘the citizenry as a 
whole can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values but only by 
a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate 
exercise of power’ that is based in shared ‘rationally based conviction’ (Habermas 1998, 
p. 225). In other words, ‘democratically structured opinion- and will-formation make 
possible rational agreement even between strangers’ (Habermas 1998, p. 137). Unity, 
then, does not require homogeneity but rational agreement ‘between citizens who 
recognize one another as free and equal’ (Habermas 1998, p. 135): citizens rationally 
agree on democratic procedures, even if they share nothing else, and this is how they 
are united.  
According to Habermas (1998, pp. 118-119) such constitutional patriotism motivates 
loyalty and unity in citizens precisely because ‘democratic citizenship pays off not only 
in terms of liberal individual rights […] but also in the enjoyment of social and cultural 
rights […] in the form of social security and the reciprocal recognition of different 
cultural forms of life’. The latter suggests that while recognition is important, it needs 
to be reciprocally provided by groups rather than by the neutral state. This chimes 
with cosmopolitan positions that emphasise how diversity is dynamic, hybrid and 
eclectic in nature and call for open attitudes and interaction rather than public 
recognition (e.g. Gilroy 2004; Waldron 1992). 
                                                     
37 Habermas (1998, pp. 215-226) somewhat paradoxically both accepts that constitutions and 
states can never be ethically neutral and argues that they need to become more so in order to 
unite diverse citizens. 
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Rawls (1993) also thinks that a consensus on political values represents how citizens are 
united, but his conception is slightly different from Habermas’ (1998, p. 225) 
‘procedural consensus’. Initially, he (Rawls 1999, pp. 102-160) also thought citizens 
could rationally agree on liberal principles of justice to order society’s basic structure, 
and that they would do so through a process of reasoning represented in the device of 
the ‘original position’, where parties are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that 
obscures all knowledge of any talents, beliefs, customs, sensibilities and so on they may 
have, and their position in society.  
But Rawls (1993) later thinks that this supposes too homogeneous a view of the moral 
beliefs in a society. Consequently, he now presents his theory as ‘free-standing’, or 
independent of any such beliefs (Rawls 1993, p. 10). It is a ‘political conception of 
justice’ limited to the political domain that citizens can agree on despite their 
reasonable disagreements brought about by the limits the ‘burdens of judgment’ pose 
on our reasoning (Rawls 1993, pp. 55-64). This conception lies at the basis of an 
‘overlapping consensus’ that citizens support for different reasons (Rawls 1993, p. 134). 
This political conception of justice is justified using ‘public reason’ (Rawls 1993, pp. 
212-230) which upholds the free and equal status of rational and reasonable citizens by 
avoiding any contentious claims and appealing only to a shared fund of political ideas 
latent in the public political culture of democracies and accessible to all.  
The overlapping consensus, as ‘the most reasonable basis of social unity available to 
us’ (Rawls 1993, p. 149), is more than a ‘mere modus vivendi’ (Rawls 1993, p. 145) that 
groups would seek to overthrow if they became more powerful: it is supported from 
within the different doctrines that exist in society so that it appeals to moral conviction 
rather than expedient reasons. But it can grow out of a modus vivendi over time. 
Citizens may first acquiesce in and then come to affirm the political values embodied 
in the constitution because they recognise how the latter facilitates fair and just 
cooperation, so that a constitutional consensus arises (which can be likened to 
Habermas’ position). Subsequently, sustained cooperation within stable institutions 
generates trust and confidence and citizens will develop political conceptions of justice 
to debate competing interpretations of the constitution that overlap because they draw 
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on the same set of fundamental ideas, and hence an overlapping consensus grows that 
is more elaborate as it also expresses shared principles of justice and applies also to 
basic institutions (Rawls 1993, pp. 158-168).  
This already indicates that Rawls thinks unity is not realised until an overlapping 
consensus exists, or in other words, that it is impeded where a political conception of 
justice is not shared. Once liberal rights and institutions are put in place, it grows over 
time; the principles they embody enable unity and stability because they generate their 
own support as they will instil a sense of justice in the population over time (Rawls 
1999, p. 119). Their acceptance ‘forges the bonds of civic friendship and establishes the 
basis of comity amidst the disparities that exist’ (Rawls 1999, p. 454): fairness and 
mutuality facilitate sympathy and friendship (Rawls 1999, p. 462). An overlapping 
consensus will come about through sustained interaction in shared institutions and 
appealing to a shared public reason, which will lead citizens to recalibrate their moral 
intuitions and affirm the political conception of justice.  
Likewise, unity is impeded in Habermas’ account as long as citizens have not yet 
reached rational agreement on democratic procedures; but he (Habermas 1998, p. 137) 
thinks rational communication in democratic institutions will result in shared 
commitments to the constitutional principles that enable democratic legitimacy, 
fostering unity that is no longer based in national myths of ethnic kinship but in 
constitutional patriotism. Indeed, if a genuine political public sphere develops at the 
European level, unity might at some stage become European rather than national 
(Habermas 1998, p. 153). Unity, on this view, is tied to the state (which for Habermas 
was originally linked to the nation; and for Rawls governs a closed society that is 
probably quite like a nation) and then arises almost organically as rational and 
reasonable individuals come to acknowledge how liberal institutions protect their 
freedom and hence affirm it from within their deepest convictions. That suggests the 
existence of the state (a liberal democracy) in itself is enough to inspire unity: states do 
not need to deploy any further policies to foster it.  
But not everyone is convinced by the idea that we can simply discard the nation as a 
source of unity now that democratic procedures are in place. For as noted in section 
  
 
75 
 
1.1, it is difficult to tell whether what is doing the uniting in the accounts above is 
indeed agreement on political values, whether rational or reasonable, or the persistence 
of initial national ties between citizens.  
3.4 National conceptions of unity 
Advocates of national conceptions of unity consider that citizens are united through 
their membership in the national community. Nationalism can be defined as ‘an 
ideological movement that seeks to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity 
for a population some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential 
“nation”’ (Smith 2004, p. 23). As such, it roughly divides into two forms that offer 
slightly different conceptions of unity. The first, more traditional version of 
nationalism has not found much support in political theory recently, although it can 
still be discerned in political contexts across Europe: the nationalism that inspires 
individuals to fight for their country and functions as an almost tangible emotional tie 
between country-members seems hard to capture and defend in rational and universal 
terms. Indeed, Freeden (1998) argues that it is not a coherent ideology in the way 
liberalism or socialism is. Most contemporary theoretical engagement with nationalism 
aims to shed its more radical aspects while retaining its attractive dimensions: it 
remains hard to conceive of another way of realising the solidarity and loyalty that 
viable democratic welfare states require (cf. Canovan 1996, pp. 45-46, 71-72). This 
second, liberal version of nationalism is a modification of the first version and to do 
justice to these attempts to liberalise it, the two will be presented separately in this 
section.   
Clearly, what is united in the more radical version of nationalism is the nation. Note 
that nations remain somewhat hard to define: they may, for example, be understood as 
political creations (Gellner 2010, pp. 77-78), as social rather than political communities 
(Scruton 2003, p. 271), as the expression of individual and collective will (Canovan 
1996, pp. 9-10) or as political communities that are imagined as its members may never 
meet face to face (Anderson 2010, pp. 56-63; see also: Calhoun 1993). But nationalists 
tend to emphasise how national membership is largely unchosen as people find 
themselves born into a particular nation (Miscevic 2010). They typically understand the 
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nation as an intergenerational, ethno-cultural community that predates the state 
(Scruton 2003, p. 278) and that is often presented as natural and organic (Freeden 1998, 
p. 762; see also: Kedourie 1966). The nation is the source of its own unity, and nations 
require self-determination: nationalists think nations need their own state to govern 
their homeland (such self-determination can also be understood as the expression of 
popular sovereignty against tyrannical regimes) (Freeden 1998, pp. 755-756, 760).  
National membership is considered emotional and might be likened to membership in 
an enlarged family (cf. Walzer 1983, p. 41). Such common descent ‘creates the 
obligations of inheritance: we must receive from our forefathers what we also pass to 
our children’ (Scruton 2003, p. 274). It is precisely this intergenerational continuity, the 
inherited nature of national characteristics such as language, culture and so on passed 
on through familial ties, which is thought to facilitate the emotional pull of the nation 
that sustains in citizens the motivation for sacrifice and redistribution that democracy 
and social justice require (Canovan 2000, pp. 425-427; see also: Markell 2000). 
Therefore, for the nationalist, loyalty to the nation should override other loyalties, such 
as those to social groups (Smith 2001, p. 22). 
In other words, groups are secondary to national membership so that it is individuals 
who belong to the nation here. National unity is important to individual well-being: 
MacIntyre (2003, pp. 286-300) explains that national membership enables people to 
make sense of their lives as they see these as ‘enacted narratives’ (MacIntyre 2003, p. 
297) that connect them to significant others, and the nation is the largest morally 
significant community that embeds the individual in its story. It embraces and threads 
together the narratives of all the smaller communities in its midst and thereby gives 
meaning to individual lives. In so doing, it also specifies moral obligations: it tends to 
be in national languages, stories and symbols that morality itself is grounded (see also: 
Walzer 1989). Nationalists consider that because people value the regard of their fellow 
nationals, they attempt to live up to the moral standards their nation specifies 
(MacIntyre 2003, pp. 291-293). The nation, in other words, ‘signifies the repository of 
social goods and values’ (Freeden 1998, p. 757) of a given community.  
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Note that this conception of individuals and their relationship to the communities of 
which they are part is rather different from that underpinning the liberal positions 
discussed above: individuals are not autonomously committed to the polity but 
embedded in it and shaped by it. This is how individuals belong to the nation: through 
emotive bonds of belonging and obligation, actualised through membership and 
identity that comprise shared meanings and practices that facilitate reciprocal 
recognition, solidarity and trust (cf. Guibernau 2004, pp. 143-140).  
This emphasis on shared features and experiences, however, suggests a certain 
hostility to cultural diversity. The tendency for nationalists to stress the distinctness of 
every nation often leads them to claim the superiority of their own (Kedourie 1966, pp. 
60-103), which easily slides into aggression both externally and internally, towards 
minorities (Miscevic 2010). Indeed, nationalists assume ‘that no polity can be stable and 
cohesive unless its members share a common national culture’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 197). 
Hence, Scruton (2003, p. 278) once suggested ‘the real price of community […] is 
sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life’s meaning depends upon 
obedience, and also on vigilance against the enemy’. But Miscevic (2010) terms such 
aggressive nationalism ‘invidious’ and Freeden (1998, pp. 757-758) points to its logical 
proximity to fascism.  
Indeed, because unity here requires a high degree of internal homogeneity, it would be 
impeded by the existence of cultural diversity. To rectify such an apparent or impending 
lack of unity, nationalists demand that minorities that are culturally different adapt to 
become part of the nation (Parekh 2000b, pp. 197-198). If this is considered impossible, 
the nationalist would suggest excluding minorities from the nation altogether (i.e. 
withholding citizenship rights and so on from them), or repatriating them, and 
severely limiting further immigration. This urge for internal homogeneity stems from 
an interest in cohesion and belonging that is considered important enough to 
(sometimes) outweigh the demands of diversity and individual liberty – where 
national unity is at stake, individual sacrifice may be required. In any case, nationalists 
believe that such sacrifice is beneficial, as it is precisely through absorption in the 
nation that the individual achieves fulfilment (Kedourie 1966, p. 73).  
  
 
78 
 
But national unity does not need to be conceived in terms of internal homogeneity. 
Liberal nationalists take seriously the liberal argument that citizens should be free to 
express and develop their own identities in their private lives. For them, unity does not 
require cultural assimilation: it only requires that all members of the nation share a 
national identity and traditions that leave enough space for their differences. Within 
the debate on unity in multicultural societies in political theory, this position is 
associated most poignantly with Miller (1995), who offers the most sophisticated 
account of it, and Kymlicka (1995), who plays a central role in the debate on 
multiculturalism.  
A shared national identity, for Miller (1995), characterises what is united: the nation. 
For him (Miller 1995, pp. 17-47), the nation is a real community, although it depends on 
the belief of its members that it exists (which is different from the organic conception of 
the nation implied above), and it may legitimately feature in personal identities. 
National communities, argues Miller (1995, pp. 25-27, 41-46), have identities that 
distinguish them from other nations, the attributes of which are hard to articulate and 
need not be biological but can be cultural, consisting of values, sensibilities and 
practices. National identities reflect the common public culture – understood as a 
limited part of the wider culture, which makes this national identity more open to 
(private) cultural diversity than the version suggested above – and myths about a 
shared history. These identities feature in people’s personal identities (albeit in 
different ways and with different degrees of importance, so that nations are internally 
diverse)38 and thereby enable mutual recognition and provide them with a sense of 
community, belonging and attachment.  
The nation, moreover, has a good claim to political self-determination (Miller 1995, pp. 
81-118): national unity normally predates the state. Indeed, Miller (1995, pp. 73, 85-87, 
100-101) thinks that nation and state should be closely connected, with the latter 
reflecting and protecting the national public culture. The state, then, is conceived not so 
much as neutral (as in the political conception of unity) but as national. Furthermore, 
                                                     
38 Miller (1995, p. 14) notes how these identities may even be latent until they are activated by 
‘events that are genuinely momentous’. 
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Miller (1995, pp. 49-80) thinks the nation carries ethical significance: nationality is a 
source of moral obligation. The obligations that arise from it are such that nationals, 
out of solidarity and loyalty, make contributions to the community without expecting 
these will be matched directly or immediately, which means that redistribution 
programmes can go beyond strict reciprocity (Miller 1995, pp. 49-80, 2003, pp. 304-315, 
2008). 39  
Kymlicka (1995, p. 76) thinks national groups are characterised by a ‘societal culture’, 
which ‘provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic 
life, encompassing both public and private spheres’. This understanding of what is 
shared between citizens is more capacious than Miller’s emphasis on a public culture. 
Societal cultures are linked to a territory and a language and pervasive because they 
are embodied in shared institutions and social practices. Given this link to institutions, 
there is again a tight connection to the state. Indeed, states cannot but reflect societal 
cultures in their choice of official language, public holidays and so on, so that the state 
‘unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others’ 
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 108). Where these belong to nations, that is problematic and hence 
nations are entitled to self-government rights (either in an independent state or 
through appropriate accommodation within a multination state) in order to maintain 
their distinctive societal culture (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 27-30).  
This is important because membership in such cultures for Kymlicka (1995, pp. 75-106) 
enables individual freedom. Individuals are free if they lead their life ‘from the inside’ 
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 81), that is, according to the beliefs they themselves value; and if 
these beliefs remain open to questioning and revision based in new information. They 
can only achieve such freedom if they have access to a ‘range of meaningful options’ 
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 83) from which to choose and such meaning typically resides within 
                                                     
39 That means that social justice is not simply a collective insurance scheme that meets rational 
self-interests, but can extend to those misfortunes that citizens can reasonably expect will not be 
their lot, such as permanent handicaps. This is the case because the bonds of nationality provide 
motivation: nationals feel that the act of making a contribution in itself is valuable (Miller 1995, 
pp. 67, 72).  
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the shared understandings embedded in societal cultures. And membership in such 
cultures is a deep bond that is not easily shed so this kind of freedom cannot simply be 
obtained through accessing alien cultures. Consequently, maintaining societal cultures 
through their embodiment in political institutions is important. It is individuals who 
belong to the nation, then, and it should be clear how they do: they are embedded in a 
societal culture that does not determine them but enables them to signify, choose and 
revise the set of culturally shaped ends, beliefs and values they pursue (Kymlicka 1995, 
pp. 89-92). Meanwhile, non-national (ethnic) minorities that arise out of immigration 
do not have a societal culture as they have left it behind when they chose to migrate, 
and for them there is no other option but to integrate into that of the majority 
(Kymlicka 1995, pp. 30-31, 77-79, 95-101).  
Miller also portrays national membership as individual and critical. While individuals 
are embedded in the ethical traditions and public culture of the nation and shaped by 
its identity and such membership is ‘for the most part unchosen and unreflectively 
acquired’ (Miller 1995, p. 43), that does not mean they cannot critically reflect on the 
content of these traditions, culture and identities. These simply present a starting point 
that individuals may revise as they work out their own identity through reasoning, 
and figure out how their national identity may relate to their other identities (Miller 
1995, p. 45). For liberal nationalists, national identification which each other and the 
national community is how these individuals belong to the nation, but such 
identification is not uncritical and is reflectively endorsed rather than simply inherited. 
This distinguishes liberal from more traditional forms of nationalism (above).  
National unity, here, depends on a shared national identity or shared membership in a 
societal culture, both of which are internally diverse (Miller 1995, pp. 25-27; Kymlicka 
1995, pp. 121-123, 2001, p. 57). Therefore, it is potentially impeded where groups do not 
share in them. Hence, Miller (1995, pp. 92-99; see also: Kymlicka 1995, p. 77) suggests 
that groups can be a source of division in society if they are not united by an 
overarching national identity that enables trust between them so they may cooperate in 
democratic institutions and recognise obligations of social justice towards each other. 
This is especially problematic for groups characterised by ethnic identities, because 
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national identities often grow out of ethnic identities so they may conflict with those of 
minority ethnic groups (Miller 1995, p. 121); and public institutions reflecting the 
societal culture may not include such minorities as they do not automatically reflect 
how they also belong to these minorities (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 30-31, 107-108).  
To foster unity, both Miller (1995) and Kymlicka (1995) suggest integration, though 
their understanding of it is rather different. Kymlicka (1995, pp. 30-31, 77-79, 95-101) 
thinks immigrants need to become part of the wider societal culture while retaining 
their heritage, thereby making the former more diverse. This means public institutions 
need to fight prejudice and discrimination. It also requires ‘polyethnic rights’ 
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 30), or multicultural policies recognising and accommodating 
minority cultural identities, which aim for inclusion and participation through the 
adaptation of society’s major institutions to better reflect the population’s diversity 
(Kymlicka 1995, pp. 171-181). Kymlicka (1995, p. 188) thinks the ‘shared identity’ that 
social unity requires should build on shared history but does not entail uniformity or 
demand adaptation from minorities: it needs to accommodate diversity and accept that 
minorities ‘belong in different ways’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 190) to the nation. Unity is 
founded on diversity and relies on the valuation of both diversity and the particular 
groups within the nation. However, that valuation is itself the product of, rather than 
the basis for, solidarity and identification, and their political creation may be 
impossible (Kymlicka 1995, p. 191).  
Meanwhile, Miller (1995, p. 154) thinks that publicly recognising minority identities 
through multicultural policies would worsen the situation: such policies might ‘ossify 
group differences, and destroy the sense of common nationality on which democratic 
politics depends’. For him, integration proceeds through recasting national identity 
through ‘a collective conversation in which many voices can join’ (Miller 1995, p. 127) 
about the nature of membership. This is about finding ‘a story that can be told in 
different ways and with different emphases by different groups’ (Miller 1995, p. 138). 
Integration is a two-way process in which national identity is ‘stripped of elements that 
are repugnant’ to minority groups; that in turn give up those values that are 
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incompatible with it, while they ‘are inducted into the national traditions and ways of 
thinking’ (Miller 1995, p. 142), for example through a national education curriculum.  
Hence, while liberal nationalism remains somewhat uncomfortable with group 
diversity, it does not contend that unity requires its assimilation but suggests more 
complex responses that allow minorities to retain their cultural identity in private, 
alongside a shared (public) national identity that is internally diverse, or shared 
institutions that reflect the diversity of the population. Effectively, in order to be 
united, citizens (including minorities) no longer need to share a moral value system 
but only to take part in wider, overlapping shared ways of life. Nonetheless, this goes 
somewhat beyond the political values and institutions advanced as generating unity in 
political conceptions of unity. As liberal nationalism requires minorities arising out of 
immigration to integrate into the culture of the historical majority, some think it 
disadvantages minorities who are expected to change more than majorities are, and the 
multicultural conceptions of unity discussed in the next section offer an alternative.  
3.5 Multicultural conceptions of unity 
Advocates of multicultural conceptions of unity (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b) are 
more optimistic about the possibilities of forging a new and plural form of unity in a 
multicultural society. Such unity is considered important not only for stability and to 
enable collective action but also, as noted in chapter 1, to enable the harmonious 
coexistence of different groups: without it, ‘a weakly held society feels threatened by 
differences and lacks the confidence and willingness to welcome and live with them’ 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 196).  
For Parekh (2000b), what best characterises the whole that is united is a state. He 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 184) notes how modern states presuppose homogeneity as they 
expect all citizens to ‘subscribe to an identical way of defining themselves and relating 
to each other and the state’; and such homogenising pressures mean that a state ‘has a 
tendency to become a nation’ – hence understood here as a relatively homogeneous 
community. Unity, then, originates not in the nation but in the state, but in 
multicultural societies this conception of the state is problematic as it ignores how 
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different cultural groups have different ideas about its ‘nature, power and goals’ 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 185). Because the state’s citizens ‘do not, and cannot be made to, 
share a moral and cultural consensus, it is no longer a cohesive cultural unit [i.e. a 
nation] and cannot base its unity on the cultural homogeneity of its citizens’ – instead, 
it could be a ‘community of communities’ that attach to the state in different ways 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 194).  
Citizenship, then, is understood not as a uniform identity but as plural in form (cf. 
Parekh 2000b, p. 184): it ‘is not a self-contained area of life with its own distinct values 
but one of several mediums in and through which human beings express and live out 
their deepest beliefs’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 324). The state may need to be restructured: 
multicultural societies ‘need to find ways of pluralising the state without undermining 
its unity and the ability to act decisively in the collective interest’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 
195). Unity, then, runs through a state that is not neutral or national but multicultural: 
it reflects the diversity of the population it governs. The polity is a state – although, as 
will become clear below, relationships between communities may evolve and grow 
thicker.  
In Modood’s (2007, pp. 126, 147) conception of unity, what is united is a national body 
of citizens, as national boundaries usually coincide with citizenship provisions. The 
polity is thus both nation and state, because the two are hard to separate, so the 
multicultural citizenship he proposes is accompanied by a national identity (Modood 
2007, p. 146). Such citizenship is not simply a legal status but also an activity: it is 
embodied in the practices of civic interaction, which occur not only in official 
institutions but also extend to civil society. These interactions make citizenship 
concrete and they also shape it as they contribute to a dialogue about what it is to be a 
citizen (Modood 2007, pp. 122-126).  
Moreover, citizens are ‘not uniform and their citizenship contours itself around them’ 
(Modood 2007, p. 126): citizenship is not a transcendental identity that is the same for 
all citizens, but is shaped by each individual. Hence, citizenship is plural in form, and 
‘each part of the plurality has a right to be a part of the whole and to speak up for itself 
and for its vision of the whole’ (Modood 2007, p. 126). Clearly, the whole itself is plural 
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which may make it somewhat indeterminate, but in any case it does not need to be 
conceived in ‘essentialist-perfectionist Platonic’ (Modood 2007, p. 111) terms. Instead, it 
may be thought of in terms of family resemblance: like members of a family, citizens 
resemble each other in different ways (Modood 2007, pp. 95-98, 115; see also: Miller 
1995, p. 27). The existence of different, overlapping interpretations of citizenship and 
belonging, then, does not jeopardise the possibility or coherence of unity (Modood 
2007, p. 111).  
In both these visions, it is citizens who belong to the whole that is united. These citizens 
do not transcend their differences upon entering the civic realm but remain 
characterised by their distinctive identities that often arise out of group membership. 
Such membership is important to individuals and therefore groups as well as 
individuals are politically significant and belong to the whole. Parekh (2000b, p. 120) 
explains that humans are ‘culturally embedded’: they are shaped by and can never 
totally leave behind the norms, values, expectations and so on of the cultures in which 
they are brought up. Cultural membership is not chosen but inherited and cultural 
groups are not associations, as Kukathas (above) suggested, but communities that 
generate obligations and command loyalty (Parekh 2000b, pp. 155-162). Consequently, 
‘the basic respect we owe to our fellow-humans extends to their culture and cultural 
community as well’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 196). The whole comprises both groups and 
individuals: it can be understood as a ‘community of citizens and a community of 
communities, and hence as a community of communally embedded and attached 
individuals’ (Parekh 2000b, pp. 340-341). 
Modood (2007, p. 37) emphasises how groups are important to people both as a source 
of meaning and identity and because they affect their life chances, because difference 
from majority norms is often represented as inferiority that ‘makes difficult equal 
membership in the wider society or polity’. It is normally groups that are considered 
different and such difference potentially impedes equal membership, or unity: when 
thinking about unity, we cannot leave out groups. Moreover, these groups take 
different forms: they can be defined by their activities, relationships, particular 
characteristics and so on, and may expect different strengths and types of 
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commitments from their members, who may in turn relate to their groups in different 
ways (Modood 2007, pp. 37-44, 94-98). Citizens, then, belong to the polity as 
individuals with individual rights, participating in the practices of citizenship, but also 
as members of different types of groups, and ‘different kinds of groups […] might 
choose to organize in different ways and to relate differently to key civic and political 
institutions. […] we should on this approach not require symmetry but be able to live 
with some degree of “variable geometry”’ (Modood 2007, p. 83).40  
Both Parekh (2000b) and Modood (2007) emphasise political membership captured in 
citizenship, but to understand how citizens belong to the whole we need to specify 
what equal citizenship means to them. That is, multiculturalists (Modood 2007, pp. 47-
61; Parekh 2000b, pp. 239-263) do not subscribe to the notion that equality requires 
identical treatment and identical relationships of belonging for all individuals (as 
proposed in the political conception of unity above). Rather, they think equality should 
be sensitive to groups: where states inevitably reflect majority cultures, they need to 
make accomodations to minorities in order for these to enjoy equality with the 
majority, so that equality requires differential treatment. Such equality is not only legal 
but also symbolic: as the norms and values of the majority, but not those of minorities, 
are reflected in the state the latter may appear inferior or invisible, and recognition 
serves to normalise them and further their acceptance. And of course, these forms of 
inequality interact with material inequality as poverty often invites stigma.  
As Modood (2013, p. 47) notes, this conception of equality draws on Taylor’s (1994) 
influential argument for recognition. He (Taylor 1994, p. 25) holds that since our 
identities are constituted and maintained in dialogue with others and partly shaped by 
social recognition, ‘nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression’. For example, if Muslim women are systematically portrayed in the media 
as meek and less able than both Muslim and other men, as well as other women, and 
this image is reinforced in their daily interactions with other persons, they may come to 
internalise it and lower their aspirations and expectations of themselves. A ‘politics of 
                                                     
40 Modood here discusses secularism, but I see no reason why this logic could not be extended 
to other (i.e. non-religious) groups in society.  
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equal dignity’ that respects these women for what they have in common with others as 
human beings or citizens, while important, is not enough to overcome such 
misrecognition. It needs to be attenuated by a ‘politics of equal respect’ that would 
recognise these persons precisely in their particular identity as Muslim women, just as 
others would be recognised for their specific identities (Taylor 1994, pp. 51-61). 
Recognition, for Taylor, expresses how equality requires treating people differently 
and can help avoid harm. Here, it shapes equal citizenship and thereby enables unity, 
as equal citizenship in this conception of unity is mediated by group membership so 
that united citizens belong to the polity not in spite of (or by transcending) their now 
recognised group identities, but through them (and of course, citizens may choose not 
to associate with their citizenship in this way, but the point is that they can).  
For Parekh (2000b, p. 207) such shared citizenship in first instance is limited to sharing 
a structure of authority that all can agree to: once in place, such a structure enables a 
multicultural society to hold ‘itself together long enough to enable its different 
communities to become used to each other and build up common interests and mutual 
trust’. Over time, stronger ties may develop: through living together and sustained and 
equal dialogue, groups constitute and unite around a plural collective culture and way 
of life that respects their diversity (Parekh 2000b, pp. 219, 221, 341). In fact, ‘there is no 
obvious reason why a culturally plural society should not develop a sense of 
community, solidarity, common loyalties and a broad moral and political consensus’ 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 171) – but recall that it cannot be brought to: a consensus cannot be 
manufactured but needs to grow organically (Parekh 2000b, p. 194).  
Clearly, the polity here moves towards a nation, as citizens are united not only through 
a shared legal status but also through a shared way of life and shared sensibilities, and 
this is cast in a positive light. But Parekh’s (2000b, p. 341) insistence that citizens from 
different cultural groups are not connected to each other directly but through the 
mediation of their membership in the political community suggests that it is not quite a 
nation, as commonly understood, after all (and when he [Parekh 2008, pp. 56-70] 
discusses national identity more elaborately elsewhere he consistently avoids the 
concept of nation and refers to identification with the political community instead).  
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As seen above, Modood (2007) more readily characterises citizenship as national. 
Citizens belong through taking part in the practices of citizenship and through seeing 
themselves reflected in representations of national identity. The latter is necessary to 
counterbalance the emotional pull of cultural identities that might otherwise become 
divisive. National identity enables people to feel they belong, and should follow from a 
process of renegotiation where minorities and majority enter into constructive dialogue 
so that it is inclusive and reflects the present make-up of the population (Modood 2007, 
pp. 146-150). Likewise, citizenship is thought to involve ‘ways of imagining and 
remaking ourselves as a country (Modood 2007, p. 128, emphasis added): national 
identity, citizenship, and hence unity, here are considered somewhat malleable and 
dynamic. In other words, the bonds that hold a community together can be re-
imagined to become more inclusive. 
This recalls Miller’s (1995) position above, but there is a difference in the motivation for 
such re-imagination. Here, it is not the diversity of groups that potentially impedes 
unity but their exclusion, so that fostering unity requires not only the reshaping of 
representations of national identity but also more substantial inclusion. After all, as 
Parekh (2000b, p. 342) points out, only when minorities feel valued by and at home in 
the polity will they feel committed to it. The multicultural conception of equality 
pertains to such inclusion. Currently, minorities are often marginalised and occupy 
disadvantaged positions in society. Multicultural policies need to target such 
inequality and remove obstacles to equal participation and belonging (Parekh 2000b, 
pp. 239-263; see also: Modood 2007, pp. 47-61), and that includes the promotion of 
more inclusive conceptions of national identity (Uberoi and Modood 2013a, pp. 132-
136). Thus, Parekh (2000b, p. 203) thinks a society’s ‘political symbols, […] collective 
self-understanding and view of national identity’ will ‘need to be suitably revised 
when shown to misrepresent or ignore the presence, experiences and contributions of 
marginalized groups’: in states where culture and institutions are biased towards the 
majority, multicultural policies that publicly recognise diversity need to ensure 
minorities are equally recognised as valued and legitimate members of society and 
share in the common sense of belonging, so that they may have the security and self-
confidence to interact in society (Parekh 2000b, pp. 203-204, 236-237).  
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This recalls Kymlicka’s multicultural understanding of integration (although, as noted 
before, he doubts whether that could ever result in a shared identity and solidarity 
whereas here this outcome is deemed possible and desirable). Modood (2013, pp. 146-
155) also qualifies multiculturalism as a form of integration and emphasises how 
multicultural policies challenge the prejudice and stereotypes that impede unity by 
excluding some groups from equal participation in the practices of citizenship. Such 
integration requires not only the promotion of inclusive national identities but also that 
multicultural policies are designed to engage with groups on terms appropriate to their 
specific needs (Modood 2007, pp. 83, 146-150).  
Concerning Muslims, arguably the most significant minority group for 
multiculturalism in Europe today, this involves reconsidering secularism and 
developing a more sensitive understanding of it that appreciates that the separation of 
church and state is never absolute and pluralises existing institutional arrangements 
(Modood 2007, pp. 72-86; see also: Williams 2008). Clearly, in contrast to the political 
conceptions of unity, political structures here are not seen as a predetermined source of 
allegiance that all citizens can share, but as dynamic, plural and potentially in need of 
change where they exclude minorities. Only when they are inclusive of different 
individuals and their groups do they enable equal membership and consequently 
facilitate unity.  
 
This chapter has offered a new perspective on unity that helps us to understand how 
political theorists conceive unity through reconstructing the visions of the ideally 
united society that underpin their positions, by asking: what is the whole that is united; 
who belongs to this whole; how do they belong to it; and how is such unity impeded 
and fostered? Together, the answers to these questions provide insight to how unity is 
conceived. While these questions more or less logically follow from understanding 
unity as an attribute of a united polity, they have thus far not been specified and 
connected in the way section 3.1 has done. This perspective on unity helped to 
distinguish and analyse four conceptions of unity that had hitherto remained implicit: 
one negative, one political, one national and one multicultural. The next two chapters 
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will now show that this perspective on unity also helps us recognise conceptions of 
unity in the – somewhat less reflective – positions put forward by political elites from 
the UK (chapter 4) and the Netherlands (chapter 5).  
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4 Case study I: Conceptualising unity in the UK 
The previous chapter offered a perspective on unity that discerns conceptions of unity 
through reconstructing the visions of the ideally united society that underpin positions 
put forward by political theorists. These visions can be reconstructed by asking what 
the character of the whole that is united is; who belongs to this united whole; how do 
they belong to it; and how is such unity impeded and fostered? This chapter and the 
next will now show that these questions are also helpful to understand how unity is 
conceived by political elites participating in parliamentary debates. The ideas of these 
elites are the ones that political theorists who aim to be of practical use intend to shape 
and knowing them facilitates formulating proposals that are clearly applicable, 
acceptable and therefore plausible within these contexts. As some of the literature 
analysed in the previous chapter focuses more or less explicitly on the UK (Miller 1995; 
Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b) and hence might be of practical use here especially, this 
case study will be presented first, before the next chapter turns to the Netherlands. 
Subsequently, chapter 6 will specify the implications of the ideas presented in the case 
studies for political theorists. Finally, chapter 7 will explain why a multicultural 
conception is not only most defensible but also politically plausible.  
This chapter will first give a brief outline of the context in which the debates from the 
British House of Lords that are analysed here were set. After all, as chapter 2 
explained, frames are shaped by the context in which they appear, so that knowing this 
context facilitates the interpretation of their meaning. These debates cover issues 
related to unity such as fragmentation, segregation, alienation, inequality, exclusion 
and security. These are interpreted and represented in rather different ways by the 
different frames, which offer alternative versions of their nature and causes, as well as 
the best ways of resolving them.  
As noted before, these frames can be understood as a form of political thought that is 
less reflective than political theory but not different in kind, so that it can similarly be 
analysed in terms of internal logic: political elites and political theorists draw on the 
same vocabulary to express their ideas and construct arguments in similar ways 
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(Freeden 1996, pp. 40-44; Miller 2013, p. 42; Parekh 2000c, p. x). Nonetheless, we cannot 
assume that the positions articulated by political elites are the same as those advanced 
by political theorists and the former will hence be presented in their own terms, 
following as much as possible the vocabulary and rationale used by these elites, and 
using quotes. When they debate unity, these elites tend to do so by addressing issues 
such as mentioned above that can be understood as epiphenomena that are 
approached from a more fundamental position on what a united society should look 
like. It takes careful interpretation to uncover these implicit positions and they are 
teased out by using the perspective on unity developed in section 3.1 and presented in 
subsections.  
Chapter 1 already explained that multiculturalism as a policy programme in Britain 
developed as a response to the fact of multiculturalism. It evolved in a pragmatic 
manner and focused on race relations and the accommodation of difference (Favell 
1998, pp. 98-134). Following a perceived crisis of multiculturalism that was sparked by 
the riots in Northern English cities in 2001, the UK government’s strategy for dealing 
with diversity shifted to community cohesion, an approach that emphasises interaction 
between different groups and shared citizenship (Grillo 2007). This strategy has been 
interpreted alternatively as a move towards assimilation (Pilkington 2008), or as a ‘civic 
rebalancing’ of multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2009, p. 374).  
With the so-called crisis of multiculturalism, national identity or Britishness gained 
attention as a potential source of cohesion. This coincided with a renewed focus on 
national identity as part of debates on devolution.41 This identity, however, is not clear-
cut and uniform. McCrone (1997, pp. 594-595) explains that certain tensions arise from 
its traditional development as a ‘supranational identity deriving from an imperial 
past’. It developed as a civic allegiance to the British state that was conceptualized as 
‘sitting on top’ of the older ethno-national identities of the English, Welsh, Irish and 
Scots (McCrone 1997, p. 584). The success of this construction relied on the uniting 
force of war, welfare, and Empire. Since WWII therefore, it has come under increased 
                                                     
41 During this time, there was debate about devolving powers to the Welsh and Scottish 
Governments and increasingly also talk about Scottish independence, which raised questions 
about the nature of Britishness and what keeps the United Kingdom united.  
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strain as war and Empire have ceased to provide integrative pressure; the re-
conceptualization of Britishness to fit its newly reduced size after Empire faces 
increased competition with the national identities of its components, especially as 
British and English are often confused (McCrone 1997). Colley (1992) similarly notes 
war and Empire but also Protestantism as common causes that distracted from internal 
divisions because they provided an ‘Other’ that Britain could unite and define itself 
against. Parekh (2000a) moreover points to the different interpretations of Britishness 
in the New Right, which emphasises such characteristics as parliamentary sovereignty, 
individual liberty, Britain’s island position and local loyalties; and New Labour, which 
emphasises features such as Britain’s global and European connections, a ‘sense of 
justice, fair play and ethic of sharing’ (Parekh 2000a, p. 12), multiculturalism, tolerance 
and its class-ridden nature.  
Although the analysis of the frames pertains to their internal rationale rather than their 
political support or origins, appreciating their shape and their position within the 
British political context requires a basic understanding of the political party system,42 
as these parties represent influential ideological traditions on which the frames draw. 
The UK’s Westminster parliamentary tradition has long had a ‘two-and-a-half party 
system’ (Budge 1998, p. 116): the Labour party and the Conservative party compete for 
political power in government, with the Liberal Democrats also attracting significant 
support.43 Government is normally made up of only one party, with the others 
remaining in opposition along with a number of smaller parties. Very rarely, a 
coalition government is formed. Since the Second World War, most governments have 
been led by the Conservatives (Ingle 2008, pp. 1-21).44  
                                                     
42 It is worth noting that political parties are somewhat less important in the House of Lords 
(which forms the focus of the current analysis) than in the House of Commons.   
43 Which is effectively capped by the electoral system: territorial first-past-the-post voting is 
biased towards the larger parties and with a more proportional system the Lib Dems would 
achieve larger numbers in parliament.  
44 1951-1964; 1970-1974; 1979-1997; and 2010 until present in coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. Labour was in power between these periods: 1945-1951; 1964-1970; 1974-1979; and 
1997-2010. 
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The Conservative party occupies the centre-right of the political spectrum and 
advocates a strong state to uphold social order. Thatcher combined this commitment to 
state authority with free market ideology, which proved difficult in relation to 
European integration (Budge 1998, pp. 123-124). The emphasis on sovereignty and 
conservatism sits uneasily with multiculturalism and an influential strand in the party 
supports a traditional vision of national identity that easily confuses British with 
English and is ‘mostly white, anglo-centric, Anglo-American and anti-European’ 
(Schnapper 2011, p. 4). This strand demands cultural adaptation to British values of 
minorities, whereas others in the party advocate benign neglect towards minorities 
within a framework of non-discrimination (Lynch 2000, pp. 59-67). The Labour party is 
a centre-left party that pursues equality in the broadest sense, including more 
significant material redistribution, but also in race issues (Budge 1998, pp. 124-125). 
Multiculturalism as a policy in the UK is mostly associated with Labour and the party 
advocates a pluralist conception of the nation. Its historical commitment to socialism 
was attenuated somewhat with Blair’s vision of New Labour that emphasised The 
Third Way as a middle ground between neo-liberal and socialist policy (Buckler and 
Dolowitz 2000, pp. 102-109). The Liberal Democrat party is a social democratic party 
that prioritises individual freedom. To achieve this, they advocate progressive policies 
and redistribution, as well as environmentalism and democratic reform (Budge 1998, p. 
125). They are non-nationalist in that they consistently defend devolution and 
European integration (Schnapper 2011, p. 5). As Schnapper (2011, pp. 5-9) points out, 
perspectives on multiculturalism and national identity increasingly cut across party 
lines.  
The frames discussed below need to be understood within this intellectual and political 
context. Moreover, they respond to the sociological reality of multicultural Britain. 
Britain’s history tells of many foreign invasions and the incorporation and fusion of 
different populations on the island. More recently, particularly relevant migration 
flows occurred around the end of Empire and the World Wars: in the 1950s large 
numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth came to Britain following measures 
to extend equal subject-hood across the Empire and the need for cheap and unskilled 
labour (Park et al 2012, p. 27). These flows were increasingly restricted, but family 
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reunification remained an important driver of continued immigration. However, it is 
only since the 1980s that immigration outnumbers emigration, and it has continued to 
increase significantly (Hatton 2004).  
Since 1991, the census45 collects data on ethnicity. It shows that the non-White 
population in Britain grew from 3 million (7 percent of the population) in 1991 to 
almost 8 million (14 percent of the population) in 2011, and that 20 percent of the 
population in 2011 identifies as other than White British. The largest increases in size 
are found in the African, Chinese, Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups, as well as 
the ‘mixed’ category that counts persons with parents from different ethnic origins, 
and the ‘Other White’ category (Jivraj 2012).  
Since 1983, the British Social Attitudes Survey collects data on perceptions of 
immigration. Although attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism do not 
necessarily coincide, they tend to be related as the former are measured here not only 
by economic factors (or the perceived benefits of immigration) but also by the 
perceived success of integration (Park et al 2012, p. viii). The surveys show that 
immigration is increasingly seen to have a negative impact on Britain in both economic 
and cultural terms, although a significant proportion of the population is positive 
about the impacts of immigration so far, while still desiring a restriction of further 
numbers. These attitudes vary between different types of immigrants: highly skilled 
migrants and well-performing students are viewed much more favourably, regardless 
of their country of origin (Park et al 2012, pp. 26-39). Migration from family 
reunification, on the other hand, is more consistently regarded as bad for Britain, and 
there exists an ‘ethnic hierarchy’ (Park et al 2012, p. 39), ranking from most positive for 
Western Europe, through Eastern Europe, to most negative for Africans and Muslims. 
These differences may be explained by concerns about integration, with some groups 
perceived as easier to integrate (Park et al 2012, p. 38).  
The debates analysed respond to these contextual factors. Four frames were discerned 
that offer alternative conceptions of unity: the community cohesion frame; the 
                                                     
45 The British census collects data on the general population every ten years.  
  
 
95 
 
multicultural frame; the conservative frame; and the liberal individual frame.46  Recall 
that these frames are reconstructions of the arguments found in the debates that help to 
model the debate; in reality, their boundaries are fuzzy and some speakers may put 
forward positions that straddle several frames (so that the same name may appear in 
the discussion of different frames).  
4.1 The community cohesion frame 
This frame corresponds to the approach to unity in multicultural society that was 
developed under New Labour and is commonly referred to as the Community 
Cohesion strategy (e.g. Cantle 2005; Pilkington 2008). On this view, national identity 
can function to bind society together. The nation is understood as diverse but this 
diversity is seen as a potential threat to national cohesion; the relationship between 
cultural diversity and unity or cohesion is presented as a balance. Lord Taylor of 
Warwick (19-06-2008: Column 1141)47 for example says that:  
“diversity and respect for difference are healthy, but over the years there has 
developed a regrettable imbalance between multiculture and integration. We 
must remain proud of our racial and cultural roots, but this must be balanced by 
encouragement and a willingness to become integrated within a common British 
identity.”48 
Diversity should be appreciated, but “this should not be at the expense of a feeling of 
belonging in the nation as a whole” (Baroness Verma, 19-06-2008: Column 1153). This 
balance between unity and diversity is perceived to have been shifted by the policy of 
multiculturalism that has allegedly supported diversity at the expense of cohesion:  
                                                     
46 The labels used to capture the frames mostly refer to widely known ideational perspectives 
current in this context, but note that these perspectives are internally diverse. 
47 Citations such as this one refer to the location of quotes in the transcript of the debates (which 
can be freely downloaded, and further details of which are provided in Appendix 3): the first 
part denotes the date of the debate while the second part refers to the column in which the 
quote is located.   
48 Note that double quotation marks (“) are used to cite parliamentarians, whereas single 
quotation marks (‘) are used to cite academic and other sources.  
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“the imbalance between multiculture and integration as a policy has led not to 
cohesion, national unity and a sense of community but to isolation, alienation and 
even hostile communities […] we must build bridges, not walls, between racial 
and cultural groups in Britain. It is vital that people from different communities 
feel a sense of being included in the British identity, alongside their other cultural 
identity. Treating them as monolithic blocks rather than as equal members of 
society has been both divisive and patronising. Either we learn to pull together or 
we learn to be pulled apart.” (Lord Taylor of Warwick, 19-06-2008: Column 1141-
2)  
Multiculturalism as a policy that accommodates cultural differences is thus seen as 
divisive as it would emphasise differences over commonalities.  
This perceived imbalance between diversity and unity is manifested most pertinently 
in the issue of segregation. This is the main problem according to this frame, and it is 
understood as a consequence of both majority and minority factors: government 
policies and discrimination in society together with the choices some minorities (as 
well as certain white communities) have made to live in close proximity – “self-
segregation” – have resulted in segregated communities living side by side (Baroness 
Verma, 19-06-2008: Column 1153) as “clusters” that “are closed and inward-looking 
rather than open and permeable” (Baroness Ludford, 28-11-2005: Column GC43). The 
problem with such separation is that “minority communities may view themselves as 
identifying with one heritage and not the other” (Baroness Verma, 19-06-2008: Column 
1153) – i.e. the British one – and multicultural policies would reinforce this problem by 
emphasising this heritage. Faith schools, for example, are perceived as “institutions of 
divisiveness” (Lord Morgan, 20-03-2002: Column 1412). What is needed instead is 
policy to target disadvantage across the population.  
The solution to right the balance and overcome the divisions in society is twofold: 
government should promote interaction between separate groups in society – “to 
bridge differences between communities” (Baroness Verma, 19-06-2008: Column 1153) 
– and promote an inclusive, civic conception of national identity that will bind all 
members of the nation together in shared citizenship. Interaction and mixing is meant 
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to overcome cultural differences and challenge stereotypes; all citizens can come 
together in an inclusive public realm and increased interaction will serve to reduce 
prejudice and ultimately lead to a fusion of different cultures into a new hybrid British 
culture (cf. Cantle 2001, pp. 9-11, 29; Home Office 2002, p. 27). This is where the frame 
may privilege unity over diversity: interaction, trust and cohesion are emphasised over 
diversity, which is nonetheless reflected in this hybrid social unity.  
The national identity that supplements the focus on interaction here has an integrative 
function and is not just an identity but an instrument to inspire a sense of community:   
“Britishness, instead of an identity that we all shared, had become a framework 
for uniting us in our differences. It was something to bring us together that was 
stronger than the things that were holding us apart. It was a kind of social 
contract, so that we could all live in the same space together.” (Lord Haskel, 19-
06-2008: Column 1155)  
This identity has to appeal to all groups and nations within the UK: it is therefore 
conceptualised as a civic identity that sits on top of other cultural identities. It is limited 
to “economic, legal and political culture” (Lord Bew, 19-06-2008: Column 1167). Lord 
Harries of Pentregarth (19-06-2008: Column 1163) argues that “we need to separate 
civic identity clearly from these other kinds of identity.” As such it consists of national 
democratic values and institutions that bind together the nation, such as: “the 
principles of liberty, democracy, tolerance, free speech, pluralism, fair play, […] politics 
and our democracy” (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, 19-06-2008: Column 1172-3). This 
frame considers Britishness to be located “more in shared values than in narrow 
national origins” (Lord Goldsmith, 02-02-2006: Column 378). A shared national identity 
is nonetheless crucial because “when communities do not feel that they are bonded by 
common values and principles, we will see something of the segregation and distrust 
that contributed to the disturbances in some of our northern towns last year” (Lord 
Bassam of Brighton, 20-03-2002: Column 1438). This suggests segregation is caused by 
a lack of shared values and can hence be addressed through their promotion. These 
shared values that form the substance of national identity are defined in terms of 
citizenship and democracy: they are presented as liberal and a-cultural, such that all 
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can share them across their cultural differences. Unity, then, is based in a common 
identity that is inclusive because it is neutral.  
Such a civic identity is moreover presented as voluntary and arising from free 
collective choice. This is expressed in the quote above referring to a social contract, and 
similarly in Lord Bew’s (19-06-2008: Column 1167) portrayal of civic nationality as “a 
sophisticated modern doctrine of consent.” Moreover, it returns in Lord Haskel’s (19-
06-2008: Column 1156) point that the 21st century is an era in which: 
 “we can choose what we want to be and change what we are […] Many blogs 
and websites are all about choosing an identity that is attractive, modern, 
beneficial and cool. This, combined with mutuality and solidarity, […] and the 
acceptance of rights, duties and common beliefs, will bind us together in 21st 
century Britishness and citizenship.”  
The government has a role to play in promoting this national identity through its 
institutions and by encouraging “certain civic values [that] are integral to the civic 
identity” (Lord Harries of Pentregarth, 19-06-2008: Column 1163). There is a role for the 
state to “define in more explicit terms what is meant by the concept of Britishness” 
(Lord Prys-Davies, 19-06-2008: Column 1159). Lord Giddens (02-02-2006: Column 351) 
endorses Gordon Brown’s (e.g. 2006) efforts to generate a “codified sense of purpose” 
for Britain to “sustain a renewed sense of purpose for the nation”; he favourably 
considers this progressive patriotism and states that “as individuals, we would find it 
hard to live without a sense of ambition. […] Why should nations be any different?” 
(Giddens, 02-02-2006: Column 353). This conception of national identity portrays it as 
voluntary and somewhat malleable, and considers it not as an essence but as a 
“political project” (Lord Harries of Pentregarth, 19-06-2008: Column 1164), which sets it 
apart from more traditional conceptions of national identity as a thick communal 
identity. 
4.1.1 A vision of society, united  
The above implies what is united into a whole in the conception of unity expressed in 
the vision of the united society underpinning this frame is best characterised as a 
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nation, defined in civic terms. Hence, the polity is associated both with the nation and 
the state. The former is both understood in political terms and elevated as a 
community that confers identity upon individuals and engenders cohesion. The nation 
and the state are also connected in a more intricate way because the state is seen as a 
legitimate actor in shaping society. This understanding of the state justifies its 
involvement in what might otherwise be considered an infringement of individual 
freedom: the promotion of more open identities in its citizens out of a concern for the 
common good – the stability and cohesion of the nation. The state in this frame thus is 
not really neutral but national: it promotes a national identity characterised by shared 
civic values.  
It is individuals who belong to this nation-state. They need to be encouraged to interact 
with individuals from other groups, and to identify with the nation over and above 
their own social or cultural group: they need to balance their group membership with 
allegiance to the nation. Interaction occurs between individuals, not groups, which 
receive no public recognition as that would be divisive. Individual identities are 
considered to be plural – they may embrace both nation and group – and changeable 
through interaction and national identification: inward-looking identities can (and 
should) become more open. This also holds for groups, so that group identity is 
equally conceptualised as contingent and dynamic rather than traditional or 
conservative. Likewise, national identity is understood as a political project; it is not 
organic and natural but malleable and the result of political contingency. 
Through interaction and a shared national identity is how these individuals belong. The 
latter is characterised by shared civic values and a common purpose so that 
membership in the nation is effectively a result of the political allegiance and belonging 
of the individual to the state and her political beliefs. Such unity is impeded where 
groups are inward-looking and do not identify with these values and this identity, 
which is why policy needs to promote Britishness and interaction between groups to 
foster it.  
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4.2 The multicultural frame 
This frame recalls multiculturalism as it developed in the British policy tradition (cf. 
Favell 1998): it advocates the recognition and accommodation of diversity in society 
and national identity. Diversity is accepted as a permanent feature of society that is not 
a problem to be feared. Lord Bhatia (20-03-2002: Column 1409) describes Britain as “a 
mosaic society where each colour is a part of one whole nation”. Segregation is 
downplayed: it is considered less prevalent than it is often portrayed and where 
minorities choose to build supportive communities that is not automatically a threat to 
society. As Baroness Afshar (19-06-2008: Column 1157) says: “It may not necessarily be 
negative that people are ghettoised, living in their own communities.” Policy should 
not be about avoiding fragmentation at all cost, as that would challenge plural society, 
and these groups already exist – “‘comfort zones’ are already established. Rather than 
allowing them to go unnoticed and flourish either positively or negatively, they must 
be recognised” (Lord Ahmed, 20-03-2002: Column 1403). This extends to faith schools, 
the spread of which “will be a positive step towards a harmonious multi-cultural 
Britain” (Lord Ahmed, 20-03-2002: Column 1403).  
The point is that the fragmentation that is associated with communities living side by 
side stems not from diversity but from inequality. As Lord Parekh (20-03-2002: Column 
1395) explains:  
“Such inequalities generate anger and a sense of injustice, and they create a 
society in which different communities lead parallel lives with no shared 
experiences and aspirations to bind them together. Fairness and equality of 
opportunity are not enough, because they pre-suppose a level playing field and 
an equal ability to take advantage of opportunities – and, sadly, that is not the 
case. Rather, our concern should be to remove self-reproducing structural 
disadvantages, so that all our citizens acquire the ability and the resources to 
benefit from the opportunities available to them and compete as equals.” 
The real issue for policy to address for this frame hence is “inequality, discrimination 
and exclusion” (Baroness Uddin, 19-07-2001: Column 1645). To respond to these 
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problems in society, policies need to go beyond simply targeting poverty because “the 
stark facts of race discrimination in employment are race-specific. They are not 
poverty-specific” (Baroness Whitaker, 19-07-2001: Column 1650). In other words, 
pursuing substantive equality requires more than neutral rules; it requires 
multicultural policies that recognise diversity to challenge racism and discrimination, 
and to remove structural disadvantages. Thus, Lord Hunt of Chesterton (20-03-2002: 
Column 1407) argues that “it is essential for the UK to move further to introduce 
positive discrimination”. For this frame, multicultural policies do not create or affirm 
divisions, but rather help to tackle inequality: they are a solution, not a problem. And 
rather than the failure that multiculturalism is often made out to be, in certain places 
“it has been a remarkable success” (Lord Parekh, 20-03-2002: Column 1394).  
The government needs to go beyond fighting discrimination. It needs to instil 
acceptance of pluralism in society: it has “a duty to promote a strong and pluralistic 
society in which cultural differences are appreciated and seen as a benefit to 
communities” (Lord Bassam of Brighton, 20-03-2002: Column 1438). A pluralistic 
Britain “cannot be built just on a set of common values” (Lord Chan, 20-03-2002: 
Column 1423); it requires accepting diversity as a characteristic of British society. To 
further this acceptance, “it is essential that our leaders should acknowledge the 
enormous contribution to this country made by minority groups” (Lord Hunt of 
Chesterton, 19-07-2001: Column 1655), and indeed to “explain and appreciate how the 
UK population is made up of different social, ethnic and regional groups” (Lord Hunt 
of Chesterton, 20-03-2002: Column 1407). The frame positively regards the conclusions 
of the Parekh report that argued for a vision of Britain as a “community of citizens and 
as a community of communities” (Lord Chan, 20-03-2002: Column 1422).  
The state, then, has a role to play in furthering the acceptance of multiculturalism as a 
social reality – and indeed its positive valuation, by “declaring the benefits of a multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural Britain” (Lord Chan, 20-03-2002: Column 1423). In contrast to the 
previous frame, recognising the diversity that characterises the nation is considered 
more important than emphasising interaction, as captured in Lord Ahmed’s (20-03-
2002: Column 1401) metaphor of fusion cooking versus a banquet: 
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“Chicken tikka masala is a wonderful dish which is the product of eastern and 
western influences. Its interaction of flavours is perhaps the result of mutual 
appreciation and the interaction of the many cultures residing in Britain. 
However, […] should we not strive to instil acceptance in our pluralistic nation, 
as opposed to seeking the homogenization process summed up in the term 
‘melting pot’? Britain should be proud that our country is a rich banquet with 
culturally distinct and complex ingredients.” 
Metaphors presenting society as made up of distinct groups are common in this frame. 
Next to this banquet and the aforementioned mosaic, it is also represented as a jigsaw: 
“‘multicultural’ has never meant a fragmentation of society into myriad unconnected 
pieces. It is certainly a jigsaw, but one which can and must be assembled into a 
coherent whole” (Baroness Ludford, 28-11-2005: Column GC43). While the mosaic and 
the jigsaw metaphors in particular are meant to express a balance between unity and 
diversity, they do portray the pieces as separate and bounded,49 implying an emphasis 
on diversity over unity (although the focus on equal opportunities and citizenship in 
Lord Parekh’s quote does express a more integrated account of unity).  
The frame displays slight suspicion of national identity, as its use may exclude 
Muslims who are already treated with suspicion in society:  
“It is important not only to celebrate and be inclusive but to recognise that many 
British-born citizens suffer because they are labelled “Muslim”. We live in a 
context where Islamophobia is encouraged […]. We need to think about why 
Muslims, specifically, are asked to choose between being British and being 
Muslim. As many of us who have spoken know, we have fluid identities.” 
(Baroness Afshar, 19-06-2008: Column 1157) 
Plainly, being British and being Muslim are not considered mutually exclusive here. 
But national identity may exclude ethnic minorities more generally:  
                                                     
49 While it is probably the case that the speakers have not thought through the implications of 
their metaphors, these figures of speech are highly significant in political language and 
structure the way issues are perceived (see: Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
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“It seems that those who urge us to embrace Britishness have not grasped the 
extent to which many of the people of our parents' generation felt an absolute 
allegiance to Britain – to the mother country. […]. Despite all the support and 
contribution given to the National Health Service and our contribution to the 
sporting success and entertaining the nation, still our allegiance and Britishness is 
questioned”. (Baroness Young of Hornsey, 02-02-06: Column 355) 
This quote points to a discrepancy between how minorities (and their parents) see 
themselves as members of the polity and how others do: minorities already feel British, 
even as they are still considered outsiders by members of the majority who urge them 
to embrace Britishness. Political elites often allude to such experiences of membership, 
allegiance and exclusion to explain and justify their positions. Thus, Baroness Howells 
of St. David’s (02-02-2006: Column 363) talks about her experience of moving to Britain 
in the 1905’s: “The Union Jack, which I had cheered as a child and carried and waved 
on 24 May each year, was posted through my letter box smeared with excrement and a 
note, ‘There is no black in the Union Jack’". She then questions the use of national 
identity to foster unity: “if we are to make citizens out of subjects and Brits out of 
blacks, […] do we not need to be less focused on old notions of British history and 
Britishness […]?”(Baroness Howells of St. David’s, 02-02-2006: Column 363) 
In the multicultural frame, national identity is thought to need to avoid a rigid 
definition to avoid the exclusion of members of the nation. Definition, in any case, 
misrepresents national identity as it “implies that what binds us together is a set of 
shared characteristics that each of us carries in our heads or our bodies. To belong to a 
country is a relationship; it is not a set of empirical characteristics” (Lord Parekh, 28-11-
2005: Column GC37). Unity in the multicultural frame is understood as belonging. 
Given the diversity of British society, “Britishness is a sense of unity in diversity—of 
mutual respect and belonging, not uniformity” (Baroness Ludford, 28-11-2005: Column 
GC45). As Baroness Afshar (19-06-2008: Column 1158) puts it: “If Britishness is about 
being part of the community, it is wonderful, but let us not try to say who is not 
British, because the lines get narrower, tighter and harder to live with.” National 
identity, hence, needs to be flexible and inclusive, as expressed in Lord Parekh’s (28-11-
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2005: Column GC38) metaphor of a shared freehold: rather than thinking of Britishness 
as a furnished apartment that can be occupied on predefined terms only,  
“I should like to think of being British and all British national identity as a shared 
freehold that we are all involved in shaping in a direction in which we can see a 
reflection of ourselves and that we can collectively own.”   
National identity is not about definition but about experience: what matters is 
belonging, which is an emotion that cannot be imposed but needs to emerge freely. 
Unity resides not in a set of values, but in feeling at home. For minorities to feel part of 
the nation, they need to feel welcome, valued and accepted. They need to feel they 
have equal chances and are treated fairly. As Lord Dholakia (20-03-2002: Column 1431) 
puts it: 
 “it is not so much what the law or a declaration specifically says as our general 
underlying attitudes and values […] the emphasis in any policy determination 
should be the manner in which and the extent to which minorities' deepest 
feelings about their race, colour, national or ethnic origins are truly accepted 
within the community and by the policy makers.”  
That is unlikely to occur without multicultural recognition as Baroness Young of 
Hornsey (02-02-2006: Column 356), again appealing to the importance of experiences 
for belonging and unity, underlines:  
 “If our role in the political, social and cultural development of Britain is omitted 
from the national curriculum, from higher education, erased from history books 
or left to gather dust as curiosities in museums and if we experience this 
continued rejection, it is not surprising that Britishness feels like a total illusion to 
some.”  
In other words, the role of ethnic minorities in Britain needs to be recognised in 
education and more widely so that minorities may feel part of the nation; multicultural 
policies not only challenge racism and discrimination but also serve to enhance a 
widely shared national feeling of belonging.  
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4.2.1 A vision of society, united  
What is the whole that is united here? It can loosely be termed a nation: unity is not 
about shared features or rights but about shared belonging, embracing diversity in 
society. The nation, then, is an emotive experience rather than a political or civic 
association. Moreover, it is not simply made up of individuals but also embraces the 
groups they are part of: it is groups as well as individuals who belong to the polity. In 
contrast to the community cohesion frame that recognises the existence of groups but 
urges individuals to transcend them in order to be united, the multicultural frame 
accords greater political significance to the group. The individual is seen here as 
constrained by social pressures such as racism and exclusion. These pressures operate 
not solely on the individual level but interact with the group; individuals are part of 
groups and it is often as a group that they encounter discrimination. It is groups that 
experience structural obstacles to equality and policies hence need to target not just 
individuals but group difference. And the recognition of groups is recommended to 
enable individuals to experience belonging. These groups and individuals are seen as 
endowed with identities that the state should recognise and accommodate rather than 
seek to alter, as was implied in the previous frame. They do not impede, or have to be 
balanced with, national belonging. That suggests that these identities are more than 
simply chosen or malleable; they should (or perhaps can) not be remade to fit the 
desires of the nation or the state but may (within legitimate boundaries) exist and 
persist as they are. 
Emotive attachments (of belonging) are how citizens belong to the polity, and these are 
facilitated by the recognition of the groups they belong to. Because the nation embraces 
groups, national and group loyalties do not conflict or have to be balanced. Such 
belonging might (but is not required to) help overcome the inward-looking identities 
the previous frame was concerned about, as it challenges the exclusion of groups, and 
equality should smooth interaction. In any case, diversity is seen here as a permanent 
feature of society that should not be feared. 
Where belonging is lacking, unity is impeded and policies to foster it need to focus on 
the inclusion of minority groups through multicultural policies that should make 
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minorities feel valued and respected, rather than through interaction and shared 
values, as in the previous frame. The state in this perspective is charged with the 
accommodation of individual and group identities. It does so by attempting to change 
the nation: citizens are implored to be more accepting of diversity. While the state 
again is involved in shaping society, here its actions are targeted at the nation: as a 
whole, it must come to accept pluralism, challenge discrimination, and be more 
inclusive. The state pursues this by publicly recognising diversity, which makes it 
reflective of multicultural diversity rather than neutral. In that sense, the state 
simultaneously shapes the nation (changing attitudes to diversity) and reflects its 
diversity.   
4.3 The conservative frame 
This frame echoes the British conservative tradition (Budge 1998, pp. 123-124) and 
prioritises national unity, which is emphasised as an emotional experience and 
identity. Diversity is seen as something that is somewhat fleeting and beyond control. 
Multicultural inequalities are downplayed. Where the previous frame emphasises how 
racism continues to exclude minorities and seeks to promote shared belonging and the 
acceptance of diversity, here this goal is presented as already achieved:  
 “We only have to look at dress, food, music, dance and sport. Everywhere there 
is diversity. There is richness. There is a shared belonging. It is something which 
actually fills me with a huge deal of hope for the future.” (Baroness Flather, 19-07-
2001: Column 1652) 
As society is already fair, the problem thus is not so much segregation or 
discrimination, but rather security. More specifically, the problem is Islamic terrorism, 
with “extremist groups using Islam as a basis or excuse for segregation, separation and 
terrorism against mainstream society” (Lord Chan, 28-11-2005: GC41). This form of 
terrorism is understood to be sustained by the distance between Islamic religious faith 
and the secular environment Muslims find themselves in;  
“[…] there is a particular challenge facing British Muslims. That concerns the 
tension between the demands of faith on the one hand and those of the secular 
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communities in which religious communities reside on the other. […] unlike 
Christianity, where the claims of faith and secular life are clearly separated, […] in 
Islam the concept of umma gives priority to religious duties over all other sources 
of authority. That is, Islamic jurisprudence does not recognise secular jurisdiction 
as a valid source of law.” (Lord Carey of Clifton, 02-02-2006: Column 350)  
Muslim and democratic, secular values are represented as incompatible. British 
Muslims find themselves in a situation which:  
“produces young adults with multiple identities, with some torn between two 
versions of themselves. One identity is designed to fit in with modern British 
secular society, but the other feels called by a religious fervour, at odds with the 
modern world around it. This background of hostility culminated in the 
bombings and attempted bombings that we have experienced in Britain in recent 
years, so the issue is critical and must be addressed.” (Lord Taylor of Warwick, 
19-06-2008: Column 1142) 
This quote challenges the notion of plural and fluid identities current in the previous 
two frames, at least where it concerns Muslims. The situation that creates these 
difficulties needs to be addressed not by the promotion of interaction or the acceptance 
of pluralism, as the previous frames offered, but by integration. Multicultural policies 
that accommodate minority cultural identities have helped to keep such tensions in 
place as they have impeded the integration of immigrant groups into wider society. 
Lord Howell of Guildford (02-02-2006: Column 373) explains that the rationale of 
multicultural policies: 
“leads not to cohesion, national unity and a sense of community, but to isolation, 
alienation and even hostile communities. The prospect always seemed ridiculous 
that people welcomed into our country, […] should not adapt to the country. It 
was a simplistic proposition and bound not to bring cultures together but to set 
them on conflicting paths.” 
Where it concerns Muslims, multicultural policies are perceived as particularly 
misguided:  
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“We are fragmenting our society by paying so much attention to the few Muslims 
who are disaffected. […] [We] should not throw money at the disaffected. We 
should separate in our minds the disaffected from all the other Muslims who […] 
contribute and who can contribute more, as I hope to see. I do not want Sharia to 
be part of my system of law. I think it is negative. Faith schools are also negative 
and they fragment society. The fragmentation which comes from focusing on 
appeasing the Muslims who are difficult to appease will hurt the basic nature of 
society.” (Baroness Flather, 19-06-2008: Column 1162) 
The frame clearly opposes multicultural policies as their effect has been “to divide 
people into categories when the desire is to unite them” (Viscount Bridgeman, 19-07-
2001: Column 1660). This resembles the rejection of multiculturalism as divisive in the 
community cohesion frame, but that frame called for a balance between diversity and 
unity in policy whereas here, diversity is more or less eliminated from policy 
altogether. Multicultural policies such as ethnic monitoring in particular professions 
are considered “restrictive and even punitive proposals” and although minorities 
enrich society, the concern should be with their integration, not their representation in 
key institutions that would then have to be “policed to ensure that ritual numbers of 
members of ethnic minority groups are to be found there” (Baroness Park of 
Monmouth, 19-07-2001: Column 1649). Representation will occur automatically on the 
basis of desert: individuals from minorities who excel will reach the top. Ethnic 
minorities should be judged on their merit and not their origin: positive discrimination 
is an insult to their capabilities and “special treatment” is something that “all those 
with spirit will resent” (Baroness Park of Monmouth, 19-07-2001: Column 1649).  
To overcome the divisions in society it needs to be left to evolve naturally, so that a 
process of “assimilatory mixing” (Viscount Bridgeman, 19-07-2001: Column 1660) can 
take place. Given the organic development of cultures, “greater assimilation is 
inevitable” (Lord Rooker, 19-07-2001: Column 1663) as well as desirable. The metaphor 
of the “melting pot” (Lord Howell of Guildford, 02-02-2006: Column 373) expresses 
this perception of integration as a process in which different elements gradually blend 
into one; Britain is understood as the result of numerous previous “invasions” (Lord 
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Carey of Clifton, 02-02-2006: Column 350) that have assimilated to one culture. This 
suggests an attitude to diversity that is not so much characterised by direct opposition, 
but rather sees it as a transitory situation that with time will evolve to become part of 
the organic unity that is the nation.  
Immigrants are implored to adapt to the national culture of Britain not only to facilitate 
smooth co-existence with the majority (as above) but also for the sake of their children:  
“Our children do not belong to their country of origin. If they are not going to 
belong to this country, where are they going to belong? We came here to improve 
our future. What right have we to ignore entirely the attitudes and opinions of the 
majority? We have no right. We have a duty also to acknowledge and change to 
fit in with what this society wants.” (Baroness Flather, 19-07-2001: Column 1653)  
The duty of immigrants to adapt follows from public order demands, but also, as this 
quote makes clear, from their choice to move. Note how, similar to what we saw in the 
previous frame, Baroness Flather here alludes to personal experience to illustrate her 
position. Individual choice and responsibility are important in this frame that 
considers that people are responsible for their own success. The differences in 
attainment between different ethnic minority groups present a case in point:  
“They indicate that minority communities should not be construed as passive 
victims of exclusion—racial, cultural, religious or economic—but rather as social 
actors who can draw on a range of resources within their communities to 
circumvent such exclusion. I should add that those resources would be the envy 
of many on our white council estates.” (Lord Bishop of Bradford, 20-03-2002: 
Column 1400) 
These differences in success arise because some groups show “better educational 
achievement and a better understanding of what is required of them [.] Is there no 
responsibility on the minorities to do something about their own situation?” (Baroness 
Flather, 19-07-2001: Column 1653). Apparently, “Some people think that it is not worth 
obtaining qualifications. They make a big mistake” (Lord Rooker, 19-07-2001: Column 
1663). Likewise, segregation in this frame is perceived not as exclusion but as “failure 
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to integrate” (Viscount Bridgeman, 28-11-2005: Column GC47). Communities live 
separate lives because:  
“people within these communities see no need to integrate, to learn English or to 
make friends outside their communities, and they feel that there is no need to 
build ties for the sake of their children. Therefore, the next generation sees that as 
normal and the cycle continues.” (Baroness Verma, 07-06-2007: 3.14-3.20 pm) 
Where the previous frame explained inequality as mostly structural, here it is seen as 
resulting to a greater degree from individual choice, which implies that society itself is 
already fair. Even if it were not (and even when it was not in the past), there are 
numerous examples of immigrants who succeeded, as Lord Taylor of Warwick (19-06-
2008: Column 1141), once again drawing on personal experience to underline his point, 
notes: 
“my father and other immigrants have shown that being British can allow you to 
be valued for your actions and not for your accents. Many descendants of the 
‘Windrush’ generation also experienced racism, but they learnt the skills to bloom 
where they were planted.”  
In other words, even if they met with racism occasionally, hard work allowed them to 
prosper nonetheless.  
The national identity that ethnic minorities are expected to adapt to is conceived here 
as organic and defined by the past, and consists of particular characteristics such as 
“our constitution, our culture and the ethical values which we have inherited”, these 
being “the historic values of our Judaeo-Christian heritage” (Baroness Cox, 19-06-2008: 
Column 1147-9). History teaching is crucial to knowing Britishness:  
“There should be a proper teaching of our history, rooted in our institutions and 
how they came about, and understanding of the challenges that we have 
historically faced on identity and the ways in which we have overcome them. 
That is because we will truly move forward with depth of understanding only if 
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we have a depth of understanding of where we came from.” (Baroness Warsi, 19-
06-2008: Column 1172) 
National identity should not be seen as a political project but rather as a legacy to be 
honoured by remembrance of the achievements of “our forebears” (Lord Carey of 
Clifton, 02-02-2006: Column 349). This heritage asks British nationals to “affirm the 
many precious, valid and valuable characteristics it enshrines and to consider how we 
may more worthily cherish and convey it, undiminished, to those who come after us, 
as their rightful legacy” (Baroness Cox, 19-06-2008: Column 1149). National identity is 
a heritage to be passed on; children need to “be taught in English because they are all 
citizens of this country, and they need to be taught an equal pride in its past and 
future” (Baroness Park of Monmouth, 19-07-2001: Column 1649). The nation hence is 
conceptualised here as an intergenerational community, a “national family” (Lord 
Carey of Clifton, 02-02-2006: Column 349). National identity is tied to a community 
with a past, and the state should not try to impose a definition: “Britishness is a current 
reality which is reinforced by our interpretation of the past reality. If we try to wrap it 
up as something we want it to be, we will make huge mistakes” (Lord Addington, 19-
06-2008: Column 1169). In opposition to the somewhat instrumental conception of 
national identity in the community cohesion frame, here it is seen not as an empty 
canvas that can be modelled to fit the needs of a state or society but rather as the result 
of centuries of tradition.  
Clearly, this is a more traditional conception of national identity than was subscribed 
to in the previous frames, recognisable also in the request “that we must take care not 
to lose the essential character that has made it worthwhile for people to come here in 
the first place” (Lord Dixon-Smith, 20-03-2002: Column 1433). National identity is 
about character and history. This historical focus implies a certain resistance to change 
that is expressed here by the rather reluctant acceptance of minority influences on 
national traditions: 
“the commonly recognised distinguishing characteristics of our country […] 
partly emerged because of the long and distinguished emphases upon the 
spiritual basis of monarchy and Parliament alike—warm beer and ladies cycling 
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to evensong indeed, even if we do now have to add chicken tikka masala, 
whatever that is.” (Lord Bishop of Chester, 20-03-2002: Column 1417) 
It also returns in this designation of the Lords participating in the debate: “I can count 
only eight out of the 19 contributors to the debate who might be called ‘English’” (Lord 
Dixon-Smith, 20-03-2002: Column 1432). Although the statement is supposedly meant 
in praise of multiculturalism, most Lords participating in these debates have been 
citizens for a while.  
Nonetheless, national identity is not conceived as purely ethnic; its characteristics are 
often defined as a mix of culture and democratic features such as the Parliamentary 
tradition (Lord Howell of Guildford, 02-02-2006: Column 372). But it goes beyond a 
civic identity as it is more than freely chosen values:  
 “Everyone has a need to have a country and to love it, however unfashionable it 
may have been to say so in recent years. People, like plants, need soil in which to 
send down their roots. Those who say we can all do nowadays without a country 
or content ourselves with trendy notions of the post-modern state, the 
international community or even some higher European loyalty, are just 
mistaken. Love of country is not a vague principle—it is an everyday necessity.” 
(Lord Howell of Guildford, 02-02-2006: Column 374)  
National identity is about pride and love: it is an emotional attachment. As such, it 
goes beyond the emotional experience of belonging that was advocated in the 
multicultural frame, for love and pride are stronger emotions than feeling welcome 
and valued.  
4.3.1 A vision of society, united  
The conception of unity expressed in the vision of the ideally united society 
underpinning this frame clearly suggests a nation best characterises what the whole 
that is united is. Unlike the previous two frames that calibrate a complex balance 
between individuals, groups, the nation and the state in their conceptions of unity, this 
frame privileges the nation. The state needs to protect the nation, and national security 
concerns are the main priorities in this frame. The nation, moreover, predates the state 
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and should not be interfered with. It is an organic entity that evolves naturally. This 
social unity is heavy with history, tradition and identity and it needs to be valued and 
respected. The nation is the natural social aggregate that directs state action, rather 
than vice versa, so that the state is the guardian of the nation and has no authority to 
interfere in it.  
It is both individuals and groups who belong to the nation: they are part of it and 
embedded in it. Meanwhile, groups may exist within the nation but cannot challenge 
its primacy; individuals should to some extent adapt to the nation and will do so 
naturally, and this adaptation is particularly important for immigrants. It is not only an 
organic process, however, but also in their best interest, as it is their own future and 
that of their children that depends on them thus becoming full members of the nation. 
Adaptation and belonging largely fall under personal responsibility here, which is an 
important aspect of the understanding of the individual (who is both embedded in the 
nation with its traditions and history and responsible for her own success). Diversity 
hence may exist within the nation at individual as well as group level, but it is always 
secondary to national unity. Absorption in the nation and internalising its identity, 
then, is how individuals belong.  
Clearly, where immigrants do not yet fit in that means unity may be impeded, but this 
situation should pass organically. Moreover, to avoid national fragmentation, the state 
needs to deploy neutral policies towards all its citizens. While the frame advocates 
history teaching to strengthen national consciousness, it understands this not so much 
as the promotion, design or shaping of national identity by the state, but rather as 
simply passing on and conveying what is already there: an inherited national identity.  
4.4 The liberal individual frame 
This frame presents a perspective that resembles the British liberal tradition (cf. Budge 
1998, p. 125) and emphasises individual liberty. Identities, both multicultural and 
national, are considered personal and private and therefore beyond the scope of state 
action (as long as they do not breach any laws). National identity is understood as a 
deeply personal experience that differs for every citizen. It therefore evades definition 
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at the collective level; “it can only be personal. It cannot be an objective way of defining 
Britishness because, even if we feel totally British, we all see our Britishness in our 
personal ways” (Baroness Flather, 19-06-2008: Column 1159). As a personal identity, 
Britishness develops organically over the lifespan of its carrier; Baroness Falkner of 
Margravine (02-02-2006: Column 370-1) explains that “people evolve into their skin, in 
terms of character, in different ways and at different speeds. A lot of this is subliminal. 
[…] Our identity evolves in subtle and complex ways.” The identities that result from 
such organic growth are plural and multi-faceted. Accepting this nature of national 
identity means that it cannot be used to induce a sense of belonging:   
“The term Britishness is designed to promote a common identity and so cultivate 
a sense of belonging and commonality between citizens. Yet I question the 
relevance of the term in this context. Britishness for me is not an objectively 
definable concept, which can be applied as a label. I understand Britishness as an 
identity that one feels and interprets in one’s own way.[…] Defining Britishness, 
then, seems to be an irrelevant consideration in promoting a sense of belonging.” 
(Baroness Verma, 19-06-2008: Column 1152)  
Because national identity is personal and variable, “it does not necessarily have 
definable characteristics that politicians should agree on and roll out as a construct that 
we as citizens need to sign up to” (Baroness Falkner of Margravine, 02-02-2006: 
Column 370). In other words, the government should stay out of national identity. 
Lord Desai (02-02-2006: Column 360) states that:  
“The Government should play a minimal role in providing a simple framework 
and not start writing a curriculum and ask us to meet 37 conditions for being 
British. I would rather that we evolved Britishness in our daily lives by ourselves, 
rather than have an official proclamation of what it is to be British.”  
This reticence towards state involvement in personal identities is expressed also in the 
injunction that “we might too often try to impose our own values on people” (Lord 
Addington, 19-06-2008: Column 1169). In a similar vein, the frame advocates:  
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 “… the value of tolerance in the first instance, rather than the exertion of more 
pressure on trying to have common moral values. Winning over hearts and minds 
cannot be dictated from on high […]. Perhaps we need less policy and greater 
trust in people themselves.” (Baroness Falkner of Margravine, 07-06-2007: 4.12-
4.25 pm) 
Diversity in national identity, at the collective level, thus is a permanent feature as 
every member of the nation defines it personally. People should have the freedom to 
negotiate their national identity as they see fit: “it is nothing we should seek to mould 
into a more uniform cultural construct” (Baroness Falkner of Margravine, 02-02-2006: 
Column 371). As national identity is a personal matter, the topic is considered “quite a 
shallow business” (Lord Howell of Guildford, 02-02-2006: Column 372). A concern for 
national identity is seen as irrelevant:  “An historical fact about Britain is that although 
the notion of nationhood was born in the late 18th or early 19th centuries […] this was 
a united polity before the notion of nationalism was invented” (Lord Desai, 02-02-2006: 
Column 360). Lord Desai (02-02-2006: Column 359) draws on personal experience to 
underline this point:   
“My Lords, I was born in India. I went to America for study, then I came here. 
What struck me when I came to Britain was how relaxed the country was about 
whether or not it was a nation. Glory to the country that is relaxed about its 
nationhood. Countries that are not relaxed about nationhood have to go to war to 
prove that they are a nation. Ever since I arrived—perhaps partly because I am 
middle-class; I have a middle-class job; and I live in a middle-class area—I have 
never been made to feel not a part of this country. […] the question of whether we 
are a nation or not is an anxiety that is not strictly necessary.[…] the whole point 
is that we all have multiple identities”.  
This conception of national identity as personal effectively eliminates the substantive 
content of its collective dimension. As a collective identity, it remains undefined and it 
is simply the aggregate of individual identities that are shaped in full freedom. That 
obviously contrasts with the conservative conception of national identity that sees it as 
shaped by the characteristics of the nation as reflected in its historical legacy and 
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passed on over generations. It also differs from the community cohesion frame’s 
conception of national identity as a political project based in shared values. Like the 
conservative and the multicultural frame, the liberal individual frame emphasises the 
personal quality of national identity. For the latter, however, this personal quality is 
left open and is not necessarily linked to emotions such as love and pride or belonging. 
In contrast to the multicultural frame, policy is not assumed to inspire belonging, 
which implies a difference in emphasis: the liberal individual frame stresses the 
personal and free (open) nature of national identity, whereas the multicultural frame 
emphasises the inclusion of minorities.  
Policy, then, should not focus on national identity but rather on equality. Lord Desai 
(02-02-2006: Column 360) argues that what is important is not to establish whether 
someone is British but “to be quite sure that one does not face discrimination, whatever 
one chooses to be. It is much more important to have a culture of equal rights and not 
to give people a single label.” This means that the state’s response to cultural diversity 
should be focused on anti-discrimination, fairness and equal treatment. Equality of 
opportunity is proposed as the main solution to the real problem, namely persistent 
inequality in society. Policy should be aimed at making “our society better and more 
accessible to those in it” (Lord Addington, 19-06-2008: Column 1169). Multicultural 
policies have inadvertently reinforced inequality:  
“People from ethnic minorities, […] find themselves trapped by certain labels 
which inhibit their mobility out of where they are starting from. This leads to the 
perpetuation of poverty in certain groups. […] We labelled people, from the best 
possible motives, and insisted that their passport to certain public goods 
depended upon their producing that identity […]. But once we have done that, 
we do not allow them to escape that labelling and become ordinary citizens.” 
(Lord Desai, 20-03-2002: Column 1415)  
Instead, the “equality of opportunity agenda” is “about treating members of British 
minority-ethnic communities as individuals rather than as monolithic blocs, robustly 
tackling racism and other barriers to equality” (Baroness Warsi, 19-06-2008: Column 
1171-2). This follows from “the most important value of the British: fairness. You treat 
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people fairly: you do not treat some this way and other another way” (Baroness 
Flather, 19-06-2008: Column 1161). Fairness for this frame hence equals identical 
treatment. The rejection of multiculturalism as a policy draws on a similar register of 
objections to that used in the other frames, but receives a different emphasis, reflecting 
the overall priorities of the frames. Where the policy is supposed to engender division 
in all three, for the community cohesion frame that is a problem because it shifts the 
balance between diversity and unity and threatens cohesion; for the conservative frame 
it is a problem because it raises security concerns as it fosters hostile communities; and 
for the liberal individual frame it is a problem because it forms an obstacle to equality.  
The rejection of multiculturalism as a policy programme, however, is not a rejection of 
pluralism, but rather follows from a commitment to diversity as individual and 
private:  
“I want to argue that creating a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society is not 
necessarily the great thing that it is said to be. I am not saying that we should not 
be tolerant or that we should not recognise the value of different languages, 
cultures, practices and cuisines. I am saying that we ought to distinguish between 
the public space and the private space. One great difficulty created by many of 
the policies followed over the last 50 years is that we have confused that 
distinction.” (Lord Desai, 20-03-2002: Column 1415) 
The frame hence accepts and values diversity but restricts it to the private sphere. The 
public space alluded to in this quote is the same for all and consists of a shared 
experience of and commitment to citizenship, rights and political institutions: this is 
where unity resides. As Lord Greaves (19-07-2001: Column 1659) explains, diversity 
has no impact on rights because cultural “communities as such do not possess rights; 
any rights that they do possess, they possess because of the rights possessed by the 
sum of their members”:   
“The diversity of individuals, which many of us welcome – the more the better – 
may follow from their membership of communities, or it may be that some of us 
are a bit eccentric. […] But fundamental human rights are not different for 
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different people. What we do with our human rights may well be very different – 
and that may lead us to have very different lives – but fundamental human rights 
are not different for different people.”   
It is important also that there exists a “sense of trust in common institutions that are to 
serve the interests of all sections of society” (Baroness Falkner of Margravine, 28-11-
2005, column GC35) – hence the need for general rather than multicultural policies. 
Lord Dahrendorf (20-03-2002: Column 1413-1414) explains that this is because cultural 
pluralism can only work under two conditions: first, “all must have equal 
opportunities to take part in economic, social and political life. Citizenship must be 
real”, and second “all must accept certain fundamentals of the society in which they 
live”, that being the “principles of its liberal order” for Britain. It must be accepted that 
“the law is common to all and that it is made here in Parliament by the institutions 
designed to provide it.” The shared public sphere, thus, provides a common 
framework within which individual and private diversity is allowed to flourish.  
4.4.1 A vision of society, united 
What is the whole that is united in the vision of the united society underpinning this 
frame? The state captures it more closely than the nation. However, this whole is rather 
‘thin’ as it remains secondary to the individuals who belong to it. The emphasis on the 
individual follows from the privileging of the individual in this frames’ vision of what 
a united society should look like. In contrast to the community cohesion and 
multicultural frames, the four social elements are not presented in a complex balance, 
but like in the conservative frame, one is foregrounded. The polity is made up of 
individuals that define their relationship to it themselves, and choose how to relate to 
other individuals and groups. The individual that takes centre stage here is conceived 
as responsible, autonomous and independent. Groups are seen as a potential source of 
inequality where they may inhibit social mobility, although that would mainly be the 
result of multicultural policies affirming these groups. The relationship between the 
individual and the state needs to be direct and expressed in citizenship, rather than run 
through groups. How should we characterise this relationship, or how do these 
individuals belong to the polity? They do so both through their legal status as citizens 
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and through their own commitments, beliefs and orientations towards it. The frame 
presents unity as located in liberal, individual commitments to liberty, equality and 
fairness; the state only needs to uphold the latter to foster it.  
Both cultural and national identities are considered private, individual matters: they 
are beyond the scope of the neutral state. In contrast to some of the other frames 
discussed above, the state in this frame exists to guarantee maximal individual 
freedom as well as pursue equality between individuals: it does not shape society apart 
from minimally, by providing individual rights and opportunities. Although it is not 
allowed to exert pressure on or interfere in individual preferences, values and (plural) 
identities, as that would constitute an infringement of individual integrity, its liberal, 
neutral political framework does restrict the legitimate expression of diversity. 
Diversity is valued as the result of individuality and a hallmark of individual liberty, 
but it should not extend beyond the confines of the private sphere. A shared political 
framework is a condition precisely for its private expression. There is a sense in which 
this political limit on diversity parallels the social (national) limit on diversity imposed 
in the conservative frame: at this level, unity comes first, either in political or national 
terms.   
Although national identity here is not a source or feature of unity, it is interesting to 
note that this frame presents it in rather different terms to the other ones above. 
Because national identity here is strictly personal, it is focused on the present: it is not 
oriented towards the future as the community cohesion frame and the multicultural 
frame are, as it does not see Britishness as a project meant to induce belonging or 
transform society or individuals and groups over time. And it is not orientated to the 
past as the conservative frame is, as its definition resides in the individuals that make 
up society now (although, of course, these may choose to draw on history for their 
conception of their national identity). When they discuss national identity, then, the 
political elites participating in these debates seem to have rather different things in 
mind.  
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This chapter has shown how unity is conceived in different ways by British political 
elites. The outline of what conceptions of unity pertain to introduced in the previous 
chapter proved helpful to interpret the visions of the ideally united society that 
underpin the different frames that offer alternative understandings of issues and 
concepts related to unity in multicultural society. Clearly, these frames offer 
significantly different views not only of what problems should be addressed but also 
about how to address them and who is responsible for such interventions. Clarifying 
these different starting positions helps us to see where they overlap and conflict and 
thereby facilitates greater understanding of the disagreement between them. 
Explicating the conceptions of unity that underpin them, moreover, helps to go beyond 
the contentions about epiphenomena such as segregation and veiling to capture more 
fundamental fault lines in the debate. As the next chapter will now show, political 
elites in the Netherlands similarly have rather different ideas about what unity is.  
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5 Case study II: Conceptualising unity in the Netherlands 
The previous chapter showed that British political elites have rather different ideas 
about what unity is. The perspective on unity developed in section 3.1 proved useful to 
interpret these ideas as it helped to reconstruct the vision of the ideally united society 
that underpins the different frames offering alternative representations of issues to 
address. This chapter will now show that Dutch political elites also conceive of unity in 
different ways, again presenting the different frames they advance and uncovering the 
implicit vision of the ideally united society that underpins them. The next chapter will 
then explain the implications of the conceptions of unity discerned in British and Dutch 
parliamentary debates for political theorists, before chapter 7 concludes the thesis by 
showing that a multicultural conception of unity is most defensible and also politically 
plausible in these two countries.  
As the Netherlands is the country most strongly associated with a ‘crisis’ of 
multiculturalism (e.g. Entzinger 2006, p. 121; Kymlicka 2010, p. 105; Modood 2013, p. 
12) – even more so than the UK, where its reality is more forcefully contested in the 
literature (e.g. Meer and Modood 2009; Uberoi and Modood 2013b) – we might expect 
to see conceptions of unity slightly less hospitable to diversity here. It will be become 
clear, however, that this is not necessarily the case. There are significant similarities 
between the conceptions of unity identified in the two case studies and to highlight 
these, this chapter is structured so as to discuss the Dutch frames that are most like 
their British counterparts in the same sequence as the latter.  
Like the previous chapter, this chapter presents the four frames distinguished in the 
debates in their own terms first. Again, these debates cover a range of issues such as 
cultural conflict and divisions, the fragmentation or disintegration of society, dual 
nationality, inequality, and a lack of communal attitudes among citizens. The frames 
approach these epiphenomena in different ways that indicate how they implicitly start 
from more fundamental positions on what society should look like united that are 
rather different. Subsections present these positions that are uncovered through careful 
interpretation using the perspective on unity developed in section 3.1 and asking: what 
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is the united whole; who belongs to this united whole; how do they belong to it; and 
how can such unity be impeded and fostered?  
First, however, the context in which the frames appear, and that shapes them, will be 
briefly introduced. Section 1.3 already outlined the political context in which the Dutch 
parliamentary debates analysed here were held. Recall that multiculturalism in the 
Netherlands developed out of the earlier pillarisation structure that created separate 
institutions for the four main social/religious groups in society (pillarisation and other 
specific Dutch terms used in the debate on multiculturalism are discussed in more 
detail in the glossary of Dutch terms in Appendix 4). The Ethnic Minorities Policy of 
the 1980s intended to extend that structure to immigrants and ethnic minorities. The 
integration policy of the 1990s that focused on universal citizenship and economic 
participation relegated cultural identities to the private sphere (Duyvendak and 
Scholten 2012). In the 2000s, policy increasingly emphasised cultural adaptation in 
what has been termed a ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ (Joppke 2004, p. 238) or a move 
to ‘assimilation’ (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007, p. 3). It was considered that national 
identity should be more explicitly defined and explained to facilitate such adaptation 
(Seegers 2007, p. 45).   
According to Duyvendak (2008, p. 172), these values and Dutch national identity more 
generally are widely shared and rather ‘thick’: the dominant majority in the 
Netherlands is strongly mono-cultural. This image of Dutch national identity as 
singular is challenged by more historical approaches that emphasise the importance of 
rifts such as that between Holland and other provinces (centre/periphery) and between 
the cosmopolitan nobility and the more nationalist bourgeoisie and people (Frijhoff 
1992, p. 631); between the Protestant North and the Catholic South (Krol 2007, pp. 143-
144); but also between supporters of the Monarchy and the State, and of the secular 
State and religion. With the development of pillarisation in response to this latter 
division, dual loyalties (to one’s pillar and the nation) were considered natural. 
Nevertheless, a shared national consciousness developed in the 19th century, both 
through conscious state policy and through bottom-up processes (Van Sas 2004, pp. 
523-534). Krol (2007, pp. 142-144) argues that important elements in this national 
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identity include the 16th century revolt against the Catholic oppressor Spain and the 
heroic role of William of Orange therein. It inspired a view of the nation as freedom-
loving, civic and opposed to tyranny. The Netherlands is portrayed (from the inside 
and the outside) as a country that emphasises cleanliness, is somewhat unnatural as 
evidenced in its reclaimed land, and as imbued with a ‘peace-loving, homelike and 
sensible disposition’ (Krol 2007, p. 143).  
Although the focus here is on the meaning of the frames, and not their political support 
or origins, a basic grasp of the political orientations that exist in the Netherlands helps 
to appreciate their distinct shape and locate them in the debate. The Netherlands has a 
proportional representation voting system with multiple political parties, so that 
governments are always coalitions between different parties. These parties are thus 
both ideologically distinct, and geared towards consensus or compromise in 
government (Irwin and Thomassen 1975, pp. 389-391). Since the Second World War, 
the most important parties50 in successive governments51 have been the Christian-
Democratic CDA, the Social Democratic Labour party (PVDA), and the Liberal party 
(VVD).52  
With its many parties, the Dutch political domain is somewhat fragmented. Pellikaan 
(2002, pp. 206-220) identifies three dominant political orientations in Dutch politics: 
religious, socialist and liberal that all prioritise one of three dimensions that can 
roughly be described as economics (state intervention vs. market economy); ethics 
(moral government vs. neutral state); and community (emphasising individuals vs. 
groups). The religious parties, among which the CDA, prioritise ethics and emphasise 
the role of the state as a moral guardian. They also favour a market economy and the 
autonomy of social groups. The latter position chimes with multiculturalism, which the 
CDA traditionally supported, although it increasingly emphasises the duty of 
                                                     
50 The labels used here refer to the current names these parties go by; in most cases, they are the 
result of fusions between smaller parties.  
51 For an overview of Governments please see: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/kabinetten-
sinds-1945. 
52 Smaller parties that have joined coalition governments are the Progressive Left GroenLinks, 
the Democrats (D’66), the populist LPF and the Protestant CU. Significant opposition parties 
furthermore are the Socialist SP and more recently the populist Freedom Party led by Wilders.  
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immigrants to adopt Dutch values and norms, as a shared core is considered essential 
in a plural society (Seegers 2007, pp. 41-43). The socialist parties, including the PVDA, 
prioritise the reduction of socio-economic inequality and see a role for the state in 
attenuating the effects of free markets. They advocate a neutral state and a corporatist 
organisation of society.53 The PVDA is open to cultural diversity but acknowledges that 
conflicts may occur and advocates stricter entry conditions for new immigrants 
(Seegers 2007, pp. 43-44). Liberal parties, including the VVD, stress individual liberty 
and oppose the delegation of authority to groups of any kind. They prefer a neutral 
state and a market economy. The VVD accepts cultural diversity as long as it does not 
conflict with the law, but also advocates pride in the national character and emphasises 
its importance for cohesion (Seegers 2007, pp. 44-45). 
Pellikaan (2002, pp. 208-214) notes that since the 2002 elections, the ethical dimension 
has retreated to the background and the community dimension has shifted its focus 
from micro-communities to the national community; it now splits between a defence of 
multicultural society and a plea for a mono-cultural society. Van der Brug et al (2009, 
pp. 200-201), moreover, point out how questions about multiculturalism cut across 
party lines. 
The frames discussed below need to be understood within this intellectual and political 
context. Moreover, they respond to the sociological reality of the Netherlands as a 
multicultural society. Since the Second World War, the Netherlands have seen post-
colonial immigration, recruited labour migration, an influx of refugees, and a 
continuing flow of family migration. Consequently, there has been a sharp rise in the 
proportion of allochtonen in the population (especially where it concerns persons with 
non-Western origins), or persons who have at least one parent of foreign origin, as 
opposed to autochtonen who have native origins (Ribbens 2004, p. 501). The largest 
minority groups in this category are Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese and 
these are also the groups that have increased in size most. In 2012, 21 percent of the 
Dutch population is of foreign origin. Meanwhile, immigration and emigration show 
                                                     
53 Society then is characterised not simply by individuals but by organisations that reflect and 
defend shared interests.  
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variation over the years but both remain significant (CBS 2012, pp. 36-42), and 
immigration in particular has been rising since the 1980s (Entzinger 2006, pp. 122-123).   
Coenders et al (2008) explain attitudes towards these minorities and immigration by 
two factors: (perceived) competition over resources such as jobs and housing, and 
concerns about national identity. They find that support for discrimination against 
minorities (in housing and jobs) fluctuates, from almost 50% of the population in 1979 
to 25% in 1986, and roughly stabilises at 40% throughout the 1990s and up to 2002 
(Coenders et al 2008, pp. 275-276). Concerns over identity are expected to weigh more 
heavily in these attitudes and here the authors find that ideological and symbolic 
context is crucial in understanding ethnic attitudes: with the negative portrayal of 
Muslims in the media and public debate since 2001, attitudes towards Muslim 
minorities (Turks and Moroccans) in particular become more negative, whereas 
attitudes towards the other two large minorities (Surinamese and Antilleans) remain 
stable (Coenders et al 2008, pp. 279-283). This effect is challenged by Breugelmans et al 
(2009) who argue that attitudes towards multiculturalism in the Netherlands are 
mostly indifferent, with a slight preference for assimilation, and have been stable over 
time despite a temporary dip in 2005.54  
Four frames can be distinguished in Dutch parliamentary debates that respond to these 
contextual factors while offering alternative visions of what issues need to be 
addressed and how: the emancipation frame; the multicultural frame; the national 
frame; and the liberal individual frame. 55 As was the case in the previous chapter, 
these frames are reconstructions that help to model the debate so that speakers may 
                                                     
54 Following a number of events that involved Muslims and heightened concerns around their 
presence, including the murder of Theo van Gogh (who had recently released a provocative 
film showing texts from the Koran projected unto naked female flesh) by a Dutch-Moroccan 
(2004), and the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005).  
55 Dutch parliamentary debates are held in Dutch, not English. The translations are my own. As 
in the previous chapter, each citation refers to the position in the original text it was retrieved 
from. For example, (Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-5938) first specifies the speaker; then specifies the 
debate, further details of which can be found in Appendix 3, and which can be freely 
downloaded; and then specifies the location of the citation within this debate by referring to the 
column in which it is located.  
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express arguments that straddle them (and consequently, the same name may appear 
in the discussion of different frames). 
5.1 The emancipation frame 
The perspective developed here overlaps with what other scholars have called the 
empowerment genre (Prins 2002, p. 372) or emancipation frame (Roggeband and 
Vliegenthart 2007, pp. 530-531). The frame argues for individualist integration through 
socio-economic participation enabled through state policy, into a pluralist national 
community that is conceptualised in terms of free and autonomous citizens. In contrast 
to the notion that cultural diversity itself causes problems in society, the frame argues 
that the “cultural conflict” (Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-5938) between different groups in 
society mostly produces tensions because of its interaction with socio-economic factors. 
This has been overlooked and policy needs to focus on these class differences: 
“reducing socio-economic differences is the key to a good integration policy” 
(Halsema, 31-08-200: 92-5939). Moreover, “not only allochtonen suffer from 
disadvantage. Disadvantaged autochtonen are equally affected” (Halsema, 06-04-2004: 
63-4121); cultural factors alone do not explain the problems in society. The frame also 
draws attention to discrimination, racism, Islamophobia and stigmatisation as 
problems (Bos, 14-04-2005: 73-4485-6) that further reinforce economic inequality and 
impede emancipation.  
It is not cultural difference itself, in other words, that causes tensions and polarisation 
in society but the way it interacts with material inequality and the way it is dealt with. 
The frame believes that the way the sensitive issues around multiculturalism and 
national identity are debated by politicians has real repercussions on society: “the tone 
in which the integration debate is held is not the last among all factors to determine 
whether we can achieve that peace in society together or end up in an atmosphere of 
animosity and escalation” (Huizinga-Heringa, 06-04-2004: 63-4132). The harsh tone 
some take in debate might alienate minorities, and particularly those who are 
successful. The frame emphasises that integration has not been a complete failure, and 
many immigrants have done very well. These people both deserve recognition and 
could play a role in further integration processes (Bos, 31-08-2004: 92-5951). Debates 
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about Islam in particular are too often of a “generalising and stigmatising character” 
(Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-5941) and this may result in the exclusion and isolation of 
Muslims in society. The frame thus calls for an end to polarisation in the debate on 
integration; it urges “conciliation” (Halsema, 14-04-2005: 73-4464).  
This concern with the effects of political debate connects to the role of government in 
this frame:  
“There is a large governmental and political responsibility to shape society, 
enhance politeness and give people the opportunity to be citizens in the fullest 
sense of the word. That will not happen by […] restating behavioural rules, but by 
facilitating citizenship through moral and political leadership.” (Halsema, 18-12-
2005: 35-2630) 
Politics has a special responsibility in shaping society – a notion sometimes referred to 
as a belief in “the mouldable society” (Dijsselbloem, 06-04-2004: 63-4145); “Only just 
political decisions will help people to take their own responsibility and participate as 
fully-fledged citizens in our fast and irreversibly changing society” (Halsema, 01-04-
2008: 70-4891). State policy, by providing opportunities and skills, needs to facilitate 
and enable people to grow into the emancipated and empowered individuals that this 
frame envisages society to be made up of. This is not “a narrow economical view of 
man or citizenship ideal […], the homo calculus, the calculating citizen, the consumer, 
the employee, the tax payer” as it was promoted by previous governments, but rather 
the citizen “who cares for others, volunteers, wants to participate and have a say, 
enjoys his free time, etcetera” (Halsema, 18-12-2002: 35-2630).  
Government should provide the conditions for such citizenship: “you have to enable 
people to be connected to each other” (Halsema, 18-12-2002: 35-2630). Solidarity only 
flourishes under certain conditions, and the neglect of the enabling role of the state in 
emancipation has produced certain “negative consequences of hurtling 
individualisation” (Kant, 18-12-2002: 35-2615-6): citizens have become self-regarding 
and solidarity has waned. Individualisation needs to be channelled so that its benefits 
in the form of emancipation are not overshadowed. In a metaphor: 
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“I see the government as a beacon for society. If the beacon points to everyone-
for-themselves, society will follow. If the beacon indicates that human dignity and 
solidarity really mean something in our society, then that realisation will trickle 
down into society as well.” (Marijnissen, 14-04-2005: 73-4483) 
Recognition of minorities, however, is limited to a positive appreciation of their 
contributions in debate: multicultural policies that publicly affirm group identities are 
rejected. They are seen to fix dynamic cultural identities (Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-5938) 
and to pose a risk to individual emancipation, which “may never be supressed by 
emancipation in the own circle”56; if religion or “a traditional migrant-culture” contests 
the equal position of women and gays this needs to be challenged – “cultural tolerance 
is not a reason to accept oppression” (Dijsselbloem, 06-04-2004: 63-4145). Patently then,   
“No matter how important the free development of minority religious and 
cultural identity is, policy that unilaterally aims for the support of cultural and 
often group identities hinders the emancipation of individuals.” (Halsema, 06-04-
2004: 63-4118) 
As indicated above, what is needed instead is a focus on socio-economic factors and 
hence on education and labour policy: “Where work is the royal way to furthering 
integration and fighting disadvantage, emancipation is only possible if people have 
been able to enjoy a good education” (Halsema, 06-04-2004: 63-4121).  
This opposition to multiculturalism as a policy programme stems from a concern with 
individual liberty rather than a rejection of diversity. In fact, the frame celebrates 
pluralism. Leerdam (27-06-2006: 95-5883) talks about the “wonderful diversity of our 
country”, and Halsema (14-04-2005: 73-4463) explains how value pluralism is crucial 
for democracy:  
“We honour the ideal of a plural society, in which value differences and value 
conflicts are seen as valuable and even necessary. Not only because we think it is 
impossible to bridge all the differences between people, but mainly because 
                                                     
56 See Appendix 4.  
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ethical pluralism, the recognition and appreciation of conflicting values, is a 
condition for critical and free citizenship. Because the moment that citizens would 
be expected to be bound to one morality, to one specific cultural identity, that 
would always mean the exclusion of others.”  
Cultural diversity is accepted in public, also where it concerns social norms and 
practices; different cultural groups have different perspectives on appropriate social 
behaviour and this needs to be accepted as a manifestation of “ethical pluralism” 
(Halsema,  14-04-2005: 73-4462). Cultural diversity, or value conflict, does not need to 
be eclipsed or solved but rather engaged in dialogue: “he who knows how to listen to 
disagreements and to deal with them can bind a modern community more effectively 
than he who strives for shared opinions about what should and should not be” (Bos, 
14-04-2005: 73-4511).  
Nevertheless, there is a limit to acceptable diversity: the values embodied in the 
constitution, which are non-negotiable (Halsema, 14-04-2005: 73-4462) and which 
immigrants are expected to “understand and respect” (Bos, 31-08-2004: 92-5952) – 
rather than interpret in different ways or contest. These are “the values that bind us, 
values that are central to the democratic Rechtsstaat” (Bos, 31-08-2004: 92-5955). The 
Rechtsstaat57 here is the focal point of national unity, and reflects “a minimal common 
morality” (Halsema, 14-04-2005: 73-4462), with the constitution guaranteeing both 
freedom from government interference in personal life and equal treatment for all 
citizens. In this sense, “the constitution is not an order for assimilation or a straitjacket 
for uniformity, but a guarantee for diversity and plurality” (Bos, 31-08-2004: 92-5952). 
Citizenship first and foremost is about “constitutionally enshrined and protected 
freedoms and rights” (Halsema, 30-01-2008: 47-3514). For integration, that means the 
emancipation frame is open to cultural identities but requires an amount of adaptation 
where it concerns the rule of law. It is an individual endeavour that centres on socio-
economic mobility, participation, interaction and emancipation. Cultural differences 
                                                     
57 The concept of the Rechtsstaat in Dutch expresses liberal democracy and the rule of law and 
embraces such concepts as justice, rights, the constitution and jurisprudence.  
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are allowed to persist and “integration is a means, for us the emancipation of people is 
the end” (Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-5941).  
The national community that integration refers to is conceived in plural terms:  
 “The Dutch culture we aim for and exemplify is a plural society of emancipated, 
free and socially and economically independent people. That is, people who make 
autonomous decisions in their relationships, in their sexuality, religion, place of 
residence, dress etc. People who take their responsibility, develop their own social 
relations and participate actively in society and politics. […] We want a society in 
which the right to be different, to have a different cultural identity and to have a 
different religion is completely self-evident and accepted.” (Halsema, 06-04-2004: 
63-4123-4) 
This plural society belongs to a country in flux:  
“The Netherlands will never again be as it used to be. The Netherlands will never 
remain what it is now. The mixing of ethnicity and culture will continue […] The 
wider our identity, the better. I think that our identity, our origin, the blood that 
flows through our veins will become increasingly less unequivocal, increasingly 
more hybrid.” (Bos, 31-08-2004: 92-5949-55) 
National identity is dynamic and cannot simply be derived from history. History 
always requires interpretation, which leads to different conclusions and therefore “is 
not an instrument to shape any national consciousness whatsoever” (Halsema, 27-06-
2006: 95-5885). This, for want of a better term, ‘open-ended’ national identity also 
includes Islam. The frame considers that:  
 “[…] it is crucial that all of us acknowledge that Islam has now become one of the 
large religions in the Netherlands and will remain so, and that Islam belongs here, 
like Protestantism and Catholicism and other religions.” (Halsema, 31-08-2004: 92-
5941) 
The need that people feel to belong to the nation – in “a time where people are trying 
to get an idea of the distinctiveness of the national identity, a time where people seem 
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to long for national pride as a counterweight to strange influences” (Azough, 04-10-
2006: 8-480) – does not have to lead to a conception of national identity that is uniform: 
 “We all want people to feel they belong to the Netherlands. The Dutch 
nationality is an important tool. I still don’t understand, however, why that 
should not go hand in hand with internationalism; why that could not go hand in 
hand with various loyalties; why Dutch nationality means that you cannot have 
another nationality as well.” (Halsema, 02-09-2004: 94-6080) 
Indeed, dual nationality is permitted, as restricting it would result in fewer requests for 
citizenship as people might want to (or sometimes are obliged to) hold on to their 
original nationality, yet “naturalisation normally leads to better integration” (Azough, 
04-10-2006: 8-481). Moreover: 
 “nationality is a part of individual identity. The nationality of the country of 
origin may equally be part of that identity. Why does the Cabinet want to 
intervene in it? Are people in this modern society and these modern times not 
free to have an identity that is based in different nationalities?” (Azough, 04-10-
2006: 8-482) 
This reflects the emphasis on individual, rather than collective, national identities: “my 
party also doubts whether there is something tangible like national identity and if so, 
whether we can reach a uniform definition of what that identity is” (Halsema, 27-06-
2006: 95-5885). People relate to the nation and its history in different ways, which 
results in different conceptions of unity. As an instance of personal identity, national 
identity should be free from government infringement: “no state, no government can 
impose what you are and what you should feel” (Azough, 04-10-2006: 8-480).  
5.1.1 A vision of society, united 
What is the whole that is united in the conception of unity expressed in the vision of the 
united society underpinning this frame? It is best characterised as a state. Actually, this 
state receives significant weight in the vision of united society constructed here. It is 
not neutral but actively involved in shaping society and pursuing unity: it needs to 
enable the connections between individual citizens and the state that constitute unity, 
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based in adherence to the constitution and solidarity. This sociology privileges the state 
as the driving force behind society, reflecting a progressive belief in the possibility of 
designing a better future.  
It is individuals who belong to the polity, which can be understood as a political project 
that follows from state policy. These individuals should be free to choose their course 
of life, including their social groups. These groups are chosen relationships more than 
communities, and potential sources of oppression. Multicultural policies, therefore, are 
opposed as they could threaten individual freedom, so that diversity is limited to the 
private sphere and the state remains neutral between different groups. Such policies 
would moreover fix cultural identities that are dynamic. The state should stay out of 
identities, and that holds also for national identity, which is conceived in individual 
terms.  
However, given the priority of the state and its role in shaping a nation made up of 
emancipated individuals, there is some influence on personal identity nonetheless. 
After all, it seems that it is only through state policies that individuals become the 
autonomous citizens that form the nation. There is a tension here in the relationship 
between the individual and the state: on the one hand, the frame treats the individual 
as already an autonomous citizen that should be free from group and state interference 
in personal identities. On the other hand, the individual is considered somewhat 
secondary to the state: she needs to be embedded in the right conditions to flourish and 
requires political leadership to grow into a free and social citizen. Individual identities 
may be plural, and they are personal – but their appropriate development occurs 
within the parameters created by the state. This means that the question of how 
individuals belong to the polity is somewhat complicated: they do so by shared 
allegiance to the constitution, which presents a locus of uniform commitments, and 
solidarity with each other, but these commitments are not completely autonomously 
developed but encouraged by the state.  
The frame suggests that society is not yet plural, free and based in solidarity, so that 
the state needs to develop appropriate policies to pursue these goals. The vision of this 
better future both embraces pluralism and requires uniform adherence; the society 
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strived for is plural but the quest itself assumes agreement on an understanding of 
what state policy should achieve, namely a society made up of autonomous 
individuals that attain socio-economic equality and adhere to progressive social values 
and the constitution. As long as individuals are not autonomous, equal and 
progressive, unity is lacking and policies to foster it should focus on education and 
labour, which are believed to facilitate emancipation.  
5.2 The multicultural frame  
This frame approaches unity in multicultural society in a way that resembles the Dutch 
pillarisation approach to multiculturalism (cf. Entzinger 2006) and echoes the religious 
political orientation discussed above (Pellikaan 2002, p. 209). Although it argues for a 
strong sense of national identity that might at first seem nationalistic, it does so while 
advocating multicultural policies towards groups. The frame points to a perceived 
“clash of cultures and religions” (Huizinga-Heringa, 06-04-2004: 63-4132), the 
escalation of which needs to be prevented both by a greater acceptance of diversity and 
a stronger sense of unity.  
Such unity is defended in rather traditional terms of community and history. It is first 
of all associated with the Rechtsstaat. But in contrast to the previous frame, the 
Rechtsstaat here is not conceived in civic or legal terms, but as a cultural legacy:  
“For our Rechtsstaat is more than a set of rules; it is also a community of law with 
many aspects. Our Rechtsstaat has a cultural foundation; it is stamped by 
Christianity, by Jewish thought, by the Enlightenment, and by humanism.” 
(Rietkerk, 18-12-2002: 35-2624) 
History plays an important role for a unity based in “the language, the culture, the 
identity that we search for and find in the history of our fatherland” (Verhagen, 27-06-
2006: 95-5876). But national identity equally comprises “shared values and norms and 
connectedness to Dutch society” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5971). A strictly procedural 
or political national identity would not suffice:  
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 “If there are no common experiences hiding behind those rules, no common 
convictions, no generally recognisable historical moments that moved us forward 
in developing an understanding of what is good and evil in society, such rules 
tend to lack substance.” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5971) 
The need for a strong sense of national community is not just fuelled by a concern with 
diversity: it also stems from a rejection of individualism. The frame opposes 
individualist conceptions of national identity and argues that these pose a problem as 
they erode the “we-feeling” (Verhagen, 14-04-2005: 73-4475). Apparently, the recent 
emphases in policy and society on individualisation, freedom from constraints, and 
tolerance have led to a situation in which people take care only of their own interests 
and not of the community, and to avoid further fragmentation:  
“We need to start to realise that our identity is not derived from extreme 
openness, permissiveness and individuality. I think we need to instead move 
towards a club feeling, where we are proud of what the Netherlands is; that 
which binds us and that which we share with each other. […] Where other parties 
emphasise freedom and the individual, Christian-Democrats instead want to 
reclaim the sense of community and security that people need in these confusing 
times of globalisation, economic unrest and terrorist threat.” (Verhagen, 14-04-
2005: 73-4475-6)  
This is in marked contrast to the previous frame that saw national identity first as a 
matter of individual freedom rather than community. National identity here is thick 
and comprehensive, and it is simultaneously historical-cultural, emotional and civic. 
Integration and a renewed emphasis on community are required to achieve it. An 
engagement with national identity has been neglected in the past, and a clearer stance 
could help the integration of immigrants (Verhagen, 27-06-2006: 95-5876). Such 
integration here is understood to be “more than participation through a job or 
education” (Sterk, 06-04-2004: 63-4094); it extends to “loyalty” to the Netherlands 
(Huizinga-Heringa, 06-04-2004: 63-4133) and for immigrants to “identify with our 
country […]. It is important to know which fundamental values and norms and which 
social codes there are” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5970-1). These social codes are 
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accepted ways of behaving and interacting in public; when in public, all must act in 
accordance with the same norms. In contrast to the previous frame, integration hence is 
not just about legal and socio-economic but also about “socio-cultural” adaptation 
(Sterk, 06-04-2004: 63-4094).  
Government has an important role to play in the integration process: the problem of 
fragmentation in all its manifestations “screamed for moral leadership that could 
strengthen social cohesion and bridge divisions in society” (Rouvoet, 18-12-2002: 35-
2610). It needs to design education and integration policies that pay attention to “our 
culture, our history and our values and norms” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5971). It is 
important for the government to engage with values and morality because these are 
reflected in the policies and legislation they develop, but also because “society expects 
moral leadership from politics” (Rouvoet, 14-04-2005: 73-4459) – morality should not be 
relegated to the private sphere:  
“The public authorities have an important task where it concerns the formulation, 
the codification, and the protection of essential norms for the coexistence of 
people who differ in many ways. And that can only be done from within 
fundamental, underlying values”  […] “I have said several times in this room that 
politics is not just about the right, but in essence always also about morality. It is 
also about moral choices.” (Rouvoet, 18-12-2002: 35-2609-10) 
Government involvement does not stop at furthering a sense of unity; it also extends to 
an engagement with diversity. In fact, there is significant scope for diversity within the 
unity embodied in the Rechtsstaat, which functions as a framework for diversity that 
does not expect identical attachment from all its citizens. It does not result from 
citizens transcending their differences in a shared allegiance to the state but needs to be 
felt from within each cultural group: “The point is to make sure that all groups in our 
country connect their deepest intentions – and that includes religion – to the 
Rechtsstaat and democracy” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5975). It is through their group 
identity that people are part of the nation. This “plurality of our public sphere” (Sterk, 
06-04-2004: 63-4099) is an important historical legacy and is to be upheld and defended; 
it is enshrined in the constitution, to guarantee freedom, and it is a fundamental value 
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of Dutch society (Rietkerk, 18-12-2002: 35-2623). The values that are embodied in the 
Rechtsstaat include “cultural pluralism” (Verhagen, 14-04-2005: 73-4475). 
The public sphere thus is not neutral but host to a democratic search for “consensus 
and compromise” (Rouvoet, 14-04-2005: 73-4459) between different groups: 
 “There exists a persistent misunderstanding that the separation of church and 
state necessarily leads to the separation of religion and politics. […] our political 
discussions about the ordering of society would have to be ‘neutral’, without 
connections to religion, faith or morality […] That is not only downright 
nonsense, it is also factually impossible […] For it is the essence of democracy that 
people strive to order society in a particular way, based on their deepest 
convictions, through debate and persuasion. […] Tolerance in essence means 
accepting that others might have different perspectives on truth, good and evil or 
the good life and act in accordance with those. We should not be concerned with 
constructing a new truth – albeit through democratic procedures – as a sort of 
highest common denominator, but with ensuring that plural society, the ‘we 
agree to disagree’, does not get in the way of a peaceful society.” (Rouvoet, 14-04-
2005: 73-4460-1)   
Immigrants equally need to be included into the Rechtsstaat with their identities: “the 
slogan of ‘integration with retention of identity’58 remains relevant” (Rouvoet, 31-08-
2004: 92-5945). There is a potentially positive relationship between cultural or religious 
identities and integration: “People can be inspired by religion precisely to make a 
bridging contribution to society” (Sterk, 06-04-2004: 63-4099). Clearly, the frame 
opposes “assimilation into a secularised culture and/or the privatisation of religion” 
(Van der Vlies, 31-08-2004: 92-5968).  
Group organisations are implored to ensure such democratic inclusion (Verhagen, 31-
08-2004: 92-5976). The constitutional right of religious groups to establish their own 
schools, reflecting their religious identity, is equally defended in this frame:  
                                                     
58 This was the slogan of multiculturalism (originating in the Ethnic Minorities Policy) in the 
Netherlands.  
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“As far as I’m concerned, integration does not mean the loss of one’s personal 
identity, nor the loss of the distinctive group identity. In such a school this 
identity can be affirmed. The confidence that gives helps integration into society.” 
(Huizinga-Heringa, 06-04-2004: 93-4135) 
Minority cultural identities, then, are protected by state-funded separate schools. It is 
important to recognise such identities in order to foster their acceptance, so that groups 
can treat each other with respect: 
 “I am willing to put an effort into ensuring that we accept each other in our 
society, also in our being different. But I am actually not willing to deny that 
differences between people exist and that different ways of life happen to exist. 
Sweeping that under the carpet will not aid integration.” (Huizinga-Heringa, 06-
04-2004: 93-4134)  
Strong group identities apparently can aid integration: Rietkerk (18-12-2002: 35-2623) in 
this vein states that the Dutch culture of pluralism, tolerance and freedom supports 
“sovereignty in the own circle, emancipation from within the own circle, social ties and 
social cohesion”. These were the slogans of pillarisation, expressing the concept of 
subsidiarity that holds that matters should be decided at the most decentralised level 
possible (Entzinger 2006, p. 124).   
The frame indeed refers to pillars, such as in its discussion of integrating Islam:  
 “We need to prevent the creation of an Islamic pillar in the Netherlands that 
turns its back to society rather than facing that society. To prevent that, we need 
precisely to keep engaging with the Islamic pillar. […] through debate and 
dialogue we can try to make sure that Islam connects itself with all the values that 
we know in the Netherlands.” (Sterk, 06-04-2004: 63-4101) 
There is a particular difficulty in integrating Islam because “as a non-Christian religion 
[it] is essentially alien to the Judeo-Christian tradition that gave rise to European 
culture” (Huizinga-Heringa, 06-04-2004: 63-4136). This is further reinforced by certain 
scepticism about the compatibility of Islam and democracy: “Islam is not always 
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inclined to connect itself to a democratic Rechtsstaat” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5975). 
Nevertheless, such a connection is possible if Islam is publicly recognised:  
 “We have to realise that eliminating Islam from public life, as is advocated by 
some, will have perverse effects. It will mean that the necessary bridges will never 
be built and radical movements that oppose our society can develop all too easily. 
Precisely for the advancement of our democratic values and norms it is important 
to keep the dialogue going.” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5975) 
Out of a concern for democracy and unity, Muslims need to be included in the 
Rechtsstaat through debate and dialogue. They must have the space to be full and 
equal citizens:  
 “We must make sure not to exclude them, not to unnecessarily remove them 
from us, but rather to include them. We must show them that within the 
framework of our democratic Rechtsstaat – and that is non-negotiable – there is 
space for them too to live their life in the way they want, including their religion.” 
(Slob, 01-04-2008: 70-4888)  
The repetitive use of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in this latest quote highlights how inclusion is still 
a future aim, to be achieved through multicultural dialogue. Here it is clear that 
national identity is defined by history as much as it is defined by diversity. As Islam is 
not traditionally part of the Netherlands, such a historical definition of collective 
identity might only include Muslims once they have been part of the nation for some 
time – i.e. in the future.  
5.2.1 A vision of society, united  
What is the united whole here, how can we characterise it? Clearly, it is a nation, and 
this nation is understood as a historical community. It is also plural, so that diversity is 
included in unity. This is because it is not just individuals who belong to this nation, 
but also groups. These are not simply chosen associations and have identities that are 
traditional and valuable. Group identities, therefore, need to be respected and 
accommodated within the framework of the Rechtsstaat through multicultural policies 
that will give minorities the confidence to be full citizens. The individual, then, is 
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effectively seen as doubly embedded: in the group and in the nation. This is not a 
source of conflict because these groups are equally embedded in the nation, which 
thereby reflects the diversity of society.  
National identification is how citizens belong to the nation and the national identity 
proposed here is rather ‘thick’ as it specifies cultural characteristics. It is not conceived 
as an identity that sits on top of other cultural identities but rather as simultaneously 
made up of them and reflected in them, but group identities do remain secondary to 
national identity in public (not in the official or political public sphere, but in the 
interaction between citizens): here, all should uphold common norms and shared social 
codes. Meanwhile, it centres on the Rechtsstaat, understood not as a neutral and 
procedural state but as a cultural tradition. It reflects the shared history of the nation, 
the overarching community made up of different groups; it is something all can share 
and take part in and forms the focal point of national identity. Effectively, that means 
that nation and state are very closely bound up. But the nation-state is not only a 
source of unity: it also provides the framework for diversity. It embodies the norms 
and structures necessary to guarantee peaceful coexistence. And it engages with 
groups, encouraging them to express their identities and connect to it from within. 
Government has a responsibility to ensure that this role of the Rechtsstaat as a source 
of unity and a provision for diversity is successful: they need to show moral 
leadership. In that sense, the state is involved in shaping society as it facilitates smooth 
coexistence as well as cohesion.  
Unity here is impeded if a sense of community is lacking. As communities, both groups 
and the nation form a source of identity and belonging for the individual, and hence 
multiculturalism and national identity are complementary as instruments to strengthen 
a sense of community and thereby foster unity. Moreover, history teaching is 
important: the central value of community needs to be realised not only through the 
inclusion of groups into the national community, but also through the inclusion of 
individuals that might otherwise emphasise their individual freedom over their ties to 
the community. 
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5.3 The national frame  
The national frame approaches unity in multicultural society in a way that has received 
much attention in literature on integration policy in the Netherlands; this is the 
perspective associated with the ‘retreat from multiculturalism’ and the ‘move towards 
assimilation’ (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2007; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012; Joppke 
2004). The frame emphasises national identity at the expense of diversity, which is seen 
as a potential problem:  
“Diversity is a reality: that I agree with, of course! Diversity should not be fought. 
Wait a minute, this is really too fast for me. Didn’t we agree that diversity can also 
have a dark side, that not everything that comes from elsewhere is good, beautiful 
and interesting just for that reason and that an excess of diversity can destroy a 
society.” (Verdonk, 02-09-2004: 94-6058)  
This concern for the negative side of diversity is particularly relevant in relation to 
Islam. Herben (18-12-2002: 35-2632) states that: “The thesis that Islam hinders the 
integration of new migrants was perhaps a taboo a year ago, but is now a fait 
accompli”. Islam is seen as an obstacle to the integration necessary for strong national 
unity. Wilders (01-04-2008: 70-4896) goes as far as arguing that if the number of 
Muslims in the Netherlands grows, “then the Dutch identity will perish”. He states:  
“I do indeed think a million Muslims is enough for the Netherlands. […] No, too 
much even. I am not ashamed of that at all. Lots of people also think this. In our 
opinion, it does not fit into our culture.” (Wilders, 01-04-2008: 70-4895) 
Islam is presented as incompatible with Dutch culture. Rutte (01-04-2008: 70-4890) thus 
berates Vogelaar (Minister for Integration 2007-2008), “who sees Islam become part of 
our traditions. In so doing she increases the feelings of insecurity in our society”. 
Apparently, “new immigrants from Islamic countries […] view Western society as a 
decadent society that lost its ties to God and order” (Herben, 14-04-2005: 73-4471). 
Islamic diversity is also connected to security concerns: a “demanding policy to work 
towards cohesion” is needed to “prevent growing differences from evolving into 
radicalism and religious fundamentalism” (Sterk, 06-04-2004: 63-4094). Criminality 
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among immigrants too is a concern here. Rutte (01-04-2008: 60-4889) rhetorically runs 
the two together when he discusses the changes people have witnessed in their 
neighbourhoods; “[…] the terrible development of much too large a group of criminal 
and intimidating, largely allochtonous, youths who terrorise a complete 
neighbourhood.” 
Diversity, and particularly Islam, then, poses a public order problem as well as a threat 
to unity. Apparently, in Dutch society there is “a cultural chasm… This distance needs 
to be decreased! I am convinced that this is only possible if policy aims to strengthen 
the common” (Verdonk, 02-09-2004: 94-6059). Multiculturalism is rejected:  
“The Netherlands are a multicultural country […]. The mistake that has long been 
made is to think that multiculturality is a good concept for the integration of new 
immigrants into the existing and dominant culture. That turned out to be false. 
[…] For those who decide to take permanent residence here there is only one way 
to success and that is to take part.” (Marijnissen, 31-08-2004: 92-5936) 
Policy should focus on shared values and norms: “I advocate the abolition of the whole 
ethnic minority policy, [taking instead] the pursuit of Dutch culture and identity as a 
guide” (Nawijn, 31-08-2004: 92-5978). Policy specifically targeted at minorities “is not 
good for the minorities and on my view also discriminating. It is also not good for the 
autochtonen, because it leads to jealous responses” (Nawijn, 06-04-2004: 63-4147). 
Instead, “a lot of attention should be paid to the Dutch language, identity, history, 
culture, our royal family, national anthem, and so on” (Van der Vlies, 31-08-2004: 92-
5969). The objection to multicultural policies here is justified in different terms than 
those raised in the emancipation frame: there, they were opposed out of a concern for 
the potential oppression of individuals by groups, whereas here, they are opposed 
because they would affirm diversity when what is needed instead is an emphasis on 
unity.  
Unity resides in shared values and norms that “belong to our collective consciousness 
and are the pillars underneath our civilisation and thereby further stability, trust, the 
prevention of fear, alienation and embitterment and even extreme egoism and 
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violence” (Kant, 18-12-2002: 35-2615). They need to be explicated, because integration 
requires that “we need to first be absolutely clear about what it is new and old 
immigrants should integrate into”(Herben, 18-12-2002: 35-2632). These values are “the 
core values of modernity” (Herben, 18-12-2002: 35-2632) and they are “our democratic 
achievements” (Herben, 14-04-2005: 73-4471). They are part of “what constitutes our 
common frame of reference, our national identity, and the character of the Dutch 
nation” (Nijs, 27-06-2006: 95-5883). To this identity belong characteristics such as 
“provincialism and courage, Calvinism and Catholicism, William of Orange and 
Phillips II, Thorbecke and Drees” (Nijs, 27-06-2006: 95-5883). These characteristics arise 
from history: “The current confusion about our moral, cultural and political identity 
partly finds its explanation in the lack of historical awareness in broad swathes of the 
population” (Marijnissen, 27-06-2006: 95-5877).  
To overcome such confusion, the state needs to explicate and define the moral 
character of the national community. Morality cannot be reduced to “common 
decency” to be left to the individual (Kant, 18-12-2002, 25-2615): 
“The concept of the minimal state conflicts with people’s expectations. They want 
a government that leads, […] a government that keeps things together, and a 
government that itself sets a good example.” (Marijnissen, 14-04-2005: 73-4481) 
The need to make explicit what is at stake also holds for the debate on the issues 
surrounding multiculturalism and national identity. The national frame opposes the 
emancipation frame’s call for conciliation; it argues against those who portray open 
and honest debate using “terms like ‘provocative’, ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘stigmatisation’” 
(Van Aartsen, 31-08-2004: 92-5960) as they invite political correctness. In fact:  
“clarity is an absolute requirement to solve problems. Clarity can of course 
sometimes be painful, but that cannot be a reason to gloss over or sidestep real 
difficulties. Respect is often mentioned in this regard. I would firstly like to 
remark that respect needs to be earned. […] In my thinking respect is inextricably 
linked to clarity. Respect for others means first of all that I do not obfuscate 
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matters, but clearly say what I think about something or someone.” (Verdonk, 02-
09-2004: 94-6059) 
Unity, then, is based in shared values and directed by government. At the level of 
community, it is expressed in terms of citizenship, here understood to go beyond rights 
and duties: it “stands for the identity of the Dutch citizen. Everybody who comes to 
live in the Netherlands should be proud to have Dutch citizenship” (Verdonk, 04-10-
2006: 8-486). Citizenship here is a source of pride and not purely civic and procedural: 
“Culture and tradition are also linked to State and citizenship” (Visser, 04-10-2006: 8-
483). The entry into citizenship for immigrants equals “the accession to a new 
community” (Visser, 04-10-2004: 8-482) that is not to be taken lightly: “so begins a 
unique tie between the naturalisandus [he who obtains nationality] and his new 
fatherland. […] Naturalisation […] is much more than simply obtaining a passport. It is 
the finishing touch to the internalisation of citizenship” (De Krom, 14-01-2010: 42-4131). 
That is, “integration is a means, a condition to naturalise. Integration is a means and a 
condition to obtain that Dutch citizenship. That is the first prize” (Verdonk, 02-09-2004: 
94-6096).  
Dutch citizenship is about identity, pride and exclusivity, and “immigrants need to 
make a conscious choice for Dutchness” (Nawijn, 31-08-2004: 92-5978). That means the 
frame opposes dual nationality, which is considered “an obstacle to integration” 
(Verdonk, 02-09-2004: 94-6074) and characterised as opportunistic; it is “buttering one’s 
bread on both sides” (Fritsma, 14-01-2010: 42-4137). This directly contrasts with the 
emancipation frame that portrayed naturalisation as the first step rather than the final 
point of integration and argued for dual nationality as an expression of personal 
identity. And despite the similar stress on community and history, this conception of 
national identity differs from that of the multicultural frame in that it is singular: the 
public sphere here does not reflect and engage groups but rather unifies individual 
citizens.  
The integration that leads up to citizenship is understood as cultural adaptation, which 
has been neglected in previous policy so that “the integration of large groups of 
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allochtonen has not succeeded and hence has failed” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5971). It 
is time for a change in approach:  
 “[…] we have […] a lot of allochtonen who, even after living in our country for a 
decade, still cannot even speak Dutch. In addition, many immigrants show little 
willingness to adapt to our society. […] still nothing is done to make clear to 
immigrants that they are expected to adapt to Dutch society […][We propose] an 
assimilation-contract […] The migrant thereby indicates that he will come to share 
the Dutch dominant values and norms. The Dutch identity and the Dutch 
freedoms can no longer be under pressure from immigration.” (Fritsma, 30-01-
2008: 47-3516)  
Adaptation is important not only to overcome the dangerous implications of diversity 
discussed above but also because “a culture or a religion can keep people in a 
disadvantaged position” (Hirsi Ali, 06-04-2004: 63-4107). Indeed, it is “the migrants 
that have largely or totally been assimilated” in Dutch society that are most successful 
(Hirsi Ali, 06-04-2004: 63-4107).  
Cultural adaptation should not be limited to the public sphere but also extends to the 
private. Sterk (06-04-2004: 63-4097) proposes measures to ensure that families speak 
Dutch at home: “it cannot be the case that children aged four start school not knowing 
a word of Dutch. Parents fail to invest in their child. This results in high costs for the 
tax payer.” In the interest of integration, children should go to school together because 
segregation hinders interaction, and “integration indeed means that you do things 
together” (Marijnissen, 02-09-2004: 94-6068). Here, “the greater societal goal, which is a 
society in which we truly live together” (Kant, 06-04-2004: 63-4122) means that the 
freedom of parents to choose a school for their children can be constrained, as they 
“have a duty towards the community” (Marijnissen, 02-09-2004: 94-6068). Likewise, the 
frame advocates a “moratorium on Islamic and Orthodox schools” (Kant, 06-04-2004: 
63-4128) as these would impede mixing. 
Integration is mainly the responsibility of the migrant: “it is ultimately up to them to 
determine whether the Netherlands will also be their country” (Kant, 06-04-2004: 63-
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4131-2). This responsibility or “duty” to integrate stems from the choice to migrate: 
“after all, they are the ones leaving their own country. They must therefore care about 
attaining a good position here” (Verhagen, 31-08-2004: 92-5971). People integrate 
themselves; this is not something the government can do for them. However, there is a 
crucial role for government to facilitate integration, and one of the most important 
factors is anti-discrimination: “we cannot on the one hand make appropriate and high 
demands of people from elsewhere who want to participate in our society and then 
exclude them because they come from elsewhere. We can’t!” (Verdonk, 02-09-2004: 94-
6061).  
5.3.1 A vision of society, united 
In the conception of unity expressed in the vision of the ideally united society 
underpinning this frame, the nation best characterises what the united whole is. The 
nation is a community defined by a shared national identity that leaves little scope for 
diversity. It is individuals who belong to this nation and national identification is how 
they do so. National membership is thick and provides identity and belonging, such 
that the nation sometimes takes precedence over individuals and the groups they may 
be part of; individuals are nationals first and should be proud of that. The strong sense 
of national identity that is advocated here is portrayed as natural and self-evident, and 
as based in history.  
The focus on national identity resembles that in the multicultural frame, but differs 
from it in its rationale. Here, the emphasis on national identity stems not so much from 
a commitment to the value of community but rather expresses a direct concern with 
unity. That is, the defence of a strong national identity is justified by an appeal to the 
need for unity in sameness to avoid fragmentation. Patently, that differs from the 
appeal to the need for what was labelled a ‘club feeling’ in the multicultural frame: 
here what is emphasised are characteristics rather than emotions. Where the 
multicultural frame pursues unity as a means to community, here it is pursued as an 
end in itself – an end that is threatened by diversity. National identity is not balanced 
with group identity but rather subsumes it; it is pictured as a singular rather than a 
plural identity. This difference reflects slightly different outlooks on the individual in 
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these frames: the multicultural frame opposed individualisation whereas here 
individual responsibility is emphasised. The nation here is made up of individuals that 
must share national characteristics. 
This already indicates that diversity potentially impedes unity. Indeed cultural diversity 
itself is considered a potential threat, both as detrimental to unity and as a feeding 
ground for Islamic radicalism. Consequently, to foster unity, diversity should be 
downplayed and national identity emphasised instead. This suggests a trade-off 
between diversity and unity, or the idea that multiculturalism and national identity are 
incompatible; too much diversity would harm the nation. Multicultural policies that 
would emphasise diversity are therefore rejected. Rather, minorities need to adapt so 
as to attenuate excess diversity and ensure an appropriate degree of unity based in 
sameness. National unity overrides individual freedom, such that individual identities 
may be sacrificed (in calls for assimilation) and individual liberty restricted (in the case 
of schools). Clearly, such sacrifices and restrictions fall especially on immigrants and 
minorities, or those who are the bearers of perceived excesses of diversity. Only by 
becoming more like the rest of the nation will they become part of it, and only with 
such inclusion will they fully enjoy the rights and liberties that come with citizenship. 
In that sense, national citizenship is an identity first and a set of legal provisions 
second. 
5.4 The liberal individual frame  
This frame echoes the Dutch liberal political orientation (cf. Pellikaan 2002, p. 209) and 
focuses on the individual. Questions of unity, diversity, multiculturalism and national 
identity here are considered individual concerns: what matters is citizenship, the 
individual relationship to the state that leaves space for diversity in private. In 
opposition to the emancipation frame that advocated state involvement in shaping 
society, here it is argued that 
 “The mouldable society was a concept that was very current in the ‘70s. I 
however assume that all of us here can conclude that we cannot completely 
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design the entire world or even the Netherlands from The Hague. People also 
have their own responsibility.” (Dittrich, 06-04-2004: 63-4112) 
This is not only based in scepticism about the effectiveness of policy, but also in a 
normative commitment to state neutrality where it concerns values. In contrast to the 
multicultural and national frames, the liberal individual frame argues that the state 
should not be involved in promoting shared values, because “it is not the state that 
governs public morality, but society itself” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2612). Although 
states can never be fully value-neutral, “the government is not in charge of the moral 
convictions of citizens, whether we like it or not” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2611). 
Therefore, Van Aartsen (14-04-2005: 73-4489) considers the political discussion about 
shared values somewhat irrelevant: “we have, I think, little use for a special debate 
about norms and values.”  
Shared values are no solution to the problem of “the disintegration of society” and the 
fear, divisions and “collective lack of self-confidence” (Dittrich, 14-04-2005: 73-4465) it 
engenders. Rather, what is needed is an emphasis on individual freedom and 
responsibility. Indeed, “emphasising individual opportunities is the only way to create 
social cohesion in a depillarised59 society” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2613), and “the 
consistent defence of individual freedom is […] the strongest weapon to fight excesses 
in multicultural society” (Dittrich, 06-04-2004: 63-4113). The frame wholeheartedly 
embraces the development of individualisation that saw the decrease of the power of 
the old pillars over individual choice. The multicultural frame was uneasy with this 
development and the emancipation framed noted the danger that particular policies 
would allow it to produce self-regarding citizens; here it is defended, for it “has led to 
more rights to self-determination and to the emancipation of women, gays and 
minorities” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2612). That nonetheless does not mean the total 
abolition of communities, because “a truly free individual only flourishes in relation to 
its environment” (Dittrich, 14-04-2005: 73-4465). Individuals are social and they will 
choose their own groups.  
                                                     
59 See Appendix 4.  
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The increased autonomy of the individual too often is “cast in strongly negative terms, 
as if the liberation from collective ties would also relegate to the background any sense 
of responsibility” (Dittrich, 14-04-2005: 73-4465). In fact, individual liberty and 
responsibility are closely bound up. Individual freedom has limits and “they seem to 
have been lost out of sight. Those limits are the freedom of others and individual 
responsibility. […] We need to appeal to people on the basis of that individual 
responsibility, not just the collective, the government, the cultural group, the firm or 
the school” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2612). There is a responsibility on the part of 
individual citizens, then, to make society function smoothly: policy can only do so 
much.  
This position on individual autonomy also characterises the response to diversity this 
frame advocates. Diversity is celebrated as a consequence of individual liberty; it arises 
as values and convictions fall in the “individual choice-domain” (Zalm, 18-12-2002: 35-
2621). The “pillarised norms” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 35-2612) of the past no longer have 
much purchase as individuals negotiate their own identities; cultural identity is a 
private and individual matter. The Netherlands is understood and valued as a diverse 
society where “different groups of people live with different cultural backgrounds and 
value-and-norm-systems. […] I see diversity as something powerful” (Dittrich, 14-04-
2005: 73-4466). Diversity is also recognised as a feature of democracy: the frame views 
“political pluralism as the expression of societal differences and of course of 
disagreements about the ordering of a society” (Van Aartsen, 14-04-2004: 73-4488).  
But this celebration of diversity does not lead to support for multicultural policies. 
These would affirm groups that may be sources of “pressure and oppression” such as 
was the case in pillarised society when “people belonging to a pillar were enjoined 
from above, as a matter of course, to take certain decisions or design their lives in a 
particular way” (Dittrich, 06-04-2004: 63-4113). This suspicion of groups also extends to 
their discussion: when talking about immigrants and ethnic minorities there is a risk of 
essentialism. Thus Dittrich (31-08-2004: 92-5962) says that “Although it is inevitable to 
talk about groups, we realise that the allochtoon does not exist”; and Rutte (01-04-2008: 
70-4890) states that “Every individual in this country has a right to be judged for his or 
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her actions as an individual and never because he or she happens to be part of a 
group”.  
Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to talk about groups because even if “a 
Moroccan boy from the Rif-area can have a completely different background from a 
Moroccan woman from Casablanca […]. Still they can sometimes encounter similar 
problems in Dutch society” (Dittrich, 31-08-2004: 92-5962). Such problems then clearly 
originate with a lack of openness in the host society. Although minorities are 
responsible for their own success because “every person creates their own happiness”, 
the fact that they encounter these problems “creates duties for government” (Dittrich, 
06-04-2004: 63-4113): to fight discrimination, to offer language courses and to make 
space for people from other countries in culture policies. Equally, integration policy 
should focus on education and labour to ensure migrants have the necessary skills to 
participate, as “arrears in integration often coincide with socio-economic 
disadvantage” (Dittrich, 31-08-2004: 92-5966). The appropriate balance between state 
policy and immigrant responsibility is expressed thus: 
“We give you the best education possible, we break open the rigid labour market 
for you, and also the long-neglected housing market and thereby create a 
foundation to build your future upon, but afterwards, after that it is up to you, to 
your ambition, to your vision for the future, to your strength.” (Pechtold, 01-04-
2008: 70-4891)  
Integration here is not about cultural adaptation; “it should be possible that somebody 
integrates into society while retaining his identity if he speaks Dutch well and does 
well in society” (Dittrich, 06-04-2004: 63-4109). This is “integration in the sense of 
participation, not assimilation” (Pechtold, 01-04-2008: 70-4890); it is “a matter of rights 
and duties and integration is a matter of individuals” (Van Aartsen, 31-08-2004: 92-
5956).  
The frame hence relegates diversity to the private sphere and emphasises legal equality 
and socio-economic participation as enabling unity. Such unity is captured in 
citizenship, which is understood in procedural terms: “being a citizen is to belong to 
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the jurisdiction of democracy and Rechtsstaat. That is what matters” (Hirsch Ballin, 30-
01-2008: 47-3535). Contra the national frame, citizenship here is about norms of 
interaction and respect for the rule of law, rather than shared values, culture or 
identity. Citizenship centres on a commitment to the constitution, which:  
“in the first place offers freedoms of citizens against the state, amongst others the 
freedom of opinion, freedom of religion and the freedom of association. An 
important article is article one that contains the ban on discrimination. We see 
that as the expression of the principle of equality of people: of man and woman, 
coloured and white, religious and non-religious, heterosexual and homosexual. 
We cannot retract from these essential achievements. When exercising the 
freedoms of the constitution, everyone must also respect article one.” (Zalm, 18-
12-2002: 35-2617) 
Although unity is mostly legal in nature, that does not make it trivial and the values of 
freedom, equality and non-discrimination are non-negotiable. They should be upheld 
in the case of a “clash of cultures in our society” in which there may be appeals to 
“cultural or religious motives to preach or practice inequality” (De Graaf, 18-12-2002: 
35-2613). And they – “Dutch values, such as equal treatment of men and women, of 
gays and straight people” – need to be taught in schools from a young age (Dittrich, 31-
08-2004: 92-5963). It should be remembered that “democracy as we know it in the 
Netherlands and the rest of the western world seems a self-evident achievement but it 
is not” (Pecthold, 27-06-2006: 95-5889); it needs maintenance in the form of democratic 
education to continue to function. 
This civic conception of unity as based in the constitution leaves space for plural 
identities: people are allowed to hold dual nationality because “the hypothesis that 
loyalty and nationality are inextricably linked is untenable” (De Krom, 14-01-2010: 42-
4131) – there is no necessary correlation between the two concepts. In fact, “everyone 
in the Europe of 25 should get the same European nationality, next to the original 
nationality of each specific country” (Dittrich, 31-08-2004: 92-5965). National identity is 
approached in an individual, cosmopolitan and internationalist manner. “Nationality 
is part of somebody’s identity”, De Krom (14-01-2010: 41-4131) states, and it is not this 
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identity that makes nationality unique (as people can have plural identities) but “what 
does make nationality unique – and for us that is the core of the nationality concept – is 
citizenship.”  
5.4.1 A vision of society, united 
Here, a state best characterises what the whole united in the vision of the ideally united 
society underpinning this frame is. In contrast to the other Dutch frames, the state here 
is considered to be neutral. It follows from society and has no role in shaping it or its 
values. The polity is conceived in terms of citizenship, which is understood as a direct 
relationship between the individual and the state. That means that it is a purely 
political association of individuals. State neutrality notwithstanding, the unity that this 
frame advocates is promoted actively through policies that affirm the values of the 
constitution that stands at its basis. Where it concerns these civic fundamentals, 
targeted state action is justified to ensure the continued allegiance of the population to 
liberal democracy. In that sense, shared citizenship is prior to cultural diversity.  
The individual is given priority in this conception of unity and it is clear that it is 
individuals who belong to the polity. The individual here is free and has more direct 
responsibility for matters such as identity and values, but also national cohesion. 
Individual identities need to be free from group as well as state interference. National 
identity is part of such personal identities and the state is only concerned with the 
provision and guarantee of free and equal citizenship as its basis. Such citizenship is 
portrayed as a limited identity that pertains mainly to the legal dimension of national 
membership – and this is how citizens belong to the polity, as well as through a shared 
allegiance to the constitution encouraged by the state. As such, citizenship identity sits 
on top of other identities and all can share it across their differences because it reflects 
the values of the constitution: it is inclusive because it is neutral.  
Groups are seen as potential sources of oppression and the individual here is seen as 
already autonomous: in that sense, this frame can be seen as an extension into the 
future of the emancipation frame. Likewise, it can be seen as located in the future vis-à-
vis the multicultural frame as it considers pillarisation purely as a thing of the past. At 
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the same time, the frame itself still looks to a future where there are no longer any 
structural obstacles to equal participation: these impede unity and to remove such 
obstacles and foster unity, policies need to fight discrimination and promote equal 
opportunities. Clearly, central concepts such as national identity, citizenship, 
multiculturalism and diversity are approached from different angles (not only in the 
obvious ideological sense but also, as noted here, in a temporal sense) in these frames, 
and this has implications for the responses that are proposed.  
As was the case in the previous chapter, the frames represent the issues to be 
addressed and the preferred responses to these in rather different terms, offering 
alternative understandings of causes and responsibility. It should also be clear that 
there are important similarities between the different perspectives on issues relating to 
unity advanced in the UK and the Netherlands. Moreover, a tendency that was noted 
in the previous chapter can be recognised here as well: political elites often allude to 
personal experiences to illustrate, underline, explain and justify their positions. To give 
but a few examples, consider, first, how Marijnissen (13-08-2004: 92-5931) recounts how 
he used to work with Turkish immigrants in a sausage factory, and witnessed how 
they were all but exploited, to arrive at his point that government has failed to be 
proactive on integration and create the conditions in which these immigrants could 
become part of the nation. Likewise, Azough (04-10-2006: 8-272) defends dual 
nationality by pointing out how she herself has both a Moroccan and a Dutch passport 
and this does not prevent her from feeling she belongs in – or has a “real tie” to – the 
Netherlands. And Herben (14-04-2005: 73-771) alludes to growing up in “the era of the 
Hare Krishnas in orange dresses” to explain and illustrate his openness to private 
forms of expressions of diversity, as distinguished from the strict separation of church 
and state he advocates.  
 
This chapter has shown that Dutch political elites, like their British counterparts, 
construct different visions of the ideally united society as they debate matters relating 
to unity and diversity. As in the previous chapter, the perspective on unity developed 
in chapter 3 helped to interpret and reconstruct the different conceptions of unity 
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underpinning the frames (that is, this perspective has proved helpful to discern 
different conceptions of unity both in theory and in practice). Clarifying the differences 
between the frames helps us to gain a clearer view of the disagreements and overlaps 
in these debates, which could facilitate more fruitful dialogue. Moreover, 
reconstructing the different conceptions of unity that underpin the frames helps to 
unpick some of  this disagreement as we can now begin to see how these frames 
actually pursue rather different visions of what a united society should look like 
ideally. They not only disagree about what issues need to be addressed and how, but 
also about what goals political intervention should aim to achieve in the long run. The 
next chapter will now consider the implications of the ideas of British and Dutch 
political elites for political theorists who aim to be of practical use and to suggest a 
conception of unity that may guide political action within these contexts.  
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6 British and Dutch political elites on unity: implications 
for political theorists 
The previous two chapters have shown that rather like political theorists, British 
(chapter 4) and Dutch (chapter 5) political elites have different ideas about what unity 
is. These ideas are the ones that practical political theorists intend to shape when they 
clarify what unity is and suggest ways to foster it. As chapter 2 explained, knowing 
these ideas helps political theorists to enhance and demonstrate the political plausibility 
of the conceptions of unity they propose: recall that this involves that such proposals 
are clearly recognisable as applicable and acceptable within the context they address. 
This chapter will now explain the implications of the ideas presented in the previous 
two chapters for political theorists who aim to be of practical use, before the next 
chapter uses them to show that a multicultural conception of unity is not only most 
defensible but also politically plausible. 
Ascertaining political plausibility is not a straightforward task: the ideas articulated by 
political elites are contingent and may be false, inconsistent, morally dubious, 
unrealistic and so on, so they should not simply be taken as a limit on the types of 
responses political theorists who aim to be of practical use may advance, or a checklist 
against which political theories can be assessed. In other words, the case studies do not 
compel a normative response: there is no ‘relationship of logical entailment’ (Miller 
2013, p. 21) between them and the next chapter. That means that the implications of the 
previous chapters for political theorists cannot be captured in a straightforward list of 
issues or concepts they need to address. But as suggested before, practical political 
theory does take the ideas presented there to represent positions in the political debate 
it contributes to: it responds to them, showing how it builds on, develops, challenges or 
subverts them. The implications of the case studies pertain to this response. Of course, 
practical political theorists cannot (and need not) respond to all and every idea floated 
in the debates analysed. This chapter will therefore indicate how to approach the 
analyses presented in chapter 4 and 5.  
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First, section 6.1 specifies the significance of the information presented in the previous 
two chapters. With that in mind, section 6.2 then reassesses the frames to distil the 
broad patterns of thought that practical political theorists should bear in mind and 
respond to when devising conceptions of unity that are politically plausible. It shows 
that the different conceptions of unity underpinning the frames expressed by British 
and Dutch political elites can all be classified in terms of the rough typology of 
conceptions of unity suggested in chapter 3. This not only helps to highlight the 
existing ideas of the political elites these political theorists need to convince, but also 
underlines the fault lines in the debates analysed: unity is conceived in a plurality of 
ways as the debates comprise different patterns of thinking about it. Section 6.3 argues 
that this pluralism is a feature of these debates political theorists who aim to be of 
practical use need to heed when devising conceptions of unity in order for the latter to 
be politically plausible.  
6.1 Specifying the significance of the case studies 
This section explains how to approach the ideas presented in the case studies so that 
the next sections can subsequently explain how practical political theorists who aim to 
devise a politically plausible conception of unity need to respond to them. First, we 
need to know what exactly the case studies tell us. We know they present the different 
ways in which political elites conceive unity, but as yet, we do not know what can be 
inferred from these case studies. Their significance is affected by the method that was 
taken to the empirical analysis, which inevitably has limitations. This analysis has 
focused on one dimension of the phenomenon of unity in multicultural societies: the 
internal logic of how it is conceived in competing frames advanced by political elites. 
Undoubtedly, it has thereby neglected other interesting aspects. This section will 
clarify the significance of the case studies by discussing four important limitations. 
First of all, the empirical analysis was not designed to generate generalisations. Yet the 
similarities between the British and Dutch frames raise the question if they might 
prove relevant in other countries dealing with similar issues. Further research in other 
countries would be needed to see whether these frames have some wider validity; or 
are embedded in specifically Western or European intellectual traditions; or, 
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alternatively, if they are particular to a certain way of accommodating difference that 
has been relatively similar in the UK and the Netherlands. 
Secondly, the causal importance of the frames cannot be established. The approach has 
focused on the content of the frames: it was concerned with the ideas that were 
presented, rather than with who presented them, or how frequently they were 
presented. While we know how political elites conceive of unity in different ways, we 
do not know the levels of support the different conceptions of unity enjoy and we do 
not know which ones might be supported by more powerful groups of actors – be they 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995) 
or epistemic communities (Haas 1992). As we do not know the support for the different 
conceptions of unity, we cannot know which ones are more or less likely to influence 
policy developments (because after all, such influence depends on support as it is not 
always simply the best arguments that win in politics). Further research could develop 
this avenue and ascertain the support for the frames, both in these two political 
contexts and in wider society.  
The third limitation concerns representativeness. Because the sample selection was 
based on the relevance and quality of the parliamentary debates, the samples cannot be 
assumed to be representative of wider political debates. This is the case in the British 
case study, because of the peculiar status and the particularly reflective character of the 
House of Lords, in which several academics participate, including most importantly 
for this thesis Lord Parekh, given his importance in the debate on multiculturalism in 
political theory. In the Dutch case study, parliamentary debates from 2004, a year of 
intense public interest in multiculturalism, are overrepresented in the sample. 
Nevertheless, the samples do represent parliamentary debates on these topics that are 
particularly sophisticated and reflective so they give a good impression of the different 
positions that are being defended.  
Furthermore, the limited focus on political elites means that the frames cannot be 
shown to be important more widely in society. Nonetheless, such importance is 
probable, because of the nature of frames as ideational constructs that are produced 
and consumed by groups made up of a variety of actors in society, rather than 
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individuals (Freeden 1996, p. 105): their meaning is not simply reducible to the intent 
of the political elites participating in the debates but derives from the wider cultural 
context in which they are shaped. These elites draw on wider societal notions of the 
political concepts they use and this can be explained both from a logical or linguistic, 
and from a political point of view. First, these elites share a conceptual language with 
the wider population: the concepts they use are imbued with particular meanings that 
are embedded in wider patterns of shared understanding in society. They cannot 
construct arguments without making reference to ideas that resonate in society (cf. 
Miller 2013, p. 42; Parekh 2000c, p. x). Secondly, these elites consciously frame the 
issues they address to match the expectations of the citizens whose votes they seek, so 
that they likely advance conceptions of unity that appeal to citizens (e.g. Béland 2005, 
2009; Campbell 1998).60  
Of course, they may fail to achieve the latter: political elites are often said to be 
disconnected from society, removed from how most citizens think about issues like 
multiculturalism and national identity. But even if they fail to capture exactly how 
citizens conceive unity, these elites probably still advance conceptions of unity that are 
at least similar to the ones held by other citizens, because they still use the same 
language, refer to the same events, construct their positions in line with expectations of 
what is ‘permissible and knowable’ (Freeden 2008, p. 206) in their society, and so on. It 
is expected, therefore, that the conceptions of unity that further research might identify 
in wider society (for example by looking at media representations of unity, 
multiculturalism and national identity, or through exploring public opinion) will be 
similar to the ones identified in the previous two chapters, even if they may not be 
exactly the same. Hence, the conceptions of unity analysed in chapters 4 and 5 will be 
treated below as if they are pertinent in wider society too.  
Finally, the focus on competition between the frames has approached them as more or 
less stable, thereby neglecting changes over time. This is in line with theories of 
knowledge and learning in policy that emphasise how more fundamental levels of 
ideas are resistant to change. The normative outlook and vision of social reality that 
                                                     
60 Although, of course, this latter consideration does not apply to the Lords.  
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characterise the frames, and the priorities of values that they pursue, constitute such 
deeper levels of policy ideas. These theories argue that at this level, change tends to 
come from external shocks: only when new events cannot be explained in terms of the 
basic axioms of the paradigm will the paradigm itself change (Campbell 2002; Hall 
1993; Sabatier 1993). Indeed, Fermin (1997, p. 155) finds that in the Netherlands, these 
most basic starting positions for approaching issues of unity and diversity have 
remained stable over a long period of time, even though problem definitions and 
proposed strategies have changed.  
It seems intuitively likely that it is hard to change someone’s ideas about what 
individuals are and how they relate to their environment: such ideas are based not only 
in scientific information that can be proved flawed, but also in her experience of her 
own identity (or self-conception [Miller 1995, p. 17]) and her interactions with others 
over the course of her lifetime, which are not so amenable to simple ideas of right and 
wrong. These beliefs and experiences may feed into the differential construction of the 
meaning of difference and unity, and also impact on the preferred political response to 
it. In that sense, the different conceptions of unity identified in the case studies are 
tightly linked to different ‘modes of being’ (Modood 2007, pp. 37-38).61 The case studies 
indeed suggest this might be the case as they pointed out how political elites often 
draw on their own experiences to explain, illustrate and justify their ideas about unity.  
Nevertheless, even if these ideas are hard to change that does not mean that change is 
impossible. There are numerous historical examples of ideational change over time. 
Deliberation might impact on the ontological presuppositions as well as the policy 
preferences of the frames (cf. Dryzek 1993; Fischer 1998; Rein and Schön 1993; Schmidt 
2008, 2010). The fact that most of the frames discussed accept diversity (in some form 
or other) as a permanent feature of society is a case in point: at times in history this 
may not have been so obvious, as nationalist ideas were much more dominant. 
However, the approach taken to the analysis does not allow discerning such changes, 
and further research would be needed to track them. Here, it is important not to 
confuse changes in the dominant policy discourse, such as identified for example by 
                                                     
61 For an interesting application of this idea to multicultural policies, see Verkuyten (2009). 
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Scholten (2011) and McGhee (2003), with changes within a frame: the former may refer 
to changes in levels of support or political power, whereas the latter more directly 
involves learning processes.  
The case studies, hence, provide a particular type of information: they shed light on 
how unity is conceived in a plurality of ways within parliamentary debates in the UK 
and the Netherlands. These conceptions of unity cannot be proved to have wider 
validity but are nonetheless assumed to resemble how citizens in these countries 
conceive unity. They are also assumed to be rather stable, because they relate to how 
people conceive of themselves and their place in society, which is partly based on life 
experiences. Despite the limitations to what we can infer from the case studies, they 
offer important insights into the ideas about unity of the political elites who political 
theorists who aim to be of practical use and guide political action intend to convince.  
6.2 Applicability and acceptability: responding to the frames 
As we saw, British and Dutch political elites already have ideas about what unity is 
and how it should be fostered. Political theorists who aim to be of practical use try to 
shape these ideas. Knowing these ideas helps them to do so, as it enables political 
theorists to propose suggestions and clarifications that are not only morally defensible 
but also politically plausible, or clearly recognisable as applicable and acceptable 
within the context they address. The frames analysed in the previous two chapters, 
therefore, indicate which types of responses may be politically plausible. But as was 
noted above, they do not condition such responses for they may be flawed. Moreover, 
political theorists who aim to propose a politically plausible conception of unity do not 
have to respond to all ideas political elites may have. The implications of the case 
studies for such political theorists, hence, are not immediately apparent, and this 
section will clarify them by specifying which ideas they have reason to be attentive to.  
It would be unrealistic to expect practical political theorists to address all the events, 
issues, policy developments and so on discussed in the parliamentary debates 
analysed. Such topics, it was suggested before, are often epiphenomena that are 
addressed from a more fundamental position on unity. The case studies already 
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explicated these positions underpinning the frames. Now, this section will distil or 
crystallise the most fundamental differences between these positions to show that they 
fall under three broad patterns of thought about unity. These patterns can be classified 
in terms of the rough typology of conceptions of unity proposed in chapter 3.  
Classifying the frames in terms of this rough typology that distinguished between a 
negative conception of unity as well as political, national and multicultural conceptions 
of unity helps to organise and understand them and interpret their meaning by 
highlighting differences and similarities between them and bringing out their 
distinctive rationale. Note, however, that the negative conception of unity was refuted 
already as it fails to specify a convincing account of unity. Indeed, its rejection of unity 
now proves too remote from the way political elites think about issues of unity and 
diversity in society to be politically plausible, as all the frames suggest some form of 
unity. As will be shown below, the other three broad patterns of thinking about unity 
can be understood as somewhat more abstract versions of the conceptions of unity that 
underpin the different frames that were identified in chapters 4 and 5. By responding 
to these three broad conceptions of unity, practical political theorist can thus address 
the central ideas about unity in these frames.  
This classification is not a case of imposing the ideas of political theorists on political 
elites. We cannot simply assume that political elites understand and depict things the 
same way as political theorists do, so the previous chapters have approached the ideas 
advanced by political elites in their own terms and illustrated this using quotes. But 
now that we have a clear view of how they do actually understand unity and related 
issues, we can see how the typology outlined in chapter 3 captures something about 
how unity is conceived not only by political theorists but also by political elites. This 
makes sense because both the debates in Parliament and in political theory were 
conceptualised as part of the wider political debate in society to which practical 
political theory contributes, and as sharing a conceptual language in which ideas are 
expressed (cf. Freeden 1996, pp. 40-44; Miller 2013, p. 42; Parekh 2000c, p. x).  
The case studies, thus, imply that political theorists who aim to propose conceptions of 
unity that are politically plausible respond to the three broad patterns of thought about 
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unity discussed below in order to facilitate and show that their proposals are 
applicable and acceptable within the context they address.  
6.2.1 Political conceptions of unity  
Recall that we can understand political conceptions of unity roughly as specifying that 
a state best captures what the united whole is; that it is individual citizens who belong 
to this polity; that rational and/or reasonable commitments to political values and/or 
the institutions that embody them is how they belong to it; and that such unity is 
impeded where these values are not widely held and will be fostered more or less 
automatically by the existence of the liberal democratic state that embodies them, as 
citizens will come to endorse them of their own accord because it is rational and 
reasonable to do so. The integration of different groups in society is limited to the 
political dimension of the shared life of the polity and does not extend to cultural 
values. The rationale of this conception of unity can be recognised most readily in the 
liberal individual frames in each case study; and in a somewhat more complicated 
sense in the Dutch emancipation frame.  
The liberal individual frames give a liberal and individual portrayal of what a united 
society should look like that locates diversity but also national identity in the private 
sphere, thus conceptualising the public sphere as neutral. Both the British and the 
Dutch liberal individual frames point out that a political concern with shared national 
values or national identity is somewhat irrelevant, because this identity is personal, 
which means the latter can be plural and internationalist and avoids uniform 
definition. In any case, the state should stay out of such private beliefs and identities. 
Unity is not found in national identity but rather in shared democratic traditions and a 
shared allegiance to the political structure of the state and the liberal values it 
embodies. In other words, it is characterised as political beliefs and commitments that 
all citizens are supposed to share. These commitments function as a non-negotiable set 
of rules, rights and duties. They find expression in the direct relationship between the 
individual and the state. The liberal framework that embodies the political values that 
citizens share also forms a boundary on the legitimate expression of diversity, which 
does not receive public recognition as that would hamper individual freedom, and for 
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the British liberal individual frame, also impede social mobility and therefore socio-
economic equality. Policy should instead focus on this latter form of equality and 
facilitate participation while upholding equal treatment. Individuals themselves are 
responsible for their own moral outlook but also for the success of national cohesion.  
In a somewhat more complex way, the Dutch emancipation frame can also be 
understood as expressive of a political conception of unity. It emphasises how unity is 
an effect of a relationship between individual citizens and the state that runs through a 
shared allegiance to the constitution and the values it embodies. Diversity is celebrated 
within the context of this shared allegiance, and national identity (like other identities) 
is thought to be private. However, the emancipation frame differs from the political 
conceptions of unity advanced by political theorists we saw in chapter 3 because it 
presupposes a widespread support for the state as an emancipatory force in society. 
The state is seen as enabling the self-realisation of its citizens into autonomous persons 
that show solidarity (hence, citizens are not only connected to the state but also to each 
other, through these emotive bonds). The frame operates on the assumption that 
citizens need certain incentives to behave in a way that is not simply self-regarding, 
such that the state needs to create the right conditions for them to behave morally. In 
the emancipation frame, the state seems concerned not just with the construction of 
virtuous citizens, but of virtuous persons. This is not a state that is neutral between 
different conceptions of the good life but one that quite explicitly pursues a particular – 
liberal – vision of the good person and society.  
Actually, this conceptualisation of the state as an important player in shaping society 
can be recognised in all but the liberal individual frame in the Dutch case study. The 
language used to express this role sets these frames apart from their British 
counterparts that more readily uphold a vision of the state as neutral, even if they 
allow it to play a role in shaping society: it is quite common to see the state referred to 
as a ‘moral leader’ in the Dutch debates, a concept that would seem very outlandish in 
the British debates. In effect, these Dutch frames more readily conceive of democracy in 
paternalistic terms, reflecting the belief that the state has a responsibility to define the 
parameters of society. 
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Of course, states cannot completely avoid paternalism as they regulate harmful 
behaviour; policy and legislation always express a view of what society should behave 
like. They tend to support particular life styles over others through the conditions they 
attach to the allocation of benefits and burdens (e.g. tax cuts for married couples). But 
paternalism exists in degrees. While a form of ‘soft paternalism’62 has been 
distinguished in the UK since the New Labour Government (1997-2010), here it is used 
as a mechanism for reducing the size of the state by increasing individual choice (Jones 
et al 2011, p. 61), rather than as an expression of moral leadership. This stands in 
marked contrast to the Netherlands, which has a tradition of strong paternalism, with 
the ‘caring state’ (Becker 2000, p. 223) at the top of a hierarchically ordered society. The 
influence of this tradition has reduced in a now more individualist society, but the state 
remains the paternalist locus of social security – as Becker (2000, p. 226) points out, the 
notion of individual responsibility is not as strong here as in the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’. 
It would appear that this paternalist conception of the state in welfare policy carries 
over into the field of integration policy.  
While the emancipation frame can still be interpreted as a version of the political 
conception of unity advanced in political theory, as unity runs through shared 
allegiance to the constitution and the political values it embodies rather than cultural 
or national traits or identities, its understanding of the role of the state means it 
represents a somewhat more elaborate permutation than the liberal individual frames.   
6.2.2 National conceptions of unity  
National conceptions of unity can roughly be said to suppose that a nation best 
characterises what the whole that is united is; that who belongs to this nation is in first 
instance individuals; that how they belong is through being embedded in the national 
community and through national identification; and that such unity is potentially 
impeded when not all members of the polity identify with the nation so that it can be 
fostered through facilitating their assimilation or, in more liberal versions, integration 
into a suitably revised conception of national identity that reflects the diversity of 
                                                     
62 A form of paternalism that aims to create choice situations for citizens that will lead to better 
decisions.  
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society. Integration here requires more than in the previous frames: it entails 
identification with certain features that are deemed national and with the community 
that harbours them. The rationale of this conception of unity can be recognised in the 
ideas put forward by some of the political elites participating in the debates that were 
analysed, namely those advancing the British community cohesion and conservative 
frames, and the Dutch national frame.  
Recall that national conceptions of unity may differ in how they conceive the nation 
and its members: as an inherited cultural community united by strong moral ties or as 
a community that comprises individuals who are shaped by their membership but 
nonetheless hold it in critical regard and are united by a shared public life that centres 
on civic values and institutions. The British community cohesion frame can be read as a 
calibration of this latter, liberal form of a national conception of unity. It locates unity 
in a civic national identity that centres on shared democratic values. These values are 
civic rather than cultural, and thought to therefore be neutral and thus inclusive of all 
groups in society. Note that while it is national identity that unites individual citizens, 
it is portrayed in terms that seem to stretch what we commonly understand as identity 
and comes closer to a rational and voluntary commitment to political values, and this 
frame thus somewhat approaches political conceptions of unity. In the community 
cohesion frame, this national identity also facilitates meaningful interaction between 
different groups that retain their cultural (and other) identities in private. Diversity is 
thereby balanced with unity; where it is not, promotion of the shared national identity 
needs to ensure it will be, so as to ensure that diversity will not threaten cohesion.  
Meanwhile, the British conservative frame and the Dutch national frame can be read as 
versions of ‘thicker’ and more cultural accounts of national unity. They privilege the 
nation in their sociology and emphasise national unity. These frames conceptualise 
unity in terms of a national identity defined by particular characteristics and traditions, 
arising from history and linked to the national community that is understood in ‘thick’ 
terms. National identity is a source of pride, love and loyalty; membership is 
emotional, and individual as it overrides other (group) identities. These two frames are 
inclined to think of diversity as potentially threatening, both as a source of division in 
  
 
165 
 
society that detracts from unity, and as facilitating Islamic terrorism. Hence, 
assimilation or cultural adaptation is prescribed (in opposition to multicultural 
policies, because those are thought to emphasise the divisive potential of cultural 
diversity). As unity is based in the historical characteristics of the nation, those who do 
not share these already need to adapt so as to become full members.  
These frames, however, do conceive of such adaptation in rather different terms. The 
British conservative frame argues for assimilation as a process that is part of the 
natural evolution of the nation, so that diversity tends to be fleeting in any case. 
Although the state should convey a sense of the national character through history 
teaching, it should not otherwise be involved in personal identities so that unity and 
belonging become the responsibility of the individual. For the Dutch national frame, on 
the other hand, assimilation should be the focus of integration policy. It accords the 
state a greater role in shaping society: again, the state is seen here as a moral leader that 
defines, explicates and promotes shared values and national identity. This identity is 
tightly linked to the state and citizenship, which are defined in legal as well as cultural 
and traditional terms. The political values embodied in the Dutch Rechtsstaat here are 
cherished in first instance because they represent the evolution of national history, not 
because of their universal validity. In this sense, this frame presents a blend of cultural 
and civic forms of nationalism, as it explicitly presents the civic as a cultural tradition.  
6.2.3 Multicultural conceptions of unity  
Finally, chapter 3 also outlined a multicultural conception of unity that can roughly be 
understood to characterise what the united whole is as both nation and state; considers 
that it is not only individuals but also groups who belong to this united whole; that how 
they belong is through equal membership in society which is mediated by group 
membership; and that such unity is impeded where minorities are marginalised so that 
it can be fostered through their inclusion through multicultural policies which involves 
challenging the dominance of majority norms. Integration here is understood as the 
inclusion and accommodation of minorities. This vision of what a united society 
should look like can be recognised in the British and Dutch multicultural frames 
advanced in the parliamentary debates that were analysed.  
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The British multicultural frame readily accepts society’s cultural diversity as a 
permanent fact that should be celebrated. It conceives unity as the open-ended, 
subjective and inclusive emotional experience of belonging to the polity that 
individuals feel not simply as citizens but as members of their social (cultural, religious 
etc.) groups. The frame eschews national identity as an instrument for generating unity 
as it would risk exclusion by emphasising certain characteristics such as norms, values 
and behaviours that are not universally shared. The state should facilitate widespread 
belonging, which depends on relationships in society, not through the promotion of 
national identity but through publicly recognising and accommodating pluralism and 
thereby furthering its acceptance in society, enabling minorities as well as the majority 
to feel welcome and valued. That means the state challenges the social structures that 
exclude and marginalise minorities. In this frame, the state has an active role in 
improving society: it needs to pursue equality beyond its strict legal and economic 
sense, and target social and symbolic inequalities too.  
The Dutch multicultural frame more comfortably embraces ‘thicker’ notions of the 
united community, as expressed in its emphasis on a shared national identity. This 
identity is the ‘thick’, defined and traditional identity of the national community, as it 
arises from history. While national identity is open to diversity, its historical focus 
restricts this openness to older forms of diversity so that it expresses a slight unease 
with Islam, as a newer form of diversity. This national identity and the norms and 
values it comprises characterise public life and interaction so that minorities who do 
not already share it need to adapt to it, at least in public. Like in the Dutch national 
frame, this national identity is linked to the Rechtsstaat, presented as a historical and 
cultural tradition. This state is a moral leader that defines and promotes the national 
identity that binds the nation together, upholds the social norms that guarantee 
peaceful coexistence between groups, and engages these different groups in democratic 
deliberation aiming for compromise. In other words, it enables diversity to flourish 
and actively engages it in the public sphere as is through public recognition that 
diverse groups are tied to it and belong to the unity of the nation-state.  
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Although this frame can thus be classified as expressing a multicultural conception of 
unity, for it suggests unity requires the equal inclusion of diverse groups in the nation-
state through public recognition, this emphasis on a rather defined historical cultural-
civic national identity means the frame is a calibration of the multicultural conception 
of unity that moves towards the national conception of unity discussed above. 
Effectively, it assumes that diversity is restricted to features such as religion that do not 
conflict with, and therefore can exist within, a shared national identity that nonetheless 
includes moral values and practices that have developed over the course of history. 
There is an apparent tension between diversity and history: the values and practices of 
new minorities fall outside of this scope of historically determined acceptable diversity.  
This section has shown that the rough typology of three broad ways of thinking about 
unity suggested in chapter 3 is helpful to classify and thus interpret the meaning of the 
conceptions of unity expressed in the visions of the ideally united society 
underpinning the frames advanced by British and Dutch political elites. These three 
ways of thinking about unity seem pertinent both in political theory and in Parliament 
– so that the notion of an extended debate between political theorists and 
parliamentarians, such as practical political theory presupposes, seems plausible as 
they operate with roughly similar starting positions which facilitates meaningful 
dialogue between them. Political theorists who aim to be of practical use and suggest 
what unity is and how it can be fostered in ways that are politically plausible, hence, 
can take these three broad patterns of thought about unity as the ideational 
background they target, showing how they build on, develop, reject or transform them.  
But the case studies have further implications for practical political theorists. Both 
British and Dutch frames could relatively easily be classified accordingly and this 
underlines the overlaps between them that are readily apparent following their 
discussion in the previous chapters (and as the previous section noted, this raises the 
question whether these ways of thinking about unity are also salient in other 
countries). This implies that a conception of unity can be politically plausible in both 
countries. Such similarities may seem surprising given that it is often suggested that 
the alleged crisis of multiculturalism was more intense in the Netherlands than it was 
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in the UK (cf. Entzinger 2006, p. 121; Kymlicka 2010, p. 105; Modood 2013, p. 12). 
Actually, the case studies indicate that ideas compatible with or supportive of 
multiculturalism are still being defended in both these countries, at least by some.  
Of course, there are also differences between the British and the Dutch frames and the 
latter often seem more elaborate permutations of the different conceptions of unity as 
they were outlined in chapter 3. This makes sense once considered that the political 
theories analysed there were often devised in and targeted at the British context63 and 
written in English64, which means they inevitably reflect certain contextually specific 
understandings. National variations may be expected, moreover, because frames are 
social products grounded in and responding to the national context in which they are 
articulated (Freeden 1996, p. 34): the frames address different national audiences (cf. 
Finlayson 2012; Parekh 2000b, p. 308).  
These differences, therefore, seem less significant than those captured in the typology 
of different conceptions of unity. While this typology facilitates a clearer view of the 
meaning of the different frames identified in the parliamentary debates analysed, it 
also points to how these debates are complex and multi-stranded. Another implication 
of the case studies is that we cannot easily derive a consensus on key terms or a shared 
‘public philosophy’ (Favell 1998, p. 2); the debates analysed seem more readily 
characterised by the recurrent disagreements that structure them (Laborde 2002, p. 
609). There is not a national tradition, in other words, but national traditions of thinking 
about unity (although, of course, such ideational pluralism is not necessarily always 
recognisable in policy) (cf. Parekh 1995, p. 179). This reinforces how political 
plausibility is not straightforwardly derivable from these debates – that is, not only 
                                                     
63 The literature analysed in chapter 3 was predominantly Anglo-American. However, Dutch 
political theory on multiculturalism is scarce, and the English literature is widely known in the 
Dutch context. Moreover, most of the literature discussed in chapter 3 specifically does not aim 
to apply only within the context in which it was written so that it can be taken to hold insights 
useful in the Dutch case study as well.  
64 As noted before, political theorists share a language with the wider population so the 
concepts they use are imbued with certain meanings. But these concepts always carry more 
than one meaning even within a single context and the meanings that attach to concepts such as 
integration often overlap in English and in Dutch so that translation and comparison is possible. 
In any case, both case studies have taken great care to clarify these variations in meaning.  
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because the ideas they contain are contingent, but also because these ideas are plural 
and reflect different and overlapping patterns of thought (even if these patterns fall 
within a certain range captured by the typology presented above). Political theorists 
who aim to be of practical use may hence propose conceptions of unity that can be 
politically plausible in different ways, responding to different strands in the debates in 
different ways: plausibility is somewhat dynamic and more than one response to unity 
may be plausible. But as the next section will explain, this pluralism itself becomes a 
condition for plausibility.  
6.3 Unity and pluralism 
A political theorist who aims to be of practical use may draw on the above analysis of 
the ideas of British and Dutch political elites in different ways to enhance and 
demonstrate the applicability, acceptability and therefore political plausibility of the 
conception of unity she proposes. The previous section, in other words, highlights the 
ideas that such a political theorist is attentive to and responds to without placing 
conditions on the shape of that response. But this section does suggest such a 
condition: it will argue that a conception of unity needs to be open to plural 
interpretations if it is to offer a plausible account of unity among diverse citizens.  
The above shows that currently, a plurality of conceptions of unity exists in the debates 
analysed; these debates are characterised by pluralism. In order to see why that 
indicates that a conception of unity should be open to plural interpretations, it is 
necessary to first outline the nature of this current pluralism. Consider how these 
plural conceptions of unity shape or are part of the phenomenon of unity itself. 
Political theorists are sensitive to the intuition that language and ideas are important as 
they express and shape the social world (e.g. Freeden 2008, p. 199; Skinner 2002, pp. 
117-118), and section 2.2 explained that unity depends on how it is conceived, so that 
the fact that it is conceived in plural ways in these two countries gives the phenomenon 
itself a plural quality. Of course, following the case studies, we only know how 
political elites conceive unity in a plurality of ways, but as noted above, we can assume 
that variations of their conceptions of unity are pertinent in wider society. A political 
theory that aims to capture and address the phenomenon of unity in these societies in a 
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realistic and credible way hence needs to factor in such pluralism: it is a characteristic 
of this phenomenon that makes a particular type of response – that is open to pluralism 
– more defensible than other types (Miller 2013, pp. 21-31).65  
This might seem too ready a surrender to the contingencies of context. After all, the fact 
that unity is now conceptualised in plural ways in these case studies does not 
automatically mean that it should be conceived in plural form. If there is one singular 
but demonstrably best way of uniting the polity, then surely all citizens (and elites) 
should be encouraged to develop these attachments and not others. Why would a 
normative response to the problem of uniting diverse citizens be conditioned by the 
highly changeable circumstances of unity as it is conceived and therefore exists now in 
these two countries? The answer to this question has two parts. The first part of the 
answer is contained in the aforementioned notion that a conception of unity that is 
politically plausible can be recognised as both applicable and acceptable within a given 
context by the other participants to the political debate to which practical political 
theory contributes. Given that these participants adhere to different views of how the 
polity is united and how they belong to it, a conception of unity that is to convince (or 
even enlighten in some small way) all of them benefits from being open to plural 
interpretations that accord with their different starting positions. However, this insight 
is somewhat superficial, because a conception of unity can be singular or uniform in 
shape while making it clear how it addresses existing ideas in different ways, so that it 
would still be clearly applicable and acceptable. This is because, as chapter 2 explained, 
such acceptability is a weak consideration as ideas can change following debate, so that 
such debate in this case might just take a little while longer.  
Here we reach the second part of the answer, which somewhat qualifies the latter 
statement by clarifying the particular nature of the frames. That is, these frames are not 
simply ideas that can be altered by a sustained effort of flawless logic and rational 
persuasion. The frames offer different conceptions of unity, as expressed in the visions 
of the united society that underpin them: they present alternative pictures of both 
                                                     
65 In Miller’s (2013, pp. 21-31) terms, the fact of pluralism functions as a presupposition that 
grounds a particular principled response: if the fact of pluralism would no longer obtain, that 
response might no longer be appropriate, relevant or necessary.   
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social reality and political priorities and preferences in their responses to multicultural 
diversity and unity in society and alternative interpretations of how individuals and 
groups belong to the nation and the state. As noted above, such interpretations are 
likely influenced by life experiences of membership, difference, inclusion and 
exclusion, and so on as much as, if not more than, factual evidence. The way people 
think about individuals in relation to their environment is likely influenced by the way 
they experience their own existing identities – in this case, the way they experience 
their personal, group, national and political identities and the interaction between 
these (and these experiences, like personalities more generally, are typically plural in 
form).  
Effectively, the frames capture different ways in which people belong to the nation-
state (and other such ways may exist, as the samples were not representative). Note 
that Kymlicka (1995, pp. 189-191) argued that different minority groups belong to the 
country in different ways; the preceding analysis suggests that it is not only minority 
groups that have different experiences of belonging, but also the political elites whose 
arguments expressed these frames in the parliamentary debates analysed – and, likely, 
citizens more generally too. The link to existing identities makes the frames hard to 
change: one is not easily persuaded that the way one has experienced life, membership, 
belonging and so on, are false (although as noted above, change is not impossible). 
And it means that a conception of unity that aims to offer a plausible account of unity 
among existing citizens within these two countries, who come with their own 
understandings of how they belong to the polity, needs to accommodate pluralism, at 
least to some extent: a singular form of unity would appeal only to some of these 
citizens, which means it only represents part of the polity as united, which makes it 
self-defeating.  
This point becomes clearer once we consider that a conception of unity is always to 
some extent about motivations and attachments experienced by citizens (cf. Uberoi 
2007, p. 144): it falls under what Markell (2000, p. 38, emphasis in the original) refers to 
as the ‘affective dimensions of political life’, which basically means that unity depends 
on processes internal to citizens. That gives the above notion of applicability and 
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acceptability a new dimension: a conception of unity can only unite citizens with 
different understandings of what unity is if these citizens can recognise it as including 
them and their ideas, for only then does it motivate them from within, and only then is 
unity – extending to all citizens – actualised. That does not mean (to reiterate a point 
made before) that a conception of unity needs to simply copy existing ideas and 
somehow piece them together, but it does mean that such a conception needs to 
recognisably include the citizens it pretends to unite, for otherwise it cannot apply to 
them. This recalls the point that even if national identities may need to change to 
become more inclusive of minorities, they need to remain recognisable as a version of 
older notions (cf. Uberoi and Modood 2013a, pp. 132-133) as radically altering existing 
self-definitions would likely lead to alienation (Parekh 2000b, p. 235). And as seen 
above, a plurality of existing notions of unity exists.  
To offer a plausible account of unity among existing British and Dutch citizens, 
therefore, a conception of unity needs to be open to plural interpretations so that all 
these citizens can recognise it as applicable and acceptable – in line with their existing 
identities – and hence be motivated by it. This point seems to logically follow from 
accepting the plurality of the frames (and more generally, most people would accept 
that we cannot ignore how citizens have different ideas and identities – indeed Freeden 
[2005, p. 132] considers ‘ontological social pluralism’ to be a standard feature of 
politics); and the fact that simply refuting some of the frames would lead to disunity 
rather than unity, as it would alienate certain groups of citizens. But there is also a 
moral point: after all, in a society of free and equal citizens, the imposition of a singular 
conception of unity – that matches the conception of some citizens but not others – 
would create hierarchies between supposedly equal citizens that are often considered 
unfair (cf. Kymlicka 2010, pp. 101-103). 
In fact, the nature of the frames, expressing different modes of belonging, has another 
implication. It not only influences how a conception of unity may motivate different 
citizens, but also makes such pluralism of ways of belonging appear not so much as a 
contingent characteristic of debates on unity but as a structural feature of them, which 
further strengthens the case for taking it seriously when devising conceptions of unity. 
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As seen above, such modes of belonging are hard to change, and even if they would 
change, it is unlikely that such transformation would result in a unanimous 
endorsement of a singular conception of unity: after all, the citizens who appeal to 
these different conceptions begin from different starting positions that normally 
influence the course of change so that it is unlikely for them to end up in exactly the 
same position (cf. Bohman 1995). Pluralism, then, is not just a current feature of 
political debate on unity but likely to remain significant, at least in the foreseeable 
future (and practical political theory precisely contributes to contemporary debates).  
This point is underlined once considered that on-going deliberation in the British 
House of Lords and the Dutch Second Chamber has not (yet) resulted in a shared 
understanding of what unity is. Yet such debates would be a prime location for the 
generation of such a shared understanding: political theorists (e.g. Calhoun 2002; 
Miller 1995, p. 127; Modood 2007, pp. 18, 152-153; Parekh 2000b, pp. 219-224, 2008, pp. 
64-65) often think that political debates (of which the parliamentary debates analysed 
form a subspecies) should shape the content of unity and national identity. Meaningful 
dialogue between members of the polity needs to continuously reproduce collective 
self-understandings and reshape or re-imagine them where necessary to become more 
reflective of the community they represent. Political debate shapes unity by 
deliberating what it means, what it requires, which collective features of the polity are 
significant, how different members of the polity belong to it, etc. As such, the outcomes 
of these debates reflect a collective interpretation of the character of the polity, and 
shape self-conceptions of citizens about what it means to be a member (Miller 1995, p. 
127; Modood 2007, pp. 127, 152-153; cf. Parekh 2000b, pp. 185-193) – and as Miller 
(1995, p. 100) notes, in principle, anything could come to be seen as a marker of 
collective identity. The outcome of such debates has been plural in form: these markers 
appear to be understood in different ways (recall, for example, how the Rechtsstaat is 
understood in the Dutch frames as either an expression or embodiment of universal 
political values, or as a cultural tradition), which makes sense as political elites 
conceive of the polity and the nature of its unity and belonging to it in a plurality of 
ways.   
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But if people with such different visions of what a united society looks like and should 
look like are to be united under a single conception of unity that hence needs to be 
plural in form, that conception effectively means different things to different people so 
it might be difficult to see how it can still be meaningful enough to unite them. Note 
that the specific content of such a conception of unity that is plural in form is left open 
here because it cannot simply be derived from the case studies, for reasons outlined 
above (this content will be specified and justified in the next chapter). The implications 
of the case studies rather pertain to the form of such a conception of unity. To 
conceptualise this plural form, it may be helpful to think of it in terms of family 
resemblance (Miller 1995, p. 27; Modood 2007, pp. 95-98, 115): different members of a 
family are not identical but resemble each other in different ways. Likewise, the 
different frames offer visions of the united society that are significantly different but 
nonetheless overlap at different points: to use the example above, even if the Dutch 
frames use different understandings of what the Rechtsstaat is, they resemble each 
other in highlighting its importance (and the next chapter will illustrate this point 
further).  
To further clarify this idea of a plural form of unity, consider how the loose overlap 
between the different modes of belonging represented by the frames can also be 
grasped by reference to the idea of a consensus, albeit loosely understood (for want of 
a better term), so that it not only involves or depends on rational commitments but is 
also open to other forms of allegiance and identification. To clarify how people with 
different ideas about how they belong, and to what form of a united polity, can be 
united, we can draw on Rawls’ (1987, 1989) conception of the overlapping consensus, 
presented in chapter 3. This consensus represents how different positions intersect on a 
political conception of justice which all parties can therefore support from conviction 
but from different premises (Rawls 1987, p. 9). A conception of unity – the content of 
which remains open here but which does not need to be conceived in terms of Rawls’ 
conception of justice, or be justified in terms of his conception of public reason – may 
similarly unite citizens for a variety of different but overlapping reasons, be they 
rational, emotional, identity related, prudential, and so on.  
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As noted above, we can conceive of such a plural conception of unity as arising from 
political debate that continuously reproduces and modifies it. Bohman (1995) argues 
that such deliberation should be plural and dynamic in nature, because in diverse 
societies reason itself might be contested – conflict can be epistemic as well as moral 
(cf. Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006) so that there is no single impartial public standpoint 
from which to judge public reasons. Abstraction does not simply shed all differences, 
and ‘agents can come to an agreement with each other for different publicly accessible 
reasons’ (Bohman 1995, p. 263) – i.e. without recourse to justification based in a set of 
shared ideas (cf. Parekh 2000b, pp. 325-327). In other words, people may endorse 
(again, this should not be understood in strictly rational terms; they may also adhere 
to, have a vague conception of, affinity with or allegiance to) a conception of unity that 
represents an overlap between different visions of what a united society looks like for 
different reasons. It was noted above that unity needs to motivate citizens from within 
(by appearing applicable and acceptable to them) and thinking about it in the terms 
suggested here helps to see how it can motivate different citizens in different ways: 
such motivation may take the form of political beliefs for those who have affinities 
with the political conception of unity; it may be captured in terms of national identity 
by those with affinities with the national conception of unity; or it may be explained in 
terms of experiences of equal membership and belonging across differences by those 
who adhere to a multicultural conception of unity.  
Achieving such a consensus may be helped by the fact that the concepts it arranges 
always to some extent remain open to different interpretations (their meaning is never 
ultimately fixed) – even if the agreement specifies them in a particular way (Freeden 
2005, pp. 117-119). Freeden (2005, pp. 122-123) argues that this is not only a normal 
feature of language but also a political strategy: ‘ambiguity is […] also a form of 
handling political language that is vital to the central political aim of mobilizing 
support […] elusiveness of meaning is the key to generating consent’. It is precisely 
such ambiguity that enables cooperation in politics (Freeden 2005, pp. 123-124).  
This points to a paradox for practical political theory. It is naturally inclined to 
precision and clarity and these doubtlessly help to challenge and persuade individual 
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positions. Yet it may benefit from allowing a certain degree of ambiguity to garner 
support for its interpretations and suggestions so that they may form the basis of 
political agreement. In Freeden’s (2005, pp. 129-130, emphasis added) words:  
‘If conceptual flexibility allows for a sustainable overlapping area to elide 
ideological differences and to reach a policy-decision, then negotiation over the 
content of political concepts is possible and may result in a compromise—each 
side can go back to its supporters and claim reasonable success. Political consensus, 
to repeat, is predicated on ambiguity, not precision, and as political theorists we must 
understand both how the construction of ambiguity works, and how to produce it when 
necessary’. 
Effectively, that means there is a place and time for both clarity and ambiguity. The 
former is needed to know the positions of opponents and also to understand when, 
how and why to use ambiguity in an attempt to propose a conception of unity that can 
appeal to and motivate adherents of different conceptions of unity. Hence, the previous 
chapters have presented the frames as reconstructions of the arguments made by 
political elites, reducing ambiguity by drawing out their internal logic; in reality, 
arguments may straddle these positions and their boundaries are fuzzy.66 Thus 
inserting greater clarity into muddled political debates about unity and diversity 
brings out the nature of disagreements and helps to model and understand them. With 
these positions now clearly specified, the next chapter will suggest how they may 
become conjoined in a consensus that is plural, challengeable, and may exhibit 
ambiguity.  
Note that pluralism characterises unity both in the UK and in the Netherlands, and as 
the previous section noted, the conceptions of unity that make up this pluralism are 
similar as well. This means that political theorists who aim to be of practical use can 
offer a conception of unity that is politically plausible in both these countries, if they 
take care to respond to the three broad patterns of thought about unity that exist here, 
and allow their conception of unity to be plural in form. The contextual orientation of 
                                                     
66 And, as indicated before, individual speakers may refer to different frames within a brief time 
period (Jacobs 1998, p. 358).  
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practical political theory does not need to be conceived as strictly coinciding with 
national boundaries. Indeed, even though the response to unity the next chapter offers 
builds on these case studies, its insights may prove useful more widely, to other 
contexts that have similar empirical features (i.e. modern, liberal democratic nation-
states with historical self-conceptions and multicultural populations, where different 
conceptions of unity with roughly similar dimensions to those presented above exist) 
(Miller 2013, p. 44).  
Hence, the case studies suggest that a response to the problem of uniting diverse 
citizens in the multicultural societies of the UK and the Netherlands needs to be open 
to pluralism to be political plausible, as this is a feature of the phenomenon it 
addresses. A conception of unity open to plural interpretations can be seen as 
applicable and acceptable by different citizens and therefore plausibly motivate and 
unite them. Nevertheless, this still leaves open to the discretion of the practical political 
theorist a variety of ways in which pluralism may be addressed (cf. Floyd 2011, pp. 44-
50). 
 
This chapter has explained the implications of the case studies for political theorists 
who aim to be of practical use. It specified the significance and limitations of the case 
studies; it distilled three broad patterns of thinking about unity (political, national and 
multicultural) from the analyses in the two previous chapters, to which such theorists 
respond in order to propose a conception of unity that can be recognised as applicable, 
acceptable and therefore politically plausible by the other participants in the debate to 
which practical political theory contributes; and it has explained the importance of 
pluralism. The next chapter will now conclude this thesis by showing that a 
multicultural conception of unity is not only most defensible but also politically 
plausible in the UK and the Netherlands.  
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7 Conclusion: Multicultural unity 
As we enter the final chapter to this thesis, it should now be clear how unity is 
conceived by political theorists and the political elites they aim to influence when they 
aim to be of practical use. Conceptions of unity roughly fall into three broad patterns of 
thinking that can be classified as political, national and multicultural. It should also be 
clear that political theorists may aim to be of practical use by proposing a conception of 
unity that is not only morally defensible but also responds to the ideas political elites 
already have so that it is politically plausible too. This chapter will now show that one 
such conception of unity, the multicultural one, is both most defensible and politically 
plausible within the context of the UK and the Netherlands. Recall that in this 
conception of unity, the whole that is united is both a nation and a state, to which both 
individuals and groups belong through equal membership that respects their 
differences. The marginalisation of minorities impedes such unity so that multicultural 
policies to further their inclusion help to foster it.  
Chapter 2 explained that practical political theory needs to be morally defensible first 
to avoid complacency. This is reinforced by the fact that, as the previous chapter 
explained, political plausibility cannot straightforwardly be derived from the case 
studies but is somewhat dynamic: more than one conception of unity can be politically 
plausible. Hence, this chapter begins by showing that a multicultural conception of 
unity is most defensible; and subsequently shows that it is also politically plausible. 
Section 7.1 shows why the political and the national conceptions of unity are 
inadequate (recall that chapter 3 already rejected the negative conception of unity) and 
how a multicultural conception of unity can meet the problems they raise. Having 
rejected the other two conceptions of unity, section 7.2 then shows that a multicultural 
conception of unity does not create new problems, while offering a convincing and 
desirable way of conceptualising unity among diverse citizens. Section 7.3 shows that, 
paradoxically in these two countries where multiculturalism has met vehement 
opposition, a multicultural conception of unity is also politically plausible as it heeds 
the implications of the case studies in the way that the previous chapter suggested: it 
responds to the three broad ways of thinking about unity discerned in the British and 
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Dutch parliamentary debates analysed in a way that is open to plural interpretations, 
so that it can motivate citizens with different existing identities. Section 7.4 shows that 
this concern for pluralism, which follows from the empirical analysis presented in this 
thesis, is compatible with, but somewhat nuances statements of multicultural 
conceptions of unity by political theorists (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b) without 
creating new problems. Finally, section 7.5 concludes this thesis by providing a brief 
summary of its overall argument.   
7.1 Unity: not political, not national, but multicultural  
Earlier chapters presented ways of thinking about unity simply as patterns of thought 
that appear salient in political theory as well as in parliamentary debates. But now that 
we understand how unity is being understood by political theorists as well as political 
elites, we can begin to think about how it should be understood by them. Such 
judgment involves assessing the credibility, consistency, coherence, moral appeal and 
so on of the reasons given for each conception. This section begins this process by 
showing that the political and the national conceptions of unity are inadequate to 
conceptualise unity in multicultural societies, because they run into difficulties, and 
these can be avoided by the multicultural conception of unity. Moreover, as the next 
section will show, the multicultural conception of unity can do so without creating new 
problems; and it meets the criterion for moral defensibility outlined in section 2.3. 
The political conception of unity raises two main problems.67 First, it suggests that 
citizens are united through shared rational commitments to political values and the 
institutions that embody these. These values and institutions are presented as neutral 
so that they can unite citizens who have different ideas about the good life, the 
ordering of society, and so on: their neutrality means that they do not favour any of 
these orientations so that they can be embraced by all. But these values and institutions 
are supposed to unite citizens and motivate them to make the sacrifices necessary for 
the smooth functioning of democracy, and it is not clear how they can do so if they are 
this neutral. Citizens tend to be motivated by values because they have a particular 
                                                     
67 These problems were already indicated in section 1.1.  
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meaning and this meaning derives from the shared understandings of the cultural 
community the values are embedded in – values gain motivational force when they are 
grounded in a community (Calhoun 2002, pp. 151-158; Laborde 2002, pp. 591-597; 
Markell 2000, pp. 41-53). That is, political principles normally inspire loyalty, belonging 
and unity because they make sense to a pre-existent community: the state needs to be 
‘ours’ first (Canovan 2000, p. 422). Citizenship, and hence civic identity, follows from 
(political) unity, and therefore cannot be the source of it (Uberoi 2007, p. 147). But if 
political values motivate and unite citizens because they are grounded in a community 
with shared understandings, it is not clear that it is these values that unite them or the 
pre-existent ties of community. Purely rational value commitments are probably too 
abstract or ethereal to unite most citizens, who nonetheless recognise the existence of 
ties to the community they grew up in (cf. Modood 2007, pp. 148-149; Phillips 2007, pp. 
67-72).     
Political conceptions of unity, hence, apparently implicitly rely on the existence of a 
community that supposedly inhabits a state and such a community tends to be a 
nation, given the historical predominance of nation-states, or more specifically, of the 
notion that one state should house one nation (cf. Nimni 2009, pp. 320-325). As we saw, 
Habermas (1998, p. 107) acknowledges the importance of the nation to explain unity 
but thinks that it can be superseded; but as suggested above, it will then be difficult to 
tell whether it is the persistence of national ties or a shared commitment to political 
values that unites citizens. Rawls (1993) is silent about the nation but he relies on the 
existence of a shared political culture that comprises ideas about the ordering of society 
– and in the real world such political cultures tend to be national – and his position 
hence implies a pre-existing shared political (O'Neill 1997, pp. 419-420) or national 
(Miller 1995, p. 93) identity. Indeed, as noted before, his (Rawls 1993, p. 12) ‘closed’ 
society is effectively an intergenerational community that resembles a nation; thus, he 
(Rawls 1993, p. 222) thinks ‘leaving one’s country is a grave step’ because ‘it involves 
leaving the society and culture in which we have been raised’ and through which we 
make sense of ourselves and the world.  
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If political conceptions of unity tacitly rely on pre-existent national unity, that also 
points to a second problem with them. This is because they can then no longer claim to 
be neutral and therefore inclusive of different groups in society. Indeed, the political 
values and institutions that supposedly unite citizens are embedded in concrete 
democratic traditions that are historical and infused with the sensibilities, values, 
expectations, norms and so on that characterise the culture in which they arose. Hence, 
they do not automatically include, and thus may exclude, groups in society that do not 
share this history (Brubaker 1999, pp. 61-63; Canovan 2000, pp. 420-421; Markell 2000, 
pp. 51-53; Uberoi 2007, p. 148). In fact, it is impossible for states to be neutral with 
regards to morality as they cannot avoid making decisions on a range of issues that 
require moral judgment, and these decisions are always coercive towards those with 
different values (Parekh 2000b, p. 202).  
Political conceptions of unity underestimate the degree of disagreement in society 
about political values and their interpretation as they presuppose that all citizens can 
agree when in fact they often may not, and unity hinges on such agreement. As Parekh 
(2000b, pp. 200-205) notes, this emphasis on political values and institutions also often 
implies that minorities who do not share the political values embodied in public 
institutions need to assimilate politically and are asked to uncritically accept the liberal 
institutions and principles that are already in place and that will inevitably reflect the 
norms and practices of the majority; and the relegation of diversity to the private 
sphere works against marginalised minorities because they need to adopt the ‘neutral’ 
norms of the majority when participating in the public sphere.  
This point is reinforced once considered that Rawls’ aforementioned insistence on 
closed borders not only makes his account more national than it concedes but also 
makes it seem somewhat irrelevant to the dilemmas of multiculturalism in Europe: 
these mostly pertain to diversity associated with immigrants and their children (cf. 
Modood 2007, pp. 1-5; Triandafyllidou et al 2006). It is likely precisely these newer 
minorities in society that do not already share the political values of the majority. 
Effectively, Rawls’ theory precludes the very questions this thesis is concerned with. 
Indeed, it is not clear if an overlapping consensus on his political conception of justice 
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is actually probable, likely or possible in a given society, as he does not examine how 
citizens actually think about justice and if their ideas could (be brought to) overlap on 
the specific points that he indicates (see: Klosko 2005). As section 1.2 noted, this is a 
drawback of ideal theory and it suggests we need to be careful about applying its 
insights to the real world.  
Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous chapter, the notion of an overlapping 
consensus itself is helpful to understand how people can agree on something for 
different reasons – although, as noted there, it needs to be understood loosely so that it 
does not only pertain to rational agreement but is also open to other types of reasons 
and people can endorse, identify with, feel loyalty, allegiance or affinity towards it in 
more passive, emotional, habitual ways and so on too. And as section 7.3 will show, a 
multicultural conception of unity could be supported by such consensus as it is 
compatible with different existing ideas about unity in the UK and the Netherlands.   
A multicultural conception of unity manages to avoid these two problems (political 
values are not neutral but reflect a tacitly presupposed nation; and therefore they are 
not automatically inclusive but may exclude minorities) because it does not locate 
unity in agreement on neutral political values but in shared and equal membership in 
society. Such membership itself unites and motivates diverse citizens, and citizenship 
is presented as national rather than neutral (Modood 2007, pp. 126, 147). Consider how 
Modood (2007, p. 128) defines citizenship:  
‘Citizenship, then, consists of a framework of rights and practices of participation 
but also discourses and symbols of belonging, ways of imagining and remaking 
ourselves as a country and expressing our sense of commonalities and 
differences, and ways in which these identities qualify each other and create – 
should create – inclusive public spaces’.  
That is, citizenship is not simply about agreement on political values. What we should 
take from this quote is that membership is three-dimensional: it is simultaneously legal 
or formal (as it comprises rights), practical or active (as it involves practices of civic 
interaction) and symbolic (as it is expressed and signified in collective representations). 
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As such, it shapes itself around the persons (and their existing identities) that share it 
so that it is plural in form (Modood 2007, p. 126). Unity does not depend on the 
possibility of civic values that are neutral and therefore inclusive of different cultural 
groups: citizenship in all its dimensions includes these groups because it reflects the 
cultural diversity of society.  
Multicultural conceptions of unity can also overcome the main problem associated 
with national conceptions of unity. The latter do not ground unity in agreement on 
political values but in a nation with its history, shared understandings, culture, 
practices and so on. Individual citizens are united through shared identification with 
and membership in the nation. The main problem with national conceptions of unity 
lies in the conceptualisation of unity as an attribute of a historical community with a 
shared culture, language and so on, which suggests the idea that newer minorities 
need to adapt in order to become part of national unity. 
This tendency is more readily visible in the traditional than in the liberal form of a 
national conception of unity. And that makes the former quite obviously inappropriate 
in multicultural societies where minorities who are equal citizens may not share the 
dominant identity and morality. Because such unity requires a high degree of internal 
homogeneity, it demands that minorities that are culturally different adapt to this 
identity and morality so as to become part of the nation. While minorities may of 
course freely choose to become more like the majority, policies to enforce this would 
require ‘an unacceptable degree of internal repression’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 171) of 
minorities, and such coerced changes of identity and value systems are painful and 
disorientating; moreover, it can be questioned whether such radical transformation is 
really achievable, as the semblance of difference often remains, continuing to mark out 
assimilated minorities (Parekh 2000b, p. 198). Moreover, where minorities are equal 
citizens, the expectation that some citizens adapt to the norms of others creates a 
hierarchy between them that challenges the idea of equal citizenship (cf. Young 1990, 
pp. 112-116). Meanwhile, this is not to say that assimilationist policies are always 
unjust: they may at times serve to protect human rights and pursue equality where 
these are threatened by specific minority practices (Mason 2010, pp. 861-862).  
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The undesirable alternative to full assimilation in the traditional national conception of 
unity would be permanent marginalisation (Parekh 2000b, p. 197-198), which would 
effectively place minorities outside of the whole (the nation) that is united and restrict 
unity to the majority. But if democracy requires citizens to be united enough ‘to take 
and enforce collectively binding decisions and regulate and resolve conflicts’ (Parekh 
2000b, p. 196), such that all citizens can be involved in these decisions, it is unclear how 
the latter would be legitimate if part of the polity was structurally excluded from such 
involvement. Unity needs to extend to all citizens if it is to be a source of legitimate 
political authority (cf. Miller 1995, p. 92); a democratic deficit might exist when unity is 
partial and a specific group of citizens is structurally disenfranchised. A conception of 
unity that requires too high a degree of shared values, characteristics, orientations and 
so on may thus end up excluding certain groups of citizens which means it becomes 
self-defeating as it then represents division rather than unity and connects only part of 
the population to the state (cf. Parekh 2000b, p. 232). 
As we saw before, liberal forms of the national conception of unity are more open to 
internal diversity and they may therefore offer a more realistic account of uniting the 
entire population. But the emphasis on the nation as a historical community, again, 
easily slips into the creation of a hierarchy between citizens that are supposedly equal: 
those who are already (and have always been) part of that nation, and those who (or 
whose parents) are not because they are newer minorities. The former then naturally 
belong to the whole that is united, whereas the latter do not so that it might appear as 
if their differences impede unity – such that one might attribute a greater burden of 
adaptation (necessary to preserve national unity located in a shared national identity) 
to them.  
Miller (1995, p. 87) suggests that the national cultures that form part of the national 
identities that unite citizens ‘very often have an essentially public dimension’ as their 
existence depends on political interventions. Landscapes, films, and so on only ‘express 
and reproduce a common culture’ (Miller 1995, p. 87) rather than reflect individual 
self-interest and market considerations if they are to some extent regulated by states – 
not in the sense that they need to express a pre-determined conception of what the 
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nation is but in the sense that they ‘provide an environment in which the culture can 
develop spontaneously’ (Miller 1995, p. 88). Nationals share (or, more specifically, 
believe they share) characteristics (political, cultural and social) of this national public 
culture in different ways (Miller 1995, pp. 25-27): Miller (1995, p. 27) rejects the idea 
that ‘for any given nation there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
belonging to that nation’. But the state institutions that encourage this public culture 
cannot recognise group identities, Miller (1995, pp. 152-154) thinks, as there is no 
authentic way of representing these identities and bringing identity claims into 
political debate unnecessarily raises the stakes and makes compromise more difficult 
to reach. In any case, such identities are not more ‘authentic’ than national identity so 
they do not deserve protection from assimilatory pressures (Miller 1995, p. 133).  
Yet as noted above, public institutions are never truly neutral and may end up 
reflecting the historical majority only, which may make it hard for minorities to 
identify with them and the culture they reproduce. Minorities are included not through 
the adaptation of these institutions, but through stripping ‘existing national identities 
[…] of elements that are repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more 
component groups’ (Miller 1995, p. 142) and emphasising those features that minorities 
and the majority share (Miller 1995, p. 92). But that does not accord minorities an equal 
position in such collective self-conceptions: the majority would still see features that 
are not shared with minorities (but do not offend them) represented, whereas 
minorities do not (Uberoi 2007, p. 149). The emphasis on a shared history, however 
mythical, that creates moral obligations (that may appeal to sacrifices made in the past 
and are grounded in shared customs, practices and understandings) as a fundamental 
part of national identity (Miller 1995, pp. 35-42) places newer minorities that do not 
already share in it at a disadvantage, which does not chime with their supposedly 
equal position as members of the political community.  
Meanwhile, a similar tendency can be recognised in Kymlicka’s position. The first 
attribute of a nation he (Kymlicka 1995, p. 11) mentions in his definition of the concept 
is that it is a ‘historical community’ that also shares a language, culture, institutions 
and a homeland. He uses this conception to distinguish between two types of cultural 
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diversity: that presented by national minorities within a single state, and that 
presented by ethnic groups that result from immigration. The latter do not have the 
historical, institutional and geographical attributes of the former which means they can 
claim fewer ‘group-specific rights’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 27). Effectively, immigrants have 
to integrate into the majority culture (while receiving appropriate accommodation to 
ease this process), while national minorities do not – even though Kymlicka (1995, p. 
86) recognises the importance of cultural membership and thinks that ‘the choice to 
leave one’s culture can be seen as analogous to the choice to take a vow of perpetual 
poverty’. Yet immigrants voluntarily give up their right to ‘live and work in their own 
culture’ by choosing to migrate (Kymlicka 1995, p. 96).  
But as Parekh (2000b, p. 103) notes, if cultural membership is as important as Kymlicka 
thinks, it cannot easily be given up, and it is not at all clear that this is what people 
have in mind when they decide to migrate. Moreover, if multicultural accommodation 
is justified by pointing to the importance of a societal culture and immigrants have 
given up their right to their own societal culture, it becomes hard to justify why they 
would receive any accommodation at all (Joppke 2001, p. 436; Modood 2013, pp. 30-33). 
Kymlicka’s emphasis on historical over other cultural communities does not sit easily 
with his notion that all individuals need access to their own culture to live a good life. 
That said, as we saw before, his (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 96-98) conception of integration is 
more open to accommodating diversity than Miller’s so that it requires less in terms of 
adaptation. But he (Kymlicka 1995, p. 191) also thinks that the positive attitudes to 
diversity and the different groups that exist within the country necessary to unite 
diverse citizens through a shared identity cannot be created politically: they follow 
from pre-existent solidarity and identification based in a shared history that newer 
minorities, inevitably, do not share.  
Miller’s liberal nationalism, furthermore, raises another problem. He (Miller 1995, p. 
127) thinks that conceptions of national identity should arise from conversations, 
debates and interactions in society – and as the previous chapter noted, this is a 
relatively uncontroversial point (e.g. Calhoun 2002; Modood 2007, pp. 18, 152-153; 
Parekh 2000b, pp. 219-224, 2008, pp. 64-65). Indeed, Miller (1995, p. 40) argues that 
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national identities are defensible precisely when debate is open and inclusive: all 
citizens need to have a chance of participating on the basis of equality, so that it reflects 
‘inputs from all sections of the community, with groups openly competing to imprint 
the common identity with their own particular image’. This gives citizens a stake in the 
resulting form of unity so that it is truly theirs.  
But as it stands, different groups in society precisely do not participate in such debates 
on the basis of equality for some of them are marginalised, and as the above suggests, 
national conceptions of unity risk a slide into casting newer minorities as somewhat 
secondary actors in shaping national identity. Such ‘participatory parity’ (Fraser 2001, 
p. 25) for different citizens is not furthered by insisting on the neutrality of a public 
realm that will inevitably be coloured by the majority’s values, practices and history: 
the ‘benign neglect’ (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 3-6, 108) of minorities in the name of 
neutrality is not in fact very benign (or even-handed) in societies where these groups 
occupy marginal positions, but favours the majority and rationalises the status quo. 
Marginalised groups cannot engage in social interaction on the basis of equality, 
because the norms and patterns that structure interaction do so according to majority 
cultural values and thereby ‘constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other 
or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners’ (Fraser 2001, p. 24; see also: Young 
1990, p. 116). The case studies indeed show that the status of certain groups as 
legitimate partners in these debates is questioned. For example, some of the frames 
presented in the case studies explicitly portrayed Muslims as outsiders, thereby 
effectively precluding them from participating as equals in debates about what unity 
and membership mean.  
Multicultural conceptions of unity do not run into the difficulties raised by national 
conceptions of unity. Clearly, assimilation is opposed and it is argued that diversity 
should be publicly recognised rather than overcome or marginalised. Moreover, 
advocates of multicultural conceptions of unity do not emphasise a shared national 
history to the same extent when they talk about the polity. The polity is understood as 
a political community that obviously has a past, but this past is not so much more 
important than how the polity is currently structured: whether its members enjoy 
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equal membership or meet obstacles to it. This somewhat more contemporary focus 
might explain why advocates of a multicultural conception of unity are more 
optimistic about generating new forms of unity between citizens. Thus, Parekh (2000b, 
p. 221) suggests that the experience of living together and on-going interaction 
between groups in society will lead to the creation of a ‘multiculturally constituted 
common culture’ that unites different groups because it reflects their input and their 
diversity. 
Unlike in the national conceptions of unity above, then, this common culture is not 
simply a modified version of the culture of the historical majority but reflects equal 
interaction between different groups in society that hence have a more equal role in 
shaping it. Multiculturalists do not deny the importance of history and continuity (cf. 
Parekh 2000b, pp. 235, 257-260; Uberoi and Modood 2013a, pp. 132-133), but think it 
needs to be balanced with a concern for equality (understood as outlined in section 3.5) 
– multiculturalism ‘seeks to extend the same respect to the [existing identities of] new 
minorities’ (Modood 2013, p. 155). In some ways, this also suggests a more dynamic 
view of unity: where liberal nationalists approach it as a seemingly pre-existent 
attribute of the nation that needs to be somehow extended to include minorities, 
multiculturalists think it is more like a process in which society becomes increasingly 
more united through increasingly equal membership (cf. Parekh 2008, p. 47).  
This process involves equal participation in the practices, interactions and debates that 
were suggested above to shape unity. As noted there, state neutrality is not a 
convincing way of furthering such participation. Multiculturalists think that to 
challenge the current marginalisation of certain groups that prevents them from equal 
participation (and equal membership), states need to publicly recognise diversity in 
order to normalise norms other than those of the majority (Fraser 2001, p. 25; Modood 
2007, pp. 54-56) and recognise minorities as ‘equally valued and legitimate members of 
the community’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 233). Multicultural policies also tackle other 
inequalities often suffered by minorities that can attract stigma and may compound 
their disadvantaged position in civic debates (cf. Modood 2013, pp. 53-57), so that they 
facilitate inclusion both directly, through recognising the presence and contributions of 
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minorities as full members of the polity, and indirectly, by enhancing their position in 
society.  
Multicultural conceptions of unity, then, can withstand the objections that can be 
raised against political and national conceptions of unity. They do not rely on an 
agreement on political values, which seems unlikely in most real societies, and nor are 
they open to the risk of creating hierarchies between citizens who are part of what was 
historically the nation and those who are not. But while this conception of unity may 
avoid these problems, perhaps it does so at the cost of creating new ones. The next 
section will now show that this is not the case.  
7.2 Multicultural unity: most defensible 
As noted before, the multicultural conception of unity forms part of more elaborate 
multicultural political theories. Multiculturalism has received sustained criticism over 
the past years, but only some of the charges raised against it apply to the conception of 
unity that underpins it. These form the focus of this section that refutes the three main 
objections that can be raised against this conception of unity to show that it avoids the 
problems associated with the other conceptions of unity without creating new ones. It 
then shows how the multicultural conception of unity is also morally defensible in 
terms of the criterion outlined in section 2.3, to conclude this first part of the chapter 
that demonstrates that multicultural unity is most defensible.  
Recall that advocates of a multicultural conception of unity (e.g. Modood 2007; Parekh 
2000b) think citizens, that is, individuals and groups, are united through equal 
membership in the nation-state, and such unity can be fostered by making the latter 
and its representations and symbols more inclusive. Because such representations tend 
to be biased towards the historical majority, this requires the recognition of features of 
minorities that they do not share with the majority on top of those that are shared 
(Uberoi and Modood 2013b, pp. 30-31). As noted above, unity here is approached as a 
process that involves change and adaptation not just in minorities but throughout 
society. Thus, as Parekh (2000b, pp. 203-204, emphasis added) acutely explains:  
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‘Such recognition confers public legitimacy on their [minorities] presence, 
recognizes them as valued members of the community, and facilitates their 
integration. “We” cannot integrate “them” so long as “we” remain “we”: “we” must be 
loosened up to create a new common space in which “they” can be accommodated and 
become part of a newly reconstituted “we”’.  
This new ‘we’, then, is aware of its internal diversity and at ease with it. This is not 
incoherent: diversity is the antonym of uniformity, not of unity, whose antonym is 
division.  
Indeed, some critics of multiculturalism seem to have missed this point as they 
suppose that it neglects and undermines national unity and identity and leads to 
fragmentation. Allegedly, multicultural recognition would lead to the proliferation of 
ever smaller communities and an affirmation of diversity would lead to the 
ghettoization of groups retreating behind their boundaries and avoiding interaction 
(Joppke and Lukes 1999, pp. 3-23), the inhibition of trust between groups (Miller 1995, 
p. 140), and the erosion of common citizenship and solidarity (Barry 2001, p. 325). 
Ultimately, that might threaten the viability of the welfare state: Kymlicka and Banting 
(2006, p. 298) note that such critics argue that ‘multiculturalism policies emphasize 
diversity; emphasizing diversity undermines the sense of common national identity; 
feelings of national solidarity are necessary for a robust welfare state’.  
But there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that multicultural policies lead to 
segregation or the erosion of trust or welfare state spending: such developments might 
be caused by other factors (see: Hooghe et al 2009; Letki 2008; Kymlicka and Banting 
2006; Phillips 2006). It is also not clear that trust requires sameness (after all, to stretch 
this point, a thief does not necessarily trust another thief), and the same goes for 
solidarity: ‘there is no obvious reason why a culturally plural society should not 
develop a sense of community, solidarity, common loyalties and a broad moral and 
political consensus’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 171). Moreover, the above seems to presuppose 
that redistribution follows from unity and cohesion, whereas in fact that link is more 
complex. Parekh (2008, p. 47) illustrates this with three examples: the US are a 
relatively cohesive society where redistribution is limited; more generous European 
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welfare states arose for a variety of reasons that are not all related to unity; and in 
India, ‘social cohesion was the intended product rather than the driving force of 
redistribution’. 
There is no reason to think that multicultural policies of necessity threaten unity or 
redistribution, then, and in fact such policies may instead give minorities the 
confidence to take part in society as full members (cf. Parekh 2000b, pp. 219-224; see 
also: Lenard 2012, p. 191). They would foster rather than impede unity as they enable 
individuals and groups to belong to the united polity through equal membership that 
respects their diversity. Archbishop of Canterbury Williams (2008, pp. 266-267) makes 
a similar point about the law when he considers that when legal practice disallows 
persons to explain their behaviour in their own terms (often shaped by group 
memberships), instead appealing only to what is ‘generally acceptable’, there is a risk 
that it imposes majority norms such that ‘the law of the land’ would fail to 
‘communicate with someone involved in the legal process’ and effectively marginalises 
them. Yet such marginalisation would contravene the law’s purpose which, according 
to Williams (2008, p. 272), is to safeguard human dignity by enabling all citizens, with 
their affiliations, to be involved in shaping the future of their polity. Therefore, legal 
systems must recognise the existence of different patterns of understanding of legal 
issues in multicultural societies. Hence, multicultural conceptions of unity (arguably 
unlike the negative conception of unity) do not advocate the recognition of diversity as 
an alternative to unity but rather as a way of modifying the latter so that it may become 
more inclusive. National identity, then, is not undermined but simply becomes more 
inclusive and acknowledges diversity as one of its features (Uberoi 2008, pp. 408-410).   
Another criticism raised against multiculturalism is that it (tacitly) relies on 
essentialism. It allegedly operates with an unrealistic sociology as its insistence on 
including not only individuals but also groups in a conception of unity supposedly 
presupposes that members of these groups share an essential similarity. Meanwhile, in 
reality, cultures are dynamic, fluid and hybrid and several interpretations of them 
coexist and compete so that group rights and representation serve to unduly fix and 
prioritise one of these over the others, which in turn feeds into internal power relations 
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(see: Barry 2001, pp. 253-279; Benhabib 1999, pp. 44-60; Shachar 1999, pp. 87-111). 
Nonetheless, essentialism is not necessary to the arguments made by multiculturalists 
and most of them indeed take great care to avoid it (Mason 2007, pp. 232-243; for 
elegant rejections of essentialism see: Modood 2007; Phillips 2007).  
For example, it is difficult to read essentialism into Parekh’s (2000b, p. 148) conception 
of culture: he thinks that ‘since a culture’s system of beliefs and practices, the locus of 
its identity, is constantly contested, subject to change, and does not form a coherent 
whole, its identity is never settled, static and free of ambiguity’. Likewise, Kymlicka 
(1989, pp. 167-171) emphasises that what matters is that cultural groups function as 
stable structures of choice. The characteristics that make groups distinct do not 
constitute a fixed essence but can be radically transformed without threatening cultural 
membership, and cultures always contain several options and are internally diverse 
and dynamic. But groups do not need to have an essential core to be important to 
people in the way multiculturalists think: they can be understood as displaying 
overlapping patterns of similarities while providing individuals with a source of 
identity and belonging and also affecting their life chances (Modood 2013, pp. 80-95).   
Multiculturalists do not need to be essentialists and usually are not; a multicultural 
conception of unity does not unite bounded groups with essential cores. But anti-
essentialism taken too far results in a refusal to acknowledge any unity or similarities 
between people (Modood 1998, pp. 378-382); as Parekh (1999, p. 106) points out, even if 
groups are not internally homogeneous, they can be individuated, much like 
languages. It is also important to note that existing groups may think of themselves in 
essentialist terms, and that such self-definitions deserve respect (Modood 2007, pp. 93-
98, 2008, pp. 552-553). Meanwhile, multiculturalist arguments themselves can be 
considered as challenging pre-existing essentialist notions of the culturally 
homogeneous nation-state (Modood 1998, p. 378).  
The third objection that might be raised against the multicultural conception of unity is 
that it may represent conflict rather than cooperation. That is, the public interaction 
that shapes it may not facilitate unity and peace, but instead fuel hostility and division. 
However, it is important to note that conflict (understood in a civic or political rather 
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than violent sense) is an inevitable part of any democracy (cf. Mouffe 2005). Although 
ideal citizens might be able to come to unanimous agreements, real citizens tend to 
disagree. Such disagreement is not necessarily a problem: dialogue is not only about 
finding agreement, but also an activity that connects citizens to each other – it has a 
‘community-building role’ (Parekh 2000b, p. 307). The activity of participating in civic 
interactions itself enables members of the community to develop ties to each other and 
share a commitment to continued cooperation (Bohman 1996, p. 33). Indeed, according 
to Calhoun (2002, pp. 152-162; see also: Laborde 2002), citizens can develop solidarity 
and civic motivation precisely through participating in public debate, as this allows 
them to jointly produce a common culture and shared identities. Unity then depends 
on shared and equal interaction rather than agreement.  
Modood (2007, p. 127) thus explains that debates about what it means to be a citizen 
will be characterised by overlapping disagreements but what matters is that ‘there is 
enough agreement and above all enough interest in the discussion for dialogues to be 
sustained’. Realistically, ‘conflict and its management, recurring conflict and recurring 
reconciliation are built into these societies and so into the citizenship possible in these 
societies’ (Modood 2007, p. 128). As noted earlier, national debates might be better 
characterised by recurring fault lines  (Laborde 2002, p. 609) than by a shared ‘public 
philosophy’ (Favell 1998, p. 2). The point is that such disagreements can nonetheless be 
seen as ‘national’, in the same way that political divides such as those between Labour 
and the Conservatives in the UK or Republicans and Democrats in the US are accepted 
as characteristically ‘national’ divides.  
The multicultural conception of unity, then, avoids the problems associated with the 
political and national conceptions of unity without creating new ones: it presents the 
most convincing and defensible conception of unity in multicultural societies. 
Meanwhile, recall that section 2.3 explained that practical political theory needs to be 
both morally defensible and politically plausible, to avoid the risk of unquestioningly 
affirming existing moral beliefs associated with realistic theory as well as the risk of 
being or appearing irrelevant associated with ideal theory. Moral defensibility was 
described there as part of wider defensibility and entails a concern for balancing 
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considerations of reciprocity, consequences and special relationships. The remainder of 
this section will clarify how the multicultural conception of unity heeds these 
considerations, before the next section will show that it is also politically plausible in 
the context of the UK and the Netherlands.  
Nation and state are tightly linked in the multicultural conception of unity and citizens 
(individuals and groups) belong to them through equal membership that respects their 
diversity. As seen above, such membership involves a concern for equal (reciprocal) 
citizenship rights. Such equal citizenship also entails equal (reciprocal) participation in 
the practices and debates that make unity meaningful and collective representations. 
As will be further elaborated below, this conception of unity is plural, which means it 
hinges on reciprocity and respect between adherents of different visions of what 
society should look like united. The multicultural conception of unity is also sensitive 
to outcomes: in the multicultural societies of the UK and the Netherlands, equal 
treatment is not enough to achieve equal membership in the three-dimensional sense 
suggested above. That means that minorities that may often occupy disadvantaged 
positions need to be publicly recognised to enjoy equal representation with the 
majority that sees its norms and values represented automatically in the key 
institutions of society, in order to achieve equal participation in civic debates. 
Moreover, the multicultural conception of unity gains persuasive force in part because 
of its potential to be effective: the previous chapter explained that only a conception of 
unity open to plural interpretation offers a plausible account of unity among existing 
citizens with their diverse identities, and as will be explained below, a multicultural 
conception of unity is plural in this sense. Finally, this conception of unity aims to be 
open to the different ways in which people are tied into special relationships: citizens 
give shape to their citizenship precisely in line with such existing relationships and 
identities, so that their citizenship ‘contours itself around them’ (Modood 2007, p. 126).   
Having shown that a multicultural conception of unity is most defensible, the next 
section will now show that is also applicable, acceptable and therefore politically 
plausible within the context of the UK and the Netherlands.  
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7.3 Multicultural unity: politically plausible  
It may appear paradoxical that out of all conceptions of unity discerned in chapter 3, it 
is the multicultural one that is most defensible and politically plausible in the UK and 
the Netherlands. After all, this conception forms part of wider theories of 
multiculturalism, and these two countries have allegedly witnessed a crisis of 
multiculturalism during which the latter has often been portrayed as divisive. 
Nonetheless, this section will show that the multicultural conception of unity is 
compatible with the ideas about unity British and Dutch political elites already have, 
so that it is indeed politically plausible.  
The previous chapter explained that political plausibility is not a straightforward test 
but involves responding to existing ideas to ensure that a proposal is clearly 
recognisable as applicable and acceptable within a given context. A conception of unity 
may do so in different ways, but it should be open to pluralism in order to be able to 
motivate citizens who already have different conceptions of unity. This section shows 
how the multicultural conception of unity responds to the plurality of existing ideas 
about unity identified in the UK and the Netherlands, and the next section will 
subsequently note how this emphasis on pluralism nuances existing theoretical 
statements of a multicultural conception of unity (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b).  
In the current climate, the political plausibility of a multicultural conception of unity 
may not be readily apparent, with political leaders such as British Prime Minister 
David Cameron (2011) suggesting that multiculturalism has failed and may undermine 
national identity. The case studies, however, present a more nuanced picture. The 
argument that multiculturalism undermines national identity suggests that these two 
concepts are incompatible, which implies that an emphasis on national identity means 
an argument against multiculturalism, i.e. for assimilation. But the case studies show 
that both multiculturalism and national identity are taken to mean different things and 
are not unanimously understood to be mutually exclusive: they are combined in 
different ways, and they are related to unity in different ways, with national identity 
being a source or symbol of unity in some frames but not others.  
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Multiculturalism in these debates refers to a policy strategy that recognises and 
accommodates cultural diversity in society, and as such it is only defended in both 
countries by the multicultural frames; it is opposed by all the other frames, and these 
objections are formulated in either or both of two registers, one of threat to national 
unity, in which multiculturalism is taken to detract from national cohesion by 
emphasising diversity and reinforcing divisions; and one of threat to the principles of 
individual liberty and equality, in which multiculturalism is taken to inhibit social 
mobility and/or delegate too much authority over individuals and their choices and 
identities to groups. But in these debates, multiculturalism also has other meanings 
(see also: Uberoi and Modood 2013a, pp. 129-132). It may refer to the fact that society is 
now multicultural, and this fact is accepted by almost all frames (except the Dutch 
national frame and in a more complicated sense the British conservative frame). 
Moreover, it also sometimes refers to an open attitude to diversity, or a vision of 
society in which diversity is valued and engaged in interaction, and again, most frames 
(again, except for the national and the conservative frames) do support such an open 
attitude – albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Overall, opposition to 
multiculturalism therefore focuses on specific policies and does not necessarily entail a 
rejection of diversity or openness to difference: it does not automatically equal an 
endorsement of assimilation.  
Likewise, calls for an emphasis on national identity do not always entail demands for 
assimilation. That only holds if national identity is conceptualised in terms of fixed 
characteristics that minorities would have to take on, in a process that simultaneously 
sheds and replaces their previous cultural identity. In fact, only the Dutch national 
frame can be classified in such terms, and to a lesser extent the British conservative 
frame. When other frames discuss national identity, they are more sensitive to minority 
cultural identities – although they may hinge on a strategy of privatisation of diversity 
that might be said to disadvantage minorities. Civic conceptions of unity, at least in 
principle, do not constitute appeals for full-blown assimilation, even if they could be 
understood as appeals for public or political assimilation (Parekh 2000b, pp. 196-206). 
And calls for national identity understood in terms of belonging certainly do not. In 
both case studies, there are those who are more comfortable with an understanding of 
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national identity as defined by certain collective characteristics than others, who 
emphasise that what matters is not some collective self-conception but that individuals 
freely shape and experience their personal national identities. The latter more readily 
leave more space for diversity. National identity, hence, is not necessarily conceived in 
terms of uniformity: should further research identify a recent surge in appeals to 
national identity that would not automatically equate an increase in opposition to or 
unease with diversity.  
Ideas that are compatible with, support, or point to a multicultural conception of unity 
can thus be recognised in these debates: its political plausibility is not as improbable as 
it might appear at first glance. The previous chapter explained that a conception of 
unity that is politically plausible can be recognised as applicable and acceptable by the 
other participants to the political debate to which practical political theory contributes. 
It was noted there that the conceptions of unity these participants operate with can be 
classified roughly as political, national and multicultural. But while the former two 
were shown above to be inadequate models for unity in actual societies for a variety of 
reasons, the versions expressed in the frames cannot be so easily discarded. This is 
because, as the previous chapter explained, they tend to be linked to the existing 
identities and experiences of the participants to the debate that often shape how they 
understand the polity and their membership to it. A multicultural conception of unity 
is open to such different interpretations of unity and belonging so that it can plausibly 
motivate diverse citizens. In other words, a multicultural conception of unity can 
accommodate recognisable versions of the political and the national conception of 
unity – in ways that, as will become clear below, its alternatives do not.  
To understand how it can do so, recall that the previous chapter suggested that a plural 
conception of unity, such as the multicultural one proposed here, can be 
conceptualised in terms of overlapping and recurring similarities and differences and 
may use ambiguity as a strategy to garner widespread support, allowing some 
conceptual flexibility so different persons can present it in their own terms (cf. Freeden 
2005, pp. 122-130). Rather than imposing a strict contextual definition on the meaning 
of central concepts that shape or relate to unity, such as diversity, multiculturalism, 
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national identity and citizenship, a multicultural conception of unity allows citizens to 
demarcate and define these in their own terms so that they can interpret it as 
applicable and acceptable from their existing perspective, and for different reasons. To 
illustrate this idea, consider how a multicultural conception of unity captures an 
overlap between the three conceptions of unity while also representing the most 
elaborate or extensive articulation (Modood [2013, p. 166] makes this point in a similar 
way and this will be further discussed in the next section).  
These three conceptions of unity can be seen to overlap most clearly on a vague notion 
of equal citizenship that is captured in the political institutions, experiences and rights 
that citizens share, but interpret in different ways (note that equal citizenship is 
approached in the British frames mostly by reference to political values and 
institutions, and in the Dutch frames, which are somewhat more statist, equal 
citizenship is captured in references to the Rechtsstaat and the constitution). For the 
frames expressing a political conception of unity, the rights associated with equal 
citizenship embody the shared political beliefs that unite citizens. The frames 
expressing national and multicultural conceptions of unity also acknowledge the 
importance of equal citizenship for unity, while interpreting it in slightly different 
ways. Effectively, they consider formal equal citizenship to be only part of what 
enables unity: they offer more capacious understandings of what unites citizens. The 
frames expressing national conceptions of unity interpret liberal democracy and 
citizenship as national historical traditions that are embedded in a wider web of 
national customs, practices, beliefs and values; they interpret citizenship in a national 
way and identify additional features that are considered important to unite citizens. 
The frames expressing multicultural conceptions of unity accept that citizenship rights 
are inclusive and may unite diverse citizens, but hold that they can only do so if 
accompanied by multicultural policies that recognise differences in society so as to 
make equal membership real. Meanwhile, they may also appeal to the national 
characteristics emphasised in national conceptions of unity, while interpreting these in 
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more plural terms.68 Hence, they can be seen to add further ingredients to the overall 
mix of features that can motivate and unite citizens as it now includes certain features 
of minorities.  
While the multicultural conception of unity captures political, national and 
multicultural attributes of unity, it does not require citizens to identify with all these 
dimensions – it does not require all citizens to have a multiculturalist view of what 
society is and their place in it. Unlike the other two conceptions of unity that expect all 
citizens to think of their place in society in pre-determined (political or national) terms, 
it leaves these terms open. For if it did require all citizens to adopt a multiculturalist 
perspective on society, it would likely end up motivating and uniting only those 
citizens who already have affinities with this particular way of thinking about unity 
and alienating others: it would conceptualise the unity of only part of society, which 
would make it self-defeating as it would then represent division rather than unity. The 
point is rather that it captures the above overlap, which means that it is open to 
different views of society and membership: it is compatible with different conceptions 
of unity in different ways and offers the widest range of possibilities for citizens to be 
motivated and united by different but overlapping features.  
That said, it cannot be open to all the ways in which citizens may conceive of unity: it 
accommodates versions of other conceptions of unity that signify elements present in 
the multicultural conception of unity in particular ways. That means these versions do 
have to fall within this conception that, albeit capacious, is not unlimited: it cannot 
accommodate, for example, a hypothetical nationalist-racist conception of unity that 
excludes minorities from belonging and restricts unity to white people. Here, it is 
important to recall that the multicultural conception of unity is most defensible first, 
but can also be shown to be politically plausible, even in a context where such 
plausibility might be questioned. That is, while it is plural in form to accommodate 
                                                     
68 This overlap recalls Laborde’s (2002, p. 598) conception of national identity as a multi-layered 
phenomenon. National identity, for her, comprises four layers that explain what binds people 
together: ethnic links; a community’s broad culture and ways of life; political culture; and 
abstract general principles as laid down in the Constitution. She argues that the second and 
third layers are most significant for unity, and that states should focus on the third and fourth 
layer.   
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pluralism, its content is not simply conditioned by existing ideas. While it may not 
appear acceptable to hypothetical citizens with such nationalist-racist conceptions of 
unity now, these ideas can be challenged (using some of the arguments outlined in this 
chapter) and changed over time and versions of the national conception of unity can be 
accommodated so they may come to see it as acceptable.  
The multicultural conception of unity, then, is not only most defensible but also 
politically plausible in the context of the UK and the Netherlands. It responds to the 
plurality of existing ideas about unity here and allows people to give meaning and 
content to their membership in their own, rather than pre-specified terms, so that it 
means different things to the people who share it in different ways. Now, one might 
perhaps argue that while the pluralism illustrated above allows a multicultural 
conception of unity to plausibly respond to different existing conceptions of unity, 
such pluralism itself is implausible. But that argument ignores how pluralism has in 
fact long been a feature of thinking about unity both in the UK and the Netherlands: in 
the UK, the existence of different nations (English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish) meant 
that British citizenship was always open to plural ways of being British (Modood 2013, 
p. 117); and in the Netherlands, national membership was mediated by the existence of 
different pillars in society, so that here too citizenship was open to plural 
interpretations (cf. Van Sas 2004, pp. 523-534). 
The emphasis on pluralism in this section follows from a concern with political 
plausibility and developed in response to the case studies, as the previous chapter 
explained. That means it does not stem directly from the analysis of multicultural 
conceptions of unity advocated by political theorists (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000b) in 
chapter 3. Nonetheless, as the next section will show, it is compatible with the work of 
these multiculturalists while nuancing it slightly.  
7.4 Pluralism and the multicultural conception of unity  
The pluralism intended above differs slightly from the cultural pluralism or diversity 
that is often central to multiculturalist arguments. It does not concern membership in 
cultural groups but pertains to how citizens have different ideas about the society they 
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belong to and their place in it. Multiculturalism can be open to such pluralism as well 
as cultural diversity, but its advocates have only dedicated limited attention to the 
former. This section will show that such pluralism is nonetheless already implicitly 
inherent in the positions of the two most prominent advocates of the multicultural 
conception of unity, Parekh and Modood, so that the previous section can be seen to 
make it explicit and thereby provide a nuance in emphasis to their work. Effectively, 
this concern for pluralism further extends a ‘basic rationale for multiculturalism’, 
namely that of ‘allowing people to be what they already are, showing respect for them 
as they are in themselves, rather than regarding them as objects of transformative 
criticism’ (Modood 2013, p. 155). As this pluralism has remained somewhat implicit, 
these scholars may not have anticipated objections to it yet, and the section will 
conclude by showing that while these may arise, they can be refuted.  
Parekh’s (2000b, pp. 50-79) work pays due attention to pluralism, but it is mostly 
conceived in terms of cultural and moral diversity, rather than in the sense intended 
here. The idea of different modes of belonging to the polity does not receive much 
attention. That said, Parekh (2000b, p. 148) does emphasise how cultures are internally 
diverse and even notes how  
‘belonging to a cultural community, then, admits of much variation and is not 
homogeneous in nature. Some members might share all its beliefs and others only 
a few, and the former might differ in their interpretation of or degrees of 
allegiance to these’.  
Yet this line of thought is not explicitly extended to the political community, even as 
Parekh (2000b, p. 184) seems aware of its relevance given his view that the modern 
state too readily expects citizens to ‘subscribe to an identical way of defining 
themselves and relating to each other and the state’. This implies he would prefer to 
see a political structure more open to different modes of belonging but he seems to 
equate these with cultural diversity. That is, he seems to implicitly assume that 
different modes of belonging neatly coincide with different group memberships. Thus, 
he (Parekh 2000b, p. 195, emphasis added) notes that modern states are less suitable for 
multicultural societies ‘whose constituent communities entertain different views on its 
  
 
202 
 
nature’. This suggests, for example, that within the UK all Pakistani Muslims share a 
conception of how they belong to the polity; all Jamaicans share a different conception 
of their membership to the polity; all Scots share a different mode of belonging to the 
polity again; and so on.   
But the case studies challenge such a seamless overlap between pluralism, as intended 
here, and cultural diversity. The participants to the parliamentary debates analysed 
were not representing cultural groups when they advanced different conceptions of 
unity, and often belonged to the same group. That suggests that we cannot assume that 
members of the same cultural group all share a specific way of relating to society and 
the state. Plural modes of belonging cannot be assumed to arise out of or be 
conditioned by cultural membership: pluralism cross-cuts rather than maps onto 
cultural diversity, and would probably exist even if societies were not multicultural.  
The notion of pluralism, as intended here, is not developed much further in Parekh’s 
work, although it is hinted at. For example, when he discusses national identity he 
(Parekh 2000b, p. 231, emphasis added) emphasises how it ‘unites its members around 
a common self-understanding and gives focus and energy to their sense of common 
belonging’ by articulating a ‘collective self-image’, and he does so without mentioning 
pluralism. But he does recognise how national identity ‘is highly complex, 
multilayered, composed of different and sometimes conflicting strands of thought’ so 
that it is ‘amenable to different interpretations’ (Parekh 2008, p. 60), and notes that 
people interpret their citizenship in different ways (Parekh 2008, p. 19). Pluralism can 
be seen to be inherent in Parekh’s position even if it is not elaborated and distinguished 
sufficiently from cultural diversity. Yet while it is doubtlessly important that a national 
identity is inclusive of different cultural groups in society, as Parekh (2000b, pp. 230-
236) rightly emphasises, it also needs to be able to motivate and unite liberals, 
communitarians, nationalists, multiculturalists and so on, who have their own views of 
what society is and how they belong to it. And again, we cannot simply assume that 
such distinctions directly map onto cultural diversity. But obviously, this point extends 
or nuances rather than undercuts Parekh’s position.  
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Modood also sometimes seems to equate pluralism, as intended here, with cultural 
diversity. Thus, Modood and Dobbernack (2011, p. 55) point out how multiculturalism 
needs to enable respectful interaction between ‘two modes of “difference”’, as non-
white Britons might conceive of themselves and their place in society in different ways 
that can roughly be divided into ‘the fluidly hybridic and the communally conserving’, 
where the first emphasises cultural exchange and mixing, and the second rootedness. 
But these different modes of difference cannot be assumed to be restricted to minorities 
and nor can they be assumed to coincide with these groups: majority citizens may 
equally evaluate difference in alternative ways, with some more open to interaction 
and transformation and others more predisposed to stability and conformity; and 
members of the same minority group may conceive their membership to the polity in 
different ways.  
At other times, however, Modood (2007, p. 126) does recognise how unity itself is 
plural: when he discusses citizenship he emphasises it is plural as it is shaped by the 
existing (group) identities citizens have and stresses how ‘each part of the plurality has 
a right to be a part of the whole and to speak up for itself and for its vision of the 
whole’. Different visions of unity, in other words, are accommodated in the 
overarching whole. While this idea does not receive much more attention here, in later 
work Modood (2013, pp. 160-168) does develop it a little further through a discussion 
of pluralist integration that is somewhat reminiscent of the discussion in the previous 
section – but again, notably, is restricted to minorities.  
There, Modood (2013, p. 165) emphasises how national self-conceptions need to be 
inclusive of minorities, but also how different ‘modes of integration’ that pursue 
different visions of the whole can be seen as attractive in different ways and as 
complementary. Indeed, similar to what was suggested above, Modood (2013, p. 165) 
thinks they can be seen as additive: ‘each successive position attempts to include what 
is thought to be missing from its predecessor’. Again, recalling what was suggested 
above, he (Modood 2013, p. 166) thinks ‘perhaps the ultimate meaning of 
multiculturalism is not as one mode of integration but as the perspective which allows 
all four modes of integration their due’. This is important because no one model is 
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likely to capture all minorities and to ‘have a reasonable chance of integrating the 
maximum number of members of minorities, none of the political responses [to 
diversity] should be dismissed’ (Modood 2013, p. 166, emphasis added). And this is 
because the value of these different approaches to equal citizenship ‘can only be 
realized if it is not imposed but is the preferred choice of minority individuals and 
groups’ (Modood 2013, p. 166, emphasis added) who inevitably make different choices. 
This recalls the discussion above: unity needs to be plural to motivate and unite all 
citizens, who come with their existing identities. However, it is not clear that this 
insight only applies to minority citizens: all citizens may have different ideas about 
how they belong to the polity, and these ideas may not automatically map onto their 
cultural membership.  
Insights that point in the direction of a concern for pluralism, as developed in the 
previous chapter and the previous section, then, can already be recognised in the work 
of Parekh (2000b, 2008) and Modood (2007, 2013). But pluralism only receives marginal 
amounts of attention and is often conceived as applying only to minorities. This thesis 
suggests a nuance in their positions that effectively extends further a sensitivity to 
pluralism, to capture how not only minority but also majority citizens (and political 
elites) can belong to the polity in different ways. As these scholars have only paid 
limited attention to such pluralism, they also have not dedicated much time refuting 
potential objections to it and the remainder of this section will now show that while a 
concern for pluralism leaves the multicultural conception of unity somewhat more 
indeterminate and this may be seen to have both internal and external consequences, 
these objections can be rebutted.  
This increased sensitivity to how all citizens belong to the polity in their own way 
further highlights how, as noted before, the multicultural conception of unity sees the 
whole that is united as plural and somewhat indeterminate, better captured in terms of 
family resemblance (Modood 2007, pp. 95-98, 115; see also: Miller 1995, p. 27) than in 
‘essentialist-perfectionist Platonic’ (Modood 2007, p. 111) terms. This does not 
contradict the possibility of unity because family members can recognise each other as 
belonging to the same family without being exactly the same: mutual identification 
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does not rest upon both parties being identical (Turner et al 1994, pp. 455-456). But one 
might think that increased indeterminacy could further reduce the overlapping 
similarities between citizens so that such mutual recognition and identification is no 
longer possible. By avoiding an exact specification of how citizens belong, this form of 
unity could be said to leave too much open to the individual, so that their 
interpretations of what is shared can be so different they may no longer be 
recognisably referring to the same thing. And it may be ‘difficult to be attached to 
something that is unclear’ (Uberoi and Modood 2013b, p. 28). Such an unspecific 
conception of unity, therefore, might be too insubstantial to provide a plausible 
account of unity among citizens.  
However, even if it lacks determinate character, the multicultural unity discussed 
above does have a recognisable shape. The different conceptions of unity that it 
accommodates are based in shared civic experiences: they are shaped within a shared 
way of life and connected to a shared set of legal citizenship provisions, so that they 
will inevitably overlap (cf. Modood 2007, p. 128; see also: Miller 1995, pp. 42-46, 68-69). 
Any country has a public culture that includes political institutions, social norms and 
expectations, a language, etc. that is known to all, even if it is contested and evaluated 
in different ways (Miller 1995, pp. 25-27, 41; Parekh 2000b, pp. 268-270). That is not to 
deny that such a shared way of life and public culture are internally diverse and that 
citizens may share them and take part in them in different ways. The point is that these 
citizens conduct their lives within roughly shared parameters.  
Indeed, for example, the Netherlands knows a tradition of a strong, somewhat 
paternalistic Rechtsstaat; is characterised by Dutch as its official language69 that is also 
the medium of Dutch film, music and media; and also by the vast numbers of bicycles 
in the street. Likewise, in the UK, shared ways of life are conducted within the 
framework of the Constitutional monarchy and find expression through popular 
media that is largely English-spoken; and stereotypical street views include double-
decker buses and red telephone boxes. Conceptions of unity are developed within this 
public culture it and refer to it, even if they seek to transgress it, so that there is some 
                                                     
69 In the province of Friesland, the Frisian language is recognised as a second official language.  
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limit to the forms they will take and these forms will overlap (Miller 1995, pp. 42-46, 
68-69). As Miller (1995, p. 69) notes, it is precisely because this shared culture is a 
public phenomenon that it can be interpreted in better and worse ways, which limits 
credible interpretations (which, again, is not to deny that this common culture is plural 
and diverse [Parekh 2000b, pp. 219-224]). The plural nature of multicultural unity 
hence does not leave it completely open-ended.  
Certainly, this presupposes that unity in some sense already exists: citizens already 
belong to a country with institutions, shared ways of life, opportunities for civic 
interaction, and so on. This is the case in most societies, and also in the UK and the 
Netherlands. Whether such unity originally arose out of national identities that 
predated the state or whether it is simply an effect of the existence of states or a variety 
of other factors is difficult to tell (cf. Anderson 2010; Gellner 2010; Parekh 2008, p. 47). 
This thesis was interested in how to unite diverse citizens in these actual societies, so 
that the question of the origin or initial creation of unity is less relevant: what matters 
is understanding how to conceptualise these existing ties and how to ensure that they 
extend to all of society so that all citizens are united.  
The inevitable vagueness of the united whole in this conception of unity, furthermore, 
might lead some to object that it fails to be externally distinctive: it fails to explain why 
it would unite this body of citizens and not that body of citizens. Again, the shared 
ways of life that colour the different conceptions of unity help to make it externally 
distinctive. But even if the features themselves are not distinctive – indeed, equal 
citizenship is not typically British or Dutch but characterises many different states – 
their concrete manifestation and substantive interpretation may be (Uberoi and 
Modood 2013b, p. 30). What is distinctive tends to be determined in interaction (cf. 
Stets and Burke 2000, pp. 229-231): people become aware of their differences and of 
which ones are significant and which ones are not only through engaging in interaction 
and tapping into shared patterns of meaning that make sense of them. That is, even if 
objectively speaking two groups of citizens are not very easily distinguished, they may 
still experience distinctiveness. What matters is not so much whether the boundaries of 
unity are obvious, but whether they are experienced as such, so that they may be 
  
 
207 
 
meaningful to and unite citizens (Parekh 2008, pp. 61-65; Uberoi and Modood 2013b, 
pp. 29-30).  
The plural quality of the multicultural conception of unity, then, may induce further 
indeterminacy but that does not stop it from providing a credible account of unity 
among diverse citizens that is most defensible and politically plausible, as it motivates 
them from within by leaving them to conceptualise society and their place in it in their 
own terms and for their own reasons.  
7.5 Concluding summary 
This thesis has analysed how political theorists and British and Dutch political elites 
conceive unity, and concluded by arguing that the multicultural conception of unity is 
most defensible and politically plausible in these two countries. This final section will 
briefly recap how the thesis has developed its argument and how it has made the three 
contributions that it set out to make.  
Chapter 1 noted how political theorists think unity is important but neglect to specify 
what they mean by it. It also noted that these political theorists often aim to be of 
practical use and guide political action, but largely neglect to examine the ideas of the 
political elites they intend to influence. The remainder of this thesis has responded to 
these two gaps by making three contributions.  
First, chapter 2 explained what practical political theory is and why practical political 
theorists might benefit from studying existing ideas. That is because they offer 
clarifications about unity and suggestions as to how to foster it that are intended to 
shape the ideas of political elites and guide their actions: their proposals are not only 
morally defensible but also applicable, acceptable and therefore politically plausible 
within the context they address. The latter presupposes knowing how unity and 
related issues are already conceived, so that studying ideas helps to enhance and 
demonstrate the political plausibility of practical political theory. This chapter also 
offered a method for studying such ideas.  
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Second, chapters 3 to 5 clarify how unity is conceived by political theorists and political 
elites. Chapter 3 first outlines a perspective on unity that approaches it as an attribute 
of something that is united and asks four questions to reconstruct how political 
orientations imply visions of the ideally united society: what is the whole that is 
united; who belongs to this whole; how do they belong to it; and how is such unity 
impeded and fostered? This perspective proved helpful to distinguish between four 
different conceptions of unity advanced by political theorists that were subsequently 
analysed in terms of their internal logic. Moreover, it also helped to discern the 
conceptions of unity that underpin the different perspectives expressed by British 
(chapter 4) and Dutch (chapter 5) political elites in the parliamentary debates analysed. 
Chapter 6 showed that these perspectives can be read as versions of three broad 
patterns of thought about unity (political, national and multicultural) that political 
theorists who aim to be ‘practical’ respond to, and argued that the case studies imply 
that such a response needs to heed pluralism.  
Third, this final chapter has concluded the thesis by arguing for the multicultural 
conception of unity proposed by certain political theorists. It has shown that this 
conception of unity is most defensible, as it avoids the problems associated with the 
political and national conceptions of unity without creating new ones. It has also 
shown that this conception is politically plausible within the context of the UK and the 
Netherlands as it is compatible with existing ideas about unity for it accommodates the 
three broad patterns of thought about unity discerned here by being open to plural 
interpretations. Paradoxically then, while multiculturalism is often rejected in these 
societies, the multicultural conception of unity is nonetheless most suitable to 
conceptualise unity here.  
By providing a clearer view of how unity is conceived in different ways by political 
elites in these countries this thesis may contribute to more fruitful political dialogue 
between them. It also indicates how unity should be conceived by these elites, and 
suggests that this is already compatible with their ideas. But it has not suggested 
strategies to foster such unity in practice, and further work is necessary to clarify what 
mechanisms would facilitate such multicultural unity in the UK and the Netherlands. 
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Political theorists, political elites, public intellectuals, activists, concerned citizens, and 
so on, who are interested in thinking about such strategies to foster unity benefit from 
a clear view of what is being aimed for and this thesis has thus provided a necessary 
first step by specifying how unity should be conceived.   
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Appendix 1: list of sensitising questions for frame analysis 
• How is multiculturalism understood? 
• How is national identity understood? 
• How are multiculturalism and national identity related? 
• How is the state positioned in relation to multiculturalism and national 
identity?  
• References made to concepts, actors, documents, events, etc. (topoi) 
• Form of discourse (e.g. argument, persuasion techniques, metaphors) 
• What is the problem and why, and what are the causes? 
• Who is responsible for the problem and who is the victim? 
• Normative principles and legitimisation strategies 
• What is the preferred solution to the problem and why? 
• How are goals prioritised, and how can they best be achieved? Who plays what 
role? 
• Calls for action or non-action; who is addressed? 
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Appendix 2: keywords  
Combinations used to select British debates: 
• Multiculturalism national identity  
• Multiculturalism Britishness 
• Integration national identity 
• Integration Britishness 
• Cohesion national identity  
• Cohesion Britishness  
Combinations used to select Dutch debates:  
• integratie allochto* nationale identiteit;  
• multicultur* nationale identiteit;  
• nationale identiteit inburgering;  
• sociale cohesie etnische minderheden; 
• sociale cohesie allochto* identiteit; 
• sociale cohesie inburgering identiteit;  
• burgerschap multicult* identiteit 
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Appendix 3: data sample 
Case study I: the UK. 
• 02-02-2006 House of Lords: British Identity and Citizenship 
• 07-06-2007 House of Lords: Multi-cultural Britain 
• 19-07-2001 House of Lords: Multi-ethnic Britain 
• 19-06-2008 House of Lords: Britishness 
• 20-03-2002 House of Lords: Multi-ethnicity and Multi-culturalism 
• 28-02-2008 House of Lords: Families, community cohesion and social action 
• 28-11-2005 House of Lords: Community relations 
Case study II: the Netherlands.  
• Behandeling van de brief van de minister-president over waarden en 
normen(28600, nr. 42); 18-12-2002, TK35. 
• Behandeling van het eindrapport “Bruggen bouwen” van de tijdelijke 
commissie Onderzoek integratiebeleid (28689); 06-04-2004, TK63. 
• Debat met de regering over het eindrapport “Bruggen bouwen” van de 
tijdelijke commissie Onderzoek integratiebeleid (28689); 31-08-2004, TK92.   
• Voortzetting debat met de regering over het eindrapport “Bruggen bouwen” 
van de tijdelijke commissie Onderzoek integratiebeleid (1) (28689); 02-09-2004, 
TK94. 
• Voortzetting debat met de regering over het eindrapport “Bruggen bouwen” 
van de tijdelijke commissie Onderzoek integratiebeleid (2) (28689); 02-09-2004, 
TK94. 
• Debat over waarden en normen (29454); 14-04-2005, TK73. 
• Voortzetting debat over waarden en normen (29454); 14-04-2004, TK73.  
• Debat over de oprichting van een museum voor de Nederlandse geschiedenis; 
27-06-2006, TK95.  
• Behandeling van wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap tot beperking van meervoudige nationaliteit en tot invoering 
van het verlies van het Nederlanderschap wegens het toebrengen van ernstige 
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schade aan de essentiele belangen van het Koninkrijk of van een of meer van 
zijn landen (30166, R1795); 04-19-2006, TK8. 
• Behandeling van wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap ter invoering van een verklaring van verbondenheid, en tot 
aanpassing van de regeling van de verkrijging van het Nederlanderschap na 
erkenning (30584, R1811); 30-01-2008, TK47. 
• Debat over de verklaring van de minister-president, de minister van Algemene 
Zaken, over de internetfilm Fitna; 01-04-2008, TK70. 
• Behandeling van wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap met betrekking tot meervoudige nationaliteit en andere 
nationaliteitsrechtelijke kwesties (31813, R1873); 14-01-2010, TK42.  
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Appendix 4: glossary of Dutch concepts  
A brief list of concepts that are often used in the Dutch context:  
• Allochtoon: person with (at least) one parent (sometimes grandparent) of 
foreign origin. 
• Autochtoon: ‘native’ Dutch (antonym of allochtoon).  
• Rechtsstaat: Dutch term to denote liberal democracy and the rule of law, 
embraces such concepts as rights, the constitution, jurisprudence, and justice.  
• Pillarisation: a Dutch tradition originating in the 19th century that effectively 
divided society in several pillars organised around a religious or social identity. 
The four pillars (Socialist, Liberal/Secular, Catholic, and Protestant) had their 
own schools, hospital, sports clubs, broadcast channels, etc. so that group 
members would not have to interact. The elites of these pillars joined together 
in a consensual government; the pillars were held together by a shared and 
overarching structure.  
• Depillarised society: from the 1960s onwards, the old ‘pillars’ decreased in 
social importance and society became more individualist.  
• Sovereignty in the own circle (also: emancipation from within the own circle): 
the philosophy behind pillarisation, emphasising group autonomy and the idea 
that groups should be able to live (and raise and treat their group members) in 
accordance with their distinctive worldview, without state interference. 
Members of these pillars were expected to live their lives following the 
worldview of their pillar.  
• Integration with retention of identity: the slogan of the Ethnic Minorities Policy. 
Denotes the idea that immigrants can become part of society (i.e. integrate) by 
cultivating and retaining their cultural identity and community.  
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